Sentiments of Arminius
Editorial note: In the section on assurance of salvation (paragraph 262), “God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things” is from 1 John 3:20; the following discussion of self-judgment and the Lord as judge spans 1 Corinthians 4:3–4. The collection cites 1 John 3:19 and only 1 Corinthians 4:3. Those inherited references are preserved in the original transcription and corrected in the modern companion. 1 John 3:20; 1 Corinthians 4:3–4.
Editorial note: In the discussion of ambiguous confessional language (paragraph 288), the collection refers to the “Fourteenth article” for the statement about God’s ordination. Providence is the subject of Article 13 of the Belgic Confession; Article 14 concerns the creation and fall of humanity. The original reading is preserved, and the modern companion corrects the article number to 13. Belgic Confession, Articles 13 and 14.
Editorial note: The final objection in the first series (paragraph 168) begins “10. Lastly” in the collection, ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 206, after objection 19. This is the twentieth objection. The original misnumbering is preserved, and the modern companion numbers it 20. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 66: the collection reads “by his meet deserve” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 183); “by his merit deserve” is a likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 99: the collection reads “these expression soccur” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 190); “these expressions occur” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 99: the collection reads “and cording to his gratuitous goodness” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 190); “and according to his gratuitous goodness” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 111: the collection reads “These three circumstance” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 192); “These three circumstances” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 116: the collection reads “it had seen good for that man” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 194); “it had been good for that man” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 185: the collection reads “those persons by whom he had foreknown” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 209); the word “by” appears spurious, but the sentence requires collation before an archival correction. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 190: the collection reads “predamnatian” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 209); “predamnation” is the likely spelling. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 212: the collection reads “had not seen intended by God” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 213); “had not been intended by God” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 253: the collection reads “whosoever believers in him” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 218); “whosoever believeth in him” is the likely historical quotation. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 264: the collection reads “whose words have frequently quoted” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 221); the sentence appears to lack a subject, likely “I” before “have”. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 266: the collection reads “his own proffer strength” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 222); “his own proper strength” is a possible reading, requiring collation. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 273: the collection reads “1 shall” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 225); “I shall” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 273: the collection reads “are evidently contradictor” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 225); “are evidently contradictory” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 273: the collection reads “said to have his essence from that form of speech signifies” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 226); the clause is broken after “from.” The missing wording and punctuation have not been established by collation. The modern companion’s “from himself” is a contextual reconstruction, not a verified reading of this defective sentence. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 315: the collection reads “in patience willlpossess my soul” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 237); “in patience will I possess my soul” is the likely reading. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Textual defect in paragraph 315: the collection reads “Sat Ecclesæ, sat Patriæ daturm” (ARM_VOL1.PDF, physical page 237); the Latin is corrupt. The modern companion’s “Sat Ecclesiae, sat Patriae datum” is an unverified reconstruction requiring collation, not an established source reading or an archival emendation. The linked parallel transcription also contains defective Latin and does not verify this reconstruction. The inherited wording is preserved in the original transcription. Declaration of Sentiments, parallel transcription (for comparison).
Editorial note: Historical qualification to paragraph 93 (ARM_VOL1.PDF, PDF page 188): the account of the second Council of Constantinople names Peter of Antioch and Anthymus and attributes a condemnation concerning the Father’s suffering to it. The surviving sentence of the council of 553 instead identifies the Three Chapters: Theodore of Mopsuestia and his writings, specified writings of Theodoret, and the letter attributed to Ibas. The account here does not accurately identify that sentence. Its intended earlier synod or source has not been established, so the inherited wording is preserved rather than replaced with a conjectural identification. Second Council of Constantinople (553), sentence.
Editorial note: Chronological qualification to paragraphs 92–93: the third Council of Constantinople met in 680–681, beyond the preceding statement’s “first six hundred years after Christ.” Its inclusion extends the list beyond the period stated. This dating correction does not by itself decide Arminius’s argument about predestination. Third Council of Constantinople (680–681), acts.
In this 1608 address to the States of Holland, James Arminius explains why he declined earlier requests to declare his views and then sets out his theological positions. He criticizes three accounts of predestination, arguing that they undermine God’s justice and goodness, human responsibility, or the place of Christ in salvation. His own account begins with God’s appointment of Christ as Mediator and Savior and relates salvation to repentance, faith, and perseverance through grace. He also discusses providence, human inability apart from grace, assurance, justification, and the divinity of the Son. He does not present either the final loss of faith or sinless perfection as a settled conclusion. Arminius closes by defending the examination of confessions and catechisms under the authority of Scripture and asking for a careful hearing of his views.
AI-assisted adaptation (Astra 6). This is a modern paraphrase, including paraphrased Bible quotations. Compare it with the historical text and linked KJV passages.
Full AI comparison completed on 2026-10-20; version 6e9540eb64a7. A completed comparison covers every paragraph, summary and study guide. No independent human scholarly review has been recorded. Study questions and prayers are modern editorial additions.
How these editions are prepared and reviewedA DECLARATION
A DECLARATION
OF THE
OF THE
SENTIMENTS OF ARMINIUS
SENTIMENTS OF ARMINIUS
ON
ON
Predestination, Divine Providence, the freedom of the will, the grace of God, the Divinity of the Son of God, and the justification of man before God.
Predestination, Divine Providence, freedom of the will, the grace of God, the divinity of the Son of God, and the justification of humanity before God.
Delivered before the states of Holland, at the Hague, on the thirtieth of October, 1608. The circumstances which led to it, are briefly related by Arminius in his introductory remarks. It was originally pronounced in Dutch, and was afterwards translated into Latin, but not by Arminius, as is evident from the style.
Delivered before the States of Holland at The Hague on October 30, 1608. The circumstances that led to this address are briefly recounted by Arminius in his introductory remarks. It was originally delivered in Dutch and later translated into Latin—though not by Arminius himself, as is clear from the style.
To the noble and most potent the states of Holland and West Friezland, my Supreme Governor, my most noble, potent, wise and prudent Lords: After the conference which, by the command of your mightinesses, was convened here at the Hague, between Gomarus and myself, had been held in the presence of four ministers and under the superintendence of their Lordships the Counselors of the Supreme Court, the result of that meeting was reported to your highnesses. Some allusion having been made in that report to the nature and importance of the controversy between us, it soon afterward, seemed good to your highnesses to cite each of us, with those four ministers, to appear openly before you in your honorable assembly, and in that public manner to intimate to all of us whatever you then judged to be expedient. After we had appeared before Your mightinesses, Gomarus affirmed, “that the controversy between him and me, was of such immense importance, that, with the opinions which I professed, he durst not appear in the presence of his maker.” He likewise asserted, “that, unless some mode of prevention were promptly devised, the consequence would be, that the various provinces, churches, and cities of our native land, and even the citizens themselves, would be placed in a state of mutual enmity and variance, and would rise up in arms against each other.” To all those allegations I then made no reply, except “that I certainly was not conscious of entertaining any such atrocious sentiments in religion, as those of which he had spoken; and I confidently expressed a hope, that I should never afford either cause or occasion for schism and separation, in the Church of God or in our common country.” In confirmation of which, I added, “that I was prepared to make an open and bona fide declaration of all my sentiments, views, and designs on every subject connected with religion, whenever I might receive a summons to appear before this august assembly, and even prior to my retiring at that time from your presence.” Your highnesses having since deliberated upon the proposal and offer which I then made, deem it proper now to summon me before you, for the purpose of redeeming, in this hall, the pledge which I had previously given. To fulfill that promise, I now appear in this place, and will with all due fidelity discharge my duty, whatever it be that is demanded of me in relation to this affair.
To the noble and most sovereign States of Holland and West Friesland, my supreme governors, most noble, mighty, wise, and prudent Lords: By your order, a conference was held here at The Hague between Professor Gomarus and me, in the presence of four ministers and overseen by their Lordships, the Counselors of the Supreme Court. After the report of that meeting was delivered to your Lordships, alluding to the nature and weight of our disagreement, you saw fit to summon both of us, along with the four ministers, to appear openly before your honorable assembly so you could convey whatever you judged best. When we stood before you, Gomarus asserted that the dispute between us was of such staggering magnitude that, holding the opinions I profess, he would not dare appear before God his Maker. He went on to claim that unless a remedy were quickly found, our provinces, churches, cities, and even ordinary citizens would be torn into hostile factions and take up arms against one another. To all these allegations I replied simply that I was completely unaware of holding any such dreadful religious views. I added that I firmly hoped I would never give cause or occasion for division either in God's church or in our common homeland. To prove my sincerity, I stated that I was ready to offer a full, open, and honest declaration of all my religious beliefs, convictions, and intentions whenever summoned before this august assembly—even before leaving your presence that day. Having considered my offer, your Lordships have now summoned me to fulfill that very pledge in this hall. In keeping with that promise, I stand before you today, ready to faithfully carry out my duty in whatever you require of me regarding this matter.
Yet since a sinister report, has for a long time been industriously and extensively circulated about me, not only among my own countrymen but also among foreigners, in which report, I am represented to have hitherto refused, after frequent solicitations, to make an open profession of my sentiments on the matter of religion and my designs concerning it; and since this unfounded rumor has already operated most injuriously against me, I importunately entreat to be favored with your gracious permission to make an ingenuous and open declaration of all the circumstances which relate to this business, before I proceed to the discussion of other topics.
Yet because harmful rumors have been busily spread far and wide about me for a long time—not only among my own countrymen but also abroad—claiming that despite repeated requests I have refused to openly state my religious convictions and intentions, and because these baseless rumors have caused me great injury, I earnestly ask your gracious permission to give a straightforward and candid account of this entire matter before addressing other topics.
1. Account of a Conference proposed to me, but which I refused. On the 30th of June, in the year 1605, three Deputies of the Synod of South Holland came to me at Leyden; they were Francis Lansbergius, Libertus Fraxinus, and Daniel Dolegius of pious memory, each of them the minister of their respective churches at Rotterdam, the Hague, and Delft. Two members of the Synod of North Holland accompanied them-John Bogardus, minister of the Church at Haerlem, and James Rolandus of the Church at Amsterdam. They told me, “they had heard, that at the regular meetings of certain of their classes, in the examination to which candidates for holy orders must submit prior to their admission into the Christian ministry, some of the students of the University of Leyden had returned such answers to the questions propounded to them as were of a novel description and contrary to the common and received doctrine of the Churches. Those novelties,” it was said, “the young men affirmed to have been instilled into them while under my tuition.” In such a situation of affairs, they desired me “to engage in a friendly conference with them, by which they might have it in their power to perceive if there were any truth in this charge, and that they might afterwards be the better qualified to consult the interests of the Church.” To these suggestions I replied, “that I could by no means approve of the mode of proceeding which they recommended: For such a course would inevitably subject me to frequent and almost incessant applications for a friendly interview and conversation, if any one thought it needful to pester me in that manner whenever a student made use of a new or uncommon answer, and in excuse pretended to have learned it from me. The following therefore appeared to me a plan of greater wisdom and prudence: As often as a student during his examination returned any answer, which, according to his affirmation, had been derived from my instructions, provided the brethren considered such answer to stand in opposition to the confession and catechism of the Belgic Churches, they should immediately confront that student with me; and, for the sake of investigating such an affair, I was ready to proceed at my own expense to any town, however distant, which it might please the brethren to appoint for that purpose. The obvious consequence of this method would be, that, after it had been resorted to a few times, it would cause it clearly and evidently to appear whether the student’s assertion were the truth or only a calumny.
1. Account of a Conference proposed to me, but which I refused. On June 30, 1605, three deputies from the Synod of South Holland came to visit me in Leiden: Francis Lansbergius, Libertus Fraxinus, and the late Daniel Dolegius, ministers of the churches in Rotterdam, The Hague, and Delft respectively. They were accompanied by two members of the Synod of North Holland: John Bogardus, minister at Haarlem, and James Rolandus, minister at Amsterdam. They told me they had heard that during the regular classis examinations of candidates for ministry, certain students from the University of Leiden had given novel answers contrary to the received doctrine of the churches. These young men had reportedly claimed they learned these new ideas under my teaching. Under these circumstances, the deputies asked me to enter into an informal, friendly conference with them so they could determine whether there was any truth to the charge and better serve the church. I replied that I could not agree to such an approach. If I consented, I would face endless demands for private conversations whenever any student gave an unfamiliar answer and excused himself by claiming he had learned it from me. I proposed what seemed a wiser and more prudent course: whenever an examination candidate gave an answer supposedly learned from me that the brethren felt contradicted the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism, they should confront that student with me face to face. To investigate the matter, I offered to travel at my own expense to whatever town they designated. This method would quickly make it obvious whether the student's claim was true or merely slander.
But when Francis Lansbergius, in the name of the rest of his brethren, continued to urge and solicit a conference I gave it as a further reason why I could not see the propriety of entering into a conference with them, that they appeared before me in the character of deputies, who had afterwards to render to the Synod an account of all their proceedings; and that I was not therefore at liberty to accede to their wishes, unless, not only with the knowledge and consent, but at the express command of others who were my superiors, and whom I was equally with them bound to obey. Besides, it would be connected with no small risk and danger to me, if, in the relation of the event of our conference which they might hereafter give to the Synod, I should leave that relation entirely to their faithfulness and discretion. They had likewise no cause for demanding any thing of this kind from me, who was quite unconscious of having propounded a single doctrine, either at Leyden or Amsterdam, that was contrary to the word of God or to the Confession and Catechism of the Churches in the Low Countries. For no such accusation had ever yet been brought against me by any person; and, I was confident, no attempt would be made to substantiate against me a charge of this description, if he who preferred such a charge were bound at the same time either to establish it by proofs, or, in failure of his proofs, to confess his uncharitable offense.”
Yet when Francis Lansbergius, speaking for his colleagues, continued to press for a conference, I gave another reason why I could not agree. They had approached me as official synodical deputies who would later have to give an account of their proceedings to the Synod. Therefore, I was not free to comply without the knowledge, consent, and explicit command of my superiors, whom I am bound to obey just as they are. Furthermore, it would put me at great risk if the report of our conference delivered to the Synod were left entirely to their faithfulness and discretion. Besides, they had no valid reason to demand this of me. To my knowledge, I had never advanced a single doctrine in either Leiden or Amsterdam that contradicted God's Word or the Confession and Catechism of the Low Countries. No one had ever formally brought such a charge against me, and I was confident no one would attempt to do so if the accuser were required either to prove the charge or publicly confess his uncharitable wrongdoing.
2. An offer on my part, of a conference with these Deputies, which they refused.
2. My own offer to meet with these deputies in a discussion, which they turned down.
I then told these five gentlemen, “that, notwithstanding all this, if they would consent to relinquish the title Deputies, and would each in his own private capacity enter into a conference with me, I was ready at that very moment to engage in it.” The conditions which I proposed to be mutually observed by us, were these:
I then told these five gentlemen that despite these concerns, if they would drop their official title of "deputies" and meet with me simply as private individuals, I was ready to begin a conference with them that very moment. I proposed the following terms for us to observe mutually:
(i.) That they should explain their opinions on every single article and then I would explain mine;
(i.) First, they would state their convictions on each theological point, and then I would state mine;
(ii.) They should adduce their proofs, and I would adduce mine; and (iii.) That they should at last attempt a refutation of my sentiments and reasons, and I would in return try to refute theirs.
(ii.) Second, they would present their scriptural and theological evidence, and I would present mine; and (iii.) third, they would try to refute my views and arguments, and I would in turn respond to theirs;
(iv.) If in this manner either party could afford complete satisfaction to the other, the result would be agreeable: but, if neither party could satisfy the other, then no mention of the subjects discussed in our private conference, or of its unfavorable termination, should be made in any place or company whatever, until the whole affair should be referred to a national Synod.”
(iv.) Finally, if either side convinced the other through this discussion, the matter would be happily resolved. If neither side convinced the other, however, nothing said in our private meeting—nor the fact that we remained in disagreement—would be publicized anywhere, until the entire matter could be brought before a national Synod.
But when to this proposition they had given a direct refusal, we should have separated from each other without further discourse, had I not requested “that they would offer a conference in the same manner to Gomarus, as well as to Trelcatius of pious memory, because it did not appear to me, that I had given them any cause for making such a demand upon me, rather than upon either of my two colleagues.” At the same time I enforced my concluding expressions with several arguments, which it would be too tedious now to repeat in the presence of your mightinesses. When I had finished, the deputies replied, “that they would comply with my request, and would wait on the two other professors of divinity and make them a similar offer:” and prior to their departure from Leyden, they called and assured me, that they had in this particular fulfilled their promise. This, then, is the first of the many requests that have been preferred to me. It was the cause of much conversation at the time when it occurred: For many persons spoke about it. Some of them related it imperfectly, and in a manner very different from what were the real circumstances of the whole transaction; while others suppressed many essential particulars, and studiously concealed the counter-proposal which I had tendered to the deputies and the strong reasons which I produced in its support.
When they flatly refused this proposal, we would have parted ways without further discussion had I not asked them to make the same offer to my colleagues, Professor Gomarus and the late Professor Trelcatius, since I saw no reason why they should demand this of me rather than my peers. I reinforced this with several arguments that would be tedious to repeat before your Lordships today. The deputies agreed to my request and promised to visit the other two theology professors with the same offer. Before leaving Leiden, they returned to assure me they had kept their word. This was the first of many such requests made to me. It sparked much discussion at the time: many spoke of it, but some gave inaccurate accounts that distorted what actually happened, while others suppressed essential details, hiding both the counter-proposal I had offered and the strong reasons I gave to support it.
3. Another application is made to me.
3. A further request was later brought to me.
A few days afterwards, that is, on the 28th of July in the same year, 1605, a request of a similar character was likewise presented to me, in the name of the Presbytery of the Church of Leyden: but on this condition, that if I approved of it, other persons, whom such a request equally concerned, should also be summoned before the same ecclesiastical tribunal: but if this offer did not receive my approbation, nothing further should be attempted. But when I had intimated, that I did not clearly perceive, how this request could possibly obtain approval from me, and when I had subjoined my reasons which were of the same description as those which I had employed on the preceding occasion, my answer was perfectly satisfactory to Bronchovius the Burgomaster [of Leyden] and Merula of pious memory, both of whom had come to me in the name of that Church of which they were the elders, and they determined to abandon all ulterior proceedings in that business.
A few days later, on July 28 of that same year, 1605, a similar request was made to me in the name of the consistory of the Church of Leiden. They proposed that if I agreed, others who were equally affected would also be called before this ecclesiastical body; but if I declined, the matter would be dropped. When I explained that I could not see how I could approve this request, giving the same reasons I had given on the previous occasion, my answer completely satisfied Burgomaster Bronchovius and the late Merula, both of whom had come as elders representing that church. They chose to drop all further proceedings.
4. The request of the Deputies of the Synod of South Holland to their Lordships, the ,visitors of the University, and the answer which they received.
4. The petition made by the Deputies of the Synod of South Holland to the Curators (the governing board) of the University, and the reply they were given.
On the ninth of November, in the same year, 1605, the deputies of the Synod of South Holland, Francis Lansbergius, Festus Hommius, and their associates, presented nine questions to their Lordships, the curators of the University of Leyden; these were accompanied with a petition, “that the Professors of Divinity might be commanded to answer them.” But the curators replied, “that they could on no account sanction by their consent the propounding of any questions to the Professors of Divinity; and if any one supposed that something was taught in the University contrary to truth and rectitude, that person had it in his power to refer the matter of his complaint to a national Synod, which, it was hoped, would, at the earliest opportunity be convened, when it would come regularly under the cognizance of that assembly, and receive the most ample discussion.” When this answer had been delivered, the deputies of the Synod did not hesitate earnestly to ask it as a particular favor, “that, by the kind permission of their Lordships, they might themselves propose those nine questions to the Professors of Divinity, and might, without troubling their Lordships, personally inform themselves what answer of his own accord, and without reluctance, each of those three Divines would return.” But, after all their pleading, they were unable to obtain the permission which they so strenuously desired. The whole of this unsuccessful negotiation was conducted in such a clandestine manner, and so carefully concealed from me, that I was totally ignorant even of the arrival of those reverend deputies in our city; yet soon after their departure, I became acquainted with their mission and its failure.
On November 9, 1605, the deputies of the Synod of South Holland—Francis Lansbergius, Festus Hommius, and their colleagues—presented nine questions to their Lordships, the Curators of the University of Leiden, along with a petition asking that the professors of theology be ordered to answer them. But the Curators replied that they could not permit any such questions to be put to the divinity professors. They added that if anyone believed something contrary to truth and sound doctrine was being taught at the university, he could bring his complaint before a national synod, which they hoped would soon be convened to properly examine and thoroughly debate the matter. After receiving this reply, the synodical deputies urgently pleaded for permission to pose those nine questions to the theology professors themselves, assuring the Curators that they would discover for themselves what answers each of the three professors would give voluntarily and without reluctance. Yet despite all their pleading, they were denied permission. This entire unsuccessful negotiation was conducted so secretly and kept so hidden from me that I had no idea these reverend deputies had even arrived in our city; only after their departure did I learn about their mission and its failure.
5. A fourth request of the same kind.
5. A fourth request of the very same kind.
After this, a whole year elapsed before I was again called to an account about such matters. But I must not omit to mention, that in the year 1607, a short time before the meeting of the Synod of South Holland at Delft, John Bernards, minister of the Church at Delft, Festus Hommius, minister of Leyden, and Dibbetius of Dort, were deputed by the Synod to come to me and inquire what progress I had made in the refutation of the Anabaptists. When I had given them a suitable reply concerning that affair, which was the cause of much conversation among us on both sides, and when they were just on the point of taking their leave, they begged “that I would not hesitate to reveal to them whatever views and designs I had formed on the subject of religion, for the purpose of their being communicated to the Synod, by the Deputies, for the satisfaction of the brethren.” But I refused to comply with their entreaties, “because the desired explanation could not be given either conveniently or to advantage; and I did not know any place in which it was possible to explain these matters with greater propriety, than in the national Synod; which, according to the resolution of their most noble and high mightinesses, the States General, was expected very shortly to assemble.” I promised “that I would use every exertion that I might be enabled in that assembly openly to profess the whole of my sentiments; and that I would employ none of that alleged concealment or dissimulation about any thing of which they might then complain.” I concluded by saying, “that if I were to make my profession before them as deputies of the Synod of South Holland, I could not commit to their fidelity the relation of what might transpire, because, in matters of this description, every one was the most competent interpreter of his own meaning.” After these mutual explanations, we parted from each other.
After that, a full year passed before I was questioned again. However, I must mention that in 1607, shortly before the Synod of South Holland met at Delft, John Bernards (minister at Delft), Festus Hommius (minister at Leiden), and Dibbetius (minister at Dordrecht) were sent by the synod to ask what progress I had made in refuting the Anabaptists. After I gave an appropriate reply, which led to considerable conversation between us, they were just about to take their leave when they pleaded with me to disclose to them all my views and plans regarding religion, so they could report them to the synod for the satisfaction of the brethren. But I declined their request, explaining that such an explanation could not be given properly or profitably under those circumstances. I knew of no better or more fitting venue to address these matters than the national synod, which, according to the resolution of the States General, was expected to convene very soon. I promised that I would do everything in my power to openly declare all my beliefs in that assembly, without any of the secrecy or evasion of which they complained. I concluded by saying that if I made a declaration before them as synod deputies, I could not rely on their reporting of it, since in such matters each person is the best interpreter of his own meaning. With these mutual explanations, we parted.
6. The same request is privately repeated to me, and my answer to it. In addition to these different applications, I was privately desired, by certain ministers, “not to view it as a hardship to communicate my views and intentions to their colleagues, the brethren assembled in Synod:” while others entreated me “to disclose my views to them, that they might have an opportunity of pondering and examining them by themselves, in the fear of the Lord,” and they gave me an assurance “that they would not divulge any portion of the desired communication” To the first of these two classes, I gave in common my usual answer, “that they had no reason for demanding such an account from me, rather than from others, but to one of these ministers, who was not among the last of the two kinds of applicants, I proposed a conference at three different times, concerning all the articles of our religion; in which we might consider and devise the best means that could possibly be adopted for establishing the truth on the most solid foundation, and for completely refuting every species of falsehood. It was also a part of my offer that such conference should be held in the presence of certain of the principal men of our country; but he did not accept of this condition. To the rest of the inquirers, I returned various answers; in some of which I plainly denied what they requested of me, and in others, I made some disclosures to the inquirers. My sole rule in making such a distinction, was, the more intimate or distant degree of acquaintance which I had with the parties. In the mean time it frequently happened, that, a short time after I had thus revealed any thing in confidence to an individual, it was slanderously related to others — how seriously soever he might have asserted in my presence, that what I had then imparted to him was, according to his judgment, agreeable to the truth, and although he had solemnly pledged his honor that he would on no account divulge it.
6. The same request is privately repeated to me, and my answer to it. In addition to these official requests, certain ministers privately urged me not to consider it a hardship to communicate my views and intentions to their colleagues assembled in synod. Others pleaded with me to share my views with them personally so they could examine them on their own in the fear of the Lord, assuring me they would not disclose a word of what I shared. To the first group, I gave my standard reply: they had no reason to demand such an account from me rather than from others. But to one minister from the first group, I offered on three separate occasions to hold a conference covering all the articles of our religion. My goal was to explore together the best ways to establish the truth on solid ground and refute every error. I also proposed that this conference be held in the presence of leading statesmen from our nation, but he refused the offer. To the rest who approached me, I gave various replies: some I refused outright, while with others I shared some of my thoughts, depending entirely on how well and intimately I knew each person. Yet it often happened that shortly after I shared something in confidence with an individual—even after he had solemnly declared that he agreed with my view and pledged on his honor never to reveal it—he would slanderously report it to others.
7. What occurred relative to the same subject in the Preparatory Convention.
7. What transpired regarding this same issue during the Preparatory Convention.
To these it is also necessary to add a report which has been spread abroad by means of letters, not only within these provinces, but far beyond their confines: it is, “that, in the preparatory convention which was held at the Hague, in the month of June, 1607, by a company of the brethren who were convened by a summons from their high mightinesses, the States General, after I had been asked in a manner the most friendly to consent to a disclosure, before the brethren then present, of my views on the subject of the Christian faith, I refused; and although they promised to endeavor, as far as it was possible, to give me satisfaction, I still declined to comply with their wishes.” But since I find by experience that this distorted version of the matter has procured for me not a few proofs of hatred and ill will from many persons who think that far more honorable deference ought to have been evinced by me towards that assembly, which was a convention of Divines from each of the United Provinces. I perceive a necessity is thus imposed upon me to commence at the very origin of this transaction, when I am about to relate the manner in which it occurred:
To all this, I must add a rumor that has been circulated through letters not only within these provinces but far beyond our borders. It claims that in the preparatory convention held at The Hague in June 1607—attended by ministers summoned by the States General—the brethren kindly asked me to share my views on the Christian faith, but I refused; and even though they promised to do everything possible to satisfy my concerns, I still declined to comply. Experience has shown me that this distorted story has stirred up much hatred and ill will against me from many who feel I should have shown far greater deference to that assembly of theologians from every United Province. I feel compelled, therefore, to trace this matter back to its very beginning and explain exactly what took place:
Before my departure from Leyden for the convention at the Hague which has just been mentioned, five articles were put into my hands, said to have been transmitted to some of the provinces, to have been perused by certain ministers and ecclesiastical assemblies, and considered by them as documents which embraced my sentiments on several points of religion. Those points of which they pretended to exhibit a correct delineation, were Predestination, the Fall of Adam, Free-will, Original Sin, and the Eternal Salvation of Infants. When I had read the whole of them, I thought that I plainly perceived, from the style in which they were written, who was the author of them; and as he was then present, (being one of the number summoned on that occasion,) I accosted him on this subject, and embraced that opportunity freely to intimate to him that I had good reasons for believing those articles to have been of his composition. He did not make any attempt to deny the correctness of this supposition, and replied, ,that they had not been distributed precisely as my articles, but as those on which the students at Leyden had held disputations.” In answer to this remark, I told him, “of one thing he must be very conscious, that, by the mere act of giving circulation to such a document, he could not avoid creating a grievous and immediate prejudice against my innocence, and that the same articles would soon be ascribed to me, as if they had been my composition: when, in reality,” as I then openly affirmed, “they had neither proceeded from me, nor accorded with my sentiments, and, as well as I could form a judgment they appeared to me to be at variance with the word of God.”
Before leaving Leiden for that convention at The Hague, someone placed into my hands five articles said to have been sent to various provinces, reviewed by certain ministers and church assemblies, and regarded as representing my views on several points of religion. These articles purported to describe my positions on Predestination, the Fall of Adam, Free Will, Original Sin, and the Eternal Salvation of Infants. When I read them, I thought I could clearly recognize the author from the style. Since he was present at the convention as one of the summoned delegates, I approached him directly, telling him frankly that I had good reason to believe he wrote them. He did not deny it, but replied that the articles were not being circulated as my personal views, but as topics that the students at Leiden had debated. I answered that he must surely realize that by circulating such a document, he was immediately creating a damaging prejudice against my innocence. People would soon attribute those articles to me as if I had written them, when in fact—as I openly declared—they never came from me, did not reflect my beliefs, and in my judgment contradicted the Word of God.
After he and I had thus discoursed together in the presence of only two other persons, I deemed it advisable to make some mention of this affair in the convention itself, at which certain persons attended who had read those very articles, and who had, according to their own confession, accounted them as mine. This plan I accordingly pursued; and just as the convention was on the point of being dissolved, and after the account of our proceedings had been signed, and some individuals had received instructions to give their high mightinesses the States General a statement of our transactions, I requested the brethren “not to consider it an inconvenience to remain a short time together, for I had something which I was desirous to communicate.” They assented to this proposal, and I told them “that I had received the five articles which I held in my hand and the tenor of which I briefly read to them; that I discovered they had been transmitted by a member of that convention, into different provinces; that I was positive concerning their distribution in Zealand and the diocese of Utrecht; and that they had been read by some ministers in their public meetings, and were considered to be documents which comprehended my sentiments.” Yet, notwithstanding, I protested to the whole of that assembly, with a good conscience, and as in the presence of God, “that those articles were not mine, and did not contain my sentiments.” Twice I repeated this solemn asseveration, and besought the brethren “not so readily to attach credit to reports that were circulated concerning me, nor so easily to listen to any thing that was represented as proceeding from me or that had been rumored abroad to my manifest injury.”
After discussing this with him in the presence of only two other witnesses, I decided it was best to bring the matter before the entire convention, since several delegates were present who had read those very articles and, by their own admission, had assumed they were mine. I followed through with this plan: just as the convention was adjourning, after our official report had been signed and delegates appointed to present our findings to the States General, I asked the brethren to stay a moment longer, as I had an important matter to share. They agreed, and I told them that I held in my hand five articles, the contents of which I briefly read to them. I explained that a member of our convention had sent them into different provinces—I knew for certain they were circulating in Zeeland and Utrecht—and that ministers were reading them in their meetings, assuming they represented my views. Then, with a clear conscience before God, I solemnly declared to the whole assembly that those articles were not mine and did not represent my beliefs. Twice I repeated this solemn declaration, pleading with the brethren not to be so quick to believe rumors about me, nor to accept reports claiming to represent my views that caused obvious damage to my reputation.
To these observations, a member of that convention answered, “that it would be well for me, on this account, to signify to the brethren what portion of those articles obtained my approbation, and what portion I disavowed, that they might thus have an opportunity of becoming acquainted in some degree with my sentiments.” Another member urged the same reasons; to which I replied, “that the convention had not been appointed to meet for such a purpose, that we had already been long enough detained together, and that their high mightinesses, the States General were now waiting for our determination,” in that manner, we separated from each other, no one attempting any longer to continue the conversation, neither did all the members of the convention express a joint concurrence in that request, nor employ any kind of persuasion with me to prove that such an explanation was in their judgment quite equitable. Besides, according to the most correct intelligence which I have since gained, some of those who were then present, declared afterwards, “that it was a part of the instructions which had been previously given to them, not to enter into any conference concerning doctrine; and that, if a discussion of that kind had arisen, they must have instantly retired from the convention.” These several circumstances therefore prove that I was very far from being “solicited by the whole assembly” to engage in the desired explanation.
In reply, one member suggested it would be helpful if I pointed out which parts of those articles I agreed with and which parts I rejected, so the brethren could gain some understanding of my sentiments. Another member urged the same thing. I replied that the convention had not been called for that purpose, that we had already been detained long enough, and that their High Mightinesses, the States General, were waiting for our report. With that, we adjourned. No one pursued the conversation further; the convention as a body never joined in that request, nor did they try to convince me that such an explanation was fair or necessary. Furthermore, as I have since learned on good authority, several who were present later stated that their instructions explicitly forbade entering into doctrinal debates, and that had such a discussion begun, they would have had to withdraw immediately. All these facts clearly prove that I was never solicited by the entire assembly to engage in the desired explanation.
8. My reasons for refusing a Conference.
8. My reasons for declining a formal conference with the deputies.
Most noble and potent Lords, this is a true narration of those interviews and conferences which the brethren have solicited, and of my continued refusal: from the whole of which, every person may, in my opinion, clearly perceive that there is no cause whatever for preferring an accusation against me on account of my behavior throughout these transactions; especially when he considers their request, with the manner in which it was delivered, and at the same time my refusal with the reasons for it; but this is still more obvious from my counter-proposal.
Most noble and potent Lords, this is a true account of the interviews and conferences the brethren requested, and of my continued refusal to enter into them. From all of this, I believe anyone can clearly see that there are no grounds whatsoever to bring an accusation against me for how I conducted myself throughout these events—especially when you consider the nature of their request and the manner in which it was delivered, alongside my refusal and the reasons for it. This becomes even clearer when you consider my counter-proposal:
1. Their request, which amounted to a demand upon me for a declaration on matters of faith, was not supported by any reasons, as far as I am enabled to form a judgment. For I never furnished a cause to any man why he should require such a declaration from me rather than from other people, by my having taught any thing contrary to the word of God, or to the Confession and Catechism of the Belgic Churches. At no period have I ceased to make this avowal, and I repeat it on this occasion. I am likewise prepared to consent to an inquiry being instituted into this my profession, either by a Provincial or a National Synod, that the truth of it may by that means, be made yet more apparent — if from such an examination it may be thought possible to derive any advantage.
1. Their request amounted to a demand that I declare my beliefs, but, as far as I can judge, they gave no grounds for it. I had never given anyone a reason to require this of me rather than of others by teaching anything contrary to God’s Word or to the Confession and Catechism of the Belgic Churches. I have always maintained this, and I repeat it now. I am also prepared to submit this claim to examination by a provincial or national synod, so that its truth may become clearer, if such an inquiry is thought likely to be useful.
2. The manner in which their request was delivered, proved of itself to be a sufficient obstacle, because it was openly made by a deputation. I was also much injured by the way in which the Synod prejudged my cause; for we may presume that it would not through its deputies invite any man to a conference, unless he had given strong grounds for such an interview. For this reason I did not consider myself at liberty to consent to a conference of this description, lest I should, by that very act, and apparently through a consciousness of guilt, have confessed that I had taught something that was wrong or unlawful.
2. Second, the very way their demand was presented was an obstacle in itself, because they came as an official public delegation. I was also treated unfairly by the way the Synod prejudged my case—for everyone assumes a Synod does not send official deputies to interrogate a professor unless he has given serious grounds for suspicion. For this reason, I could not in good conscience agree to such a hearing; doing so would have looked like a tacit admission of guilt, as though I were confessing that I had taught something unorthodox or unlawful.
3. The reasons of my refusal were these:
3. Here are the specific reasons why I declined their proposal:
First. Because as I am not subject to the jurisdiction either of the North Holland Synod or that of South Holland, but have other superiors to whom I am bound to render an account of all my concerns, I could not consent to a conference with deputies, except by the advice of those superiors and at their express command: especially since a conference of this kind was not incumbent on me in consequence of the ordinary discharge of my duty. It was also not obscurely hinted by the deputies, that the conference, [in 1605,] would by no means be a private one; but this they discovered in a manner sufficiently intelligible, when they refused to enter into a conference with me, divested of their title of “deputies.” I should, therefore, have failed in obedience to my superiors, if I had not rejected a conference which was in this manner proposed. I wish the brethren would remember this fact, that although every one of our ministers is subject as a member to the jurisdiction of the particular Synod to which he belongs, yet not one of them has hitherto dared to engage in a conference, without the advice and permission of the magistrates under whom he is placed; that no particular magistrates have ever allowed any minister within their jurisdiction to undertake a conference with the deputies of the Churches, unless they had themselves previously granted their consent; and that it was frequently their wish, to be present at such conference, in the persons of their own deputies. Let it be recollected what transpired at Leyden, in the case of Coolhasius [Koolhaes,] at Gouda with Herman Herberts, at Horn in the case of Cornelius Wiggeri, [Wiggerston,] and at Medenblick in the case of Tako, [Sybrants.]
First. Because as I am not subject to the jurisdiction either of the North Holland Synod or that of South Holland, but have other superiors to whom I am bound to render an account of all my concerns, I could not consent to a conference with deputies, except by the advice of those superiors and at their express command: especially since a conference of this kind was not incumbent on me in consequence of the ordinary discharge of my duty. It was also not obscurely hinted by the deputies, that the conference in 1605 would by no means be a private one; but this they revealed in a manner sufficiently clear when they refused to enter into a conference with me divested of their title of “deputies.” I should, therefore, have failed in obedience to my superiors if I had not rejected a conference proposed in this manner. I wish the brethren would remember that although every minister belongs to a particular synod, no minister among us has ever ventured to enter into such a conference without the counsel and permission of the magistrates who govern him. Nor have local magistrates ever permitted a minister under their authority to confer with church deputies without prior consent; in fact, magistrates have often insisted on having their own representatives present. One only need recall what happened at Leiden with Coolhaes, at Gouda with Herman Herberts, at Hoorn with Cornelius Wiggeri, and at Medemblik with Taco Sybrants.
The second reason by which I was dissuaded from a conference, is this: I perceived that there would be a great inequality in the conference which was proposed, when, on the contrary, it is necessary that the greatest equality should exist between the parties who are about to confer together on any subject. For
The second reason I declined their conference was this: I saw clearly that the proposed meeting would be deeply unequal, whereas any genuine theological dialogue requires fair and equal footing between the participants. Consider the imbalance:
(1.) they came to me armed with public authority; while, with respect to myself, everything partook of a private character. And I am not so ignorant in these matters as not to perceive the powerful support which that man enjoys who transacts any business under the sanction of the public authority.
(1.) They came to me clothed with official church authority, whereas I would have been speaking purely as a private individual. Anyone with the slightest experience in public affairs knows what an immense advantage a person holds when he acts with the backing of official authority.
(2.) They were themselves three in number, and had with them two deputies of the Synod of North Holland. On the other hand, I was alone, and destitute not only of all assistance, but also of persons who might act as witnesses of the proceedings that were then to have commenced, and to whom they as well as myself might have safely entrusted our several causes.
(2.) Furthermore, there were three of them, accompanied by two additional deputies from the Synod of North Holland—five in all. I, on the other hand, stood completely alone, without colleagues to support me and without impartial witnesses to observe the proceedings and ensure that both sides were fairly represented.
(3.) They were not persons at their own disposal, but compelled to depend on the judgment of their superiors; and they were bound most pertinaciously to contend for those religious sentiments, which their superiors had within their own minds determined to maintain. To such a length was this principle extended, that they were not even left to their own discretion — to admit the validity of the argument which I might have adduced, however cogent and forcible they might have found them to be, and even if they had been altogether unanswerable. From these considerations I could not see by what means both parties could obtain that mutual advantage, which ought properly to accrue from such a conference. I might have gained some beneficial result from it; because I was completely at liberty, and, by employing my own conscience alone in forming a decision, I could, without prejudice to any one, have made those admissions which my conviction of the truth might have dictated to me as correct. Of what great importance this last circumstance might be, your Lordships would have most fully discovered by experience, had any of you been present in the Preparatory Convention, as the representatives of your own august body.
(3.) They were not free to act independently. They had to rely on their superiors’ judgment and firmly defend the religious positions their superiors had already decided to maintain. They were not even free to acknowledge the force of any arguments I might offer, however compelling or even unanswerable they found them. I therefore could not see how both sides could gain the mutual benefit that such a conference ought to provide. I might have benefited, because I was free to decide according to my own conscience and to accept whatever I became convinced was true, without infringing anyone’s rights. Your Lordships would have seen how much this freedom matters if any of you had attended the Preparatory Convention as representatives of your assembly.
My third reason is, that the account which they would have rendered to their superiors after the conference, could not but have operated in many ways to my injury, whether I had been absent or present at the time when they delivered their report.
My third reason is that the report these deputies would afterward deliver to their superiors was bound to work against me in multiple ways—whether I was present or absent when they presented their account.
(1.) Had I been absent, it might easily have happened either through the omission or the addition of certain words, or through the alteration of others, in regard to their sense or order, that some fact or argument would be repeated in a manner very different from that in which it really occurred. Such an erroneous statement might also have been made, either through the inconsiderateness which arises from a defect in the intellect, through the weakness of an imperfect memory, or through a prejudice of the affections.
(1.) If I were absent, omissions, additions, or changes in the meaning or order of words could easily cause a fact or argument to be reported quite differently from what actually occurred. Such errors might arise from failures of understanding, an imperfect memory, or prejudice.
(2.) And indeed by my presence, I could with difficulty have avoided or corrected this inconvenience; because a greater degree of credit would have been given to their own deputies, than to me who was only a private individual.
(2.) And even if I were present, I could hardly avoid or correct this disadvantage, because their own deputies would have been given more credibility than I, a private individual.
Lastly. By this means I should have conveyed to that assembly, [the Provincial Synod,] a right and some kind of prerogative over me; which, in reference to me, it does not actually possess; and which, consistently with that office whose duties I discharge, it would not be possible for me to transfer to the Synod without manifest injustice towards those persons under whose jurisdiction it has been the pleasure of the general magistracy of the land to place me. Imperious necessity, therefore, as well as equity, demanded of me to reject the terms on which this conference was offered.
Lastly. By agreeing to their terms, I would have granted that assembly [the Provincial Synod] an authority and jurisdiction over me that it does not legally possess. Given the public office I hold, I could not concede such authority to the Synod without committing a blatant injustice against the governing magistrates under whose authority I was placed. Therefore, both necessity and justice required that I reject the conditions on which this conference was offered.
4. But however strong my sentiments might be on this subject, I gave these deputies an opportunity of gaining the information which they desired. If it had been their wish to accept the private conference which I proposed, they would have become possessed of my sentiments on every article of the Christian Faith. Besides, this conference would have been much better adapted to promote our mutual edification and instruction, than a public one could be; because it is customary in private conferences, for each person to speak everything with greater familiarity and freedom, than when all the formalities of deputations are observed, if I may so express myself. Neither had they the least reason to manifest any reluctance on this point; because every one of them was at liberty, (if he chose,) to enter into a private conference between him and me alone. But when I made this offer to all and to each of them, I added as one of my most particular stipulations, that, whatever the discussions might be which arose between us, they should remain within our bosoms, and no particle of them should be divulged to any person living. If on these terms they had consented to hold a conference with me, I entertain not the smallest doubt that we should either have given each other complete satisfaction: or we should at least have made it apparent, that, from our mutual controversy, no imminent danger could easily arise, to injure either that truth which is necessary to salvation, piety, or Christian peace and amity.
4. But however strong my sentiments might be on this subject, I gave these deputies an opportunity of gaining the information they desired. If they had accepted the private conference I proposed, they would have learned my views on every article of the Christian faith. Moreover, a private conversation would have served our mutual edification far better than an official hearing, for in private discussions people speak freely and familiarly, unhindered by the rigid formalities of an official deputation. They had no reason to hesitate, since any one of them was free to meet with me one-on-one. But when I made this offer to all and each of them, I insisted on one strict condition: whatever was discussed must remain strictly between us, and not a single detail disclosed to anyone living. If they had agreed to those terms, I have no doubt that we would either have resolved our differences completely or at least made it evident that our disagreements were unlikely to pose an imminent threat to the truth necessary for salvation, to piety, or to Christian peace and friendship.
9. The complaint concerning my refusal to make a declaration of my sentiments, does not agree with the rumors concerning me which are in general circulation.
9. Moreover, the complaint that I refuse to state my views openly contradicts the very rumors being spread about me everywhere.
But omitting all further mention of those transactions, I am not able entirely to satisfy myself by what contrivance these two complaints appear consistent with each other.
Setting aside further details of those events, I cannot understand how my critics can reconcile two contradictory complaints they level against me:
(1.) That I refuse to make a profession of my sentiments; and yet
(1.) On the one hand, they complain that I refuse to declare my convictions; and yet,
(2.) Invectives are poured forth against me, both in foreign countries and at home, as though I am attempting to introduce into the Church and into the Christian religion, novel, impure and false doctrines. If I do not openly profess my sentiments, from what can their injurious tendency be made evident? If I do not explain myself, by what method can I be introducing false doctrines? If they be mere groundless suspicions that are advanced against me, it is uncharitable to grant them entertainment, or at least to ascribe to them such great importance.
(2.) Invectives are poured forth against me, both in foreign countries and at home, as though I am attempting to introduce into the church and the Christian religion novel, impure, and false doctrines. If I do not openly disclose my views, how can anyone prove they are harmful? If I have not explained myself, how can I be introducing false doctrines? If these charges are based on nothing more than groundless suspicion, it is uncharitable to entertain them—let alone treat them with such gravity.
But it is cast upon me as a reproach, “that I do certainly disclose a few of my opinions, but not all of them; and that, from the few which I thus make known, the object at which I aim is no longer obscure, but becomes very evident.”
Still, critics fault me by saying: “Granted, he reveals a few of his views, but not all of them; and even from the few he does share, it is easy to see where he is heading.”
In reference to this censure, the great consideration ought to be, “can any of those sentiments which I am said to have disclosed, be proved to stand in contradiction either to the word of God, or the Confession of the Belgic Churches”
In response to that accusation, the real question that ought to be asked is simple: “Can a single one of the views I am said to have expressed be proven contrary either to the Word of God or to the Belgic Confession?”
(1.) If it be decided, that they are contrary to the Confession, then I have been engaged in teaching something in opposition to a document, “against which never to propound any doctrine,” was the faithful promise which I made, when I signed it with my own hand. If, therefore, I be found thus criminal, I ought to be visited with merited punishment.
(1.) If it be decided that they are contrary to the Confession, then I have been engaged in teaching something in opposition to a document against which I faithfully promised never to teach anything when I signed it with my own hand. If, therefore, I am found guilty of this, I ought to receive deserved punishment.
(2.) But if it can be proved, that any of those opinions are contrary to the word of God, then I ought to experience a greater degree of blame, and to suffer a severer punishment, and compelled either to utter a recantation or to resign my office, especially if those heads of doctrine which I have uttered, are of such a description as to be notoriously prejudicial to the honor of God and the salvation of mankind.
(2.) But if it can be proved that any of those opinions are contrary to the Word of God, then I ought to experience even greater blame and suffer a severer punishment—compelled either to publicly recant or resign my office, especially if the doctrines I have taught are notoriously harmful to the honor of God and the salvation of mankind.
(3.) But if those few sentiments which I am accused of having advanced, are found neither to be at variance with the word of God nor with the Confession, which I have just mentioned, then those consequences which are elicited from them, or seem dependent on them, cannot possibly be contradictory either to the word of God or to the Belgic Confession. For, according to the rule of the schoolmen, “if the consectaries or consequences of any doctrine be false, it necessarily follows that the doctrine itself is also false, and vice versa.” The one of these two courses, therefore, ought to have been pursued towards me, either to have instituted an action against me, or to have given no credit to those rumors. If I might have my own choice, the latter course is that which I should have desired; but of the former I am not at all afraid. For, how extensively soever and in all directions those Thirty-One Articles which concern me have been dispersed to my great injury and disparagement, and though they have been placed in the hands of several men of great eminence, they afford sufficient internal testimony, from the want of sense and of other requisites visible in their very composition, that they are charged upon me through a total disregard to justice, honor and conscience.
(3.) But if those few sentiments which I am accused of having advanced are found to contradict neither the Word of God nor the Confession, then the consequences drawn from them or depending on them cannot possibly contradict either God’s Word or the Belgic Confession. For according to the scholastic rule, “If the consequences of a doctrine are false, it necessarily follows that the doctrine itself is also false, and vice versa.” One of two courses, therefore, ought to have been pursued toward me: either bring formal charges against me, or give no credit to these rumors. If given my choice, I would have preferred the latter; but of the former I am not at all afraid. For however widely those Thirty-One Articles falsely attributed to me have been circulated to my great injury and disparagement, even reaching men of high standing, their very composition reveals such confusion and lack of sense that they carry their own refutation, proving they were charged against me with a total disregard for justice, honor, and conscience.
10. The principal reasons why I durst not disclose to the deputies my opinions on the subject of Religion.
10. The main reasons why I felt I could not safely disclose all my theological reflections to those deputies.
But some person will perhaps say: “for the sake of avoiding these disturbances, and partly in order by such a measure to give some satisfaction to a great number of ministers, you might undoubtedly have made to your brethren an open and simple declaration of your sentiments on the whole subject of religion, either for the purpose of being yourself maturely instructed in more correct principles, or that they might have been able in an opportune manner to prepare themselves for a mutual conference.”
Someone will perhaps say: “To avoid these disturbances, and partly to give satisfaction to a large number of ministers, you could surely have made an open and plain declaration of your sentiments on the whole subject of religion to your brethren—either so you could be maturely instructed in sounder principles, or so they could properly prepare themselves for a mutual conference.”
But I was deterred from adopting that method, on account of three inconveniences, of which I was afraid:
Yet I held back from taking that step because of three difficulties I feared:
First,. I was afraid that if I had made a profession of my sentiments, the consequence would have been, that an inquiry would be instituted on the part of others, with regard to the manner in which an action might be framed against me from those premises. Secondly. Another cause of my fear, was, that such a statement of my opinions would have furnished matter for discussion and refutation, in the pulpits of the Churches and the scholastic exercises of the Universities. Thirdly. I was also afraid, that my opinions would have been transmitted to foreign Universities and Churches, in hopes of obtaining from them a sentence of condemnation, and the means of oppressing me.” That I had very weighty reasons to fear every one of these consequences together, it would not be difficult for me clearly to demonstrate from the Thirty-One Articles, and from the writings of certain individuals.
First, I was afraid that if I made a profession of my sentiments, an inquiry would immediately be launched by others to see how formal charges could be framed against me. Secondly, another cause of my fear was that such a statement of my opinions would provide fuel for public debate and refutation in church pulpits and university lectures. Thirdly, I was also afraid that my opinions would be sent to foreign universities and churches in hopes of securing a sentence of condemnation against me to crush me. That I had weighty reasons to fear all of these consequences together, I could easily demonstrate from those very Thirty-One Articles and from the writings of certain individuals.
With respect to “the personal instruction and edification,” which I might have hoped to derive from such a disclosure, it is necessary to consider, that not only I but many others, and even they themselves, have peculiar views which they have formed on religious topics; and, therefore, that such instruction cannot be applied to any useful purpose, except in some place or other where we may all hereafter appear together, and where a definitive sentence, as it is called, both may and must be pronounced. With respect to “the opportune and benefiting preparation which my brethren ought in the mean time to be making for a conference,” I declare that it will at that time be most seasonable and proper when all shall have produced their views, and disclosed them before a whole assembly, that thus an account may be taken of them all at once, and they may be considered together. Since none of these objections have any existence in this august assembly, I proceed to the declaration of my sentiments.
With respect to “personal instruction and edification” that I might have hoped to gain from such a disclosure, we must recognize that not only I, but many others—including the deputies themselves—hold distinct views on various religious topics. Therefore, such instruction cannot achieve any useful purpose except in an assembly where we may all meet together, and where an authoritative, definitive judgment can and must be pronounced. And as for “the timely preparation the brethren could make for a conference,” I maintain that preparation will be most fitting and proper when all have openly presented their views before the whole assembly, so an evaluation can be made of all at once and considered together. Since none of these obstacles exist in this august assembly, I now gladly proceed to the declaration of my sentiments.
Having in this manner refuted all those objections which have been made against me, I will now endeavor to fulfill my promise, and to execute those commands which your Lordships have been pleased to lay upon me. I entertain a confident persuasion, that no prejudice will be created against me or my sentiments from this act, however imperfectly I may perform it, because it has its origin in that obedience which is due from me to this noble assembly, next to God, and according to the Divine pleasure.
Having in this manner answered all the objections that have been raised against me, I will now endeavor to fulfill my promise and carry out the commands your Lordships have laid upon me. I have full confidence that no prejudice will be held against me or my convictions because of this act, however imperfectly I may perform it; for it springs from that obedience which, next to God and according to His divine pleasure, I owe to this sovereign assembly.
1. ON PREDESTINATION
1. ON PREDESTINATION
The first and most important article in religion on which I have to offer my views, and which for many years past has engaged my attention, is the Predestination of God, that is, the Election of men to salvation, and the Reprobation of them to destruction. Commencing with this article, I will first explain what is taught concerning it, both in discourses and writings, by certain persons in our Churches, and in the University of Leyden. I will afterwards declare my own views and thoughts on the same subject, while I shew my opinion on what they advance.
The first and most important article in religion on which I have to offer my views, and which for many years past has engaged my deepest attention, is the Predestination of God—that is, the election of men to salvation and the reprobation of men to destruction. Beginning with this article, I will first explain what is taught concerning it, both in sermons and writings, by certain teachers in our churches and at the University of Leiden. Afterwards, I will declare my own views and convictions on the subject, showing my evaluation of what they advance.
On this article there is no uniform and simple opinion among the teachers of our Churches; but there is some variation in certain parts of it in which they differ from each other.
On this doctrine of predestination, there is no single, uniform view among the teachers of our Reformed churches; instead, they differ from one another on certain points.
1. The first opinion, which I reject, but which is espoused by those [Supralapsarians] who assume the very highest ground of this Predestination.
1. The first view—which I reject—is held by those (often called Supralapsarians) who take the most extreme position on predestination.
The opinion of those who take the highest ground on this point, as it is generally contained in their writings, is to this effect: “1. God by an eternal and immutable decree has predestinated, from among men, (whom he did not consider as being then created, much less as being fallen,) certain individuals to everlasting life, and others to eternal destruction, without any regard whatever to righteousness or sin, to obedience or disobedience, but purely of his own good pleasure, to demonstrate the glory of his justice and mercy; or, (as others assert,) to demonstrate his saving grace, wisdom and free uncontrollable power. “2. In addition to this decree, God has pre-ordained certain determinate means which pertain to its execution, and this by an eternal and immutable decree. These means necessarily follow by virtue of the preceding decree, and necessarily bring him who has been predestinated, to the end which has been fore-ordained for him. Some of these means belong in common both to the decree of election and that of rejection, and others of them are specially restricted to the one decree or to the other.
The opinion of those who take the highest ground on this point, as it is generally contained in their writings, is essentially this: “1. God, by an eternal and unchangeable decree, has predestined from among men (whom He did not view as created, much less as fallen) certain individuals to everlasting life and others to eternal destruction, without any regard whatever to righteousness or sin, to obedience or disobedience. Rather, purely of His own good pleasure, He did this to demonstrate the glory of His justice and mercy—or, as others assert, to demonstrate His saving grace, wisdom, and sovereign, uncontrollable power. 2. In addition to this decree, God has preordained certain specific means for its execution by an eternal and unchangeable decree. These means follow necessarily by virtue of the preceding decree, unfailingly bringing the predestined person to the end foreordained for him. Some of these means belong in common both to the decree of election and that of rejection, while others are specially restricted to one decree or the other.
“3. The means common to both the decrees, are three: the first is, the creation of man in the upright [or erect] state of original righteousness, or after the image and likeness of God in righteousness and true holiness. The second is, the permission of the fall of Adam, or the ordination of God that man should sin, and become corrupt or vitiated. The third is, the loss or the removal of original righteousness and of the image of God, and a being concluded under sin and condemnation.
“3. The means common to both decrees are three: First, the creation of man in the upright state of original righteousness, or after the image and likeness of God in righteousness and true holiness. Second, the permission of the fall of Adam—or God’s ordination that man should sin and become corrupt or depraved. Third, the loss or removal of original righteousness and of the divine image, leaving all people trapped under sin and condemnation.
“4. For unless God had created some men, he would not have had any upon whom he might either bestow eternal life, or superinduce everlasting death. Unless he had created them in righteousness and true holiness, he would himself have been the author of sin, and would by this means have possessed no right either to punish them to the praise of his justice, or to save them to the praise of his mercy. Unless they had themselves sinned, and by the demerit of sin had rendered themselves guilty of death, there would have been no room for the demonstration either of justice or of mercy.
“4. For unless God had created men, He would have had none upon whom He might either bestow eternal life or inflict everlasting death. Unless He had created them in righteousness and true holiness, He Himself would have been the author of sin, and would thereby have possessed no right either to punish them to the praise of His justice or to save them to the praise of His mercy. And unless they had themselves sinned, and through the guilt of sin made themselves worthy of death, there would have been no room for displaying either justice or mercy.
“5. The means pre-ordained for the execution of the decree of election, are also these three. The first is, the pre-ordination, or the giving of Jesus Christ as a Mediator and a Savior, who might by his meet deserve, [or purchase,] for all the elect and for them only, the lost righteousness and life, and might communicate them by his own power [Or virtue]. The second is, the call [or vocation] to faith outwardly by the word, but inwardly by his Spirit, in the mind, affections and will; by an operation of such efficacy that the elect person of necessity yields assent and obedience to the vocation, in so much that it is not possible for him to do otherwise than believe and be obedient to this vocation. From hence arise justification and sanctification through the blood of Christ and his Spirit, and from them the existence of all good works. And all that, manifestly by means of the same force and necessity. The third is, that which keeps and preserves the elect in faith, holiness, and a zeal for good works; or, it is the gift of perseverance; the virtue of which is such, that believing and elect persons not only do not sin with a full and entire will, or do not fall away totally from faith and grace, but it likewise is neither possible for them to sin with a full and perfect will, nor to fall away totally or finally from faith and grace.
“5. The means preordained for the execution of the decree of election are likewise these three: First, the preordination and gift of Jesus Christ as Mediator and Savior, who by His merit would purchase lost righteousness and life for all the elect—and for them alone—and communicate them by His own power. Second, the call to faith outwardly by the Word, but inwardly by His Spirit in the mind, affections, and will, through an operation of such efficacy that the elect person must of necessity yield assent and obedience to the call, so that it is impossible for him to do otherwise than believe and obey. From this flow justification and sanctification through the blood and Spirit of Christ, and from them all good works—all produced by the same irresistible power and necessity. Third, the gift of perseverance, which keeps and preserves the elect in faith, holiness, and zeal for good works. The power of this gift is such that believing, elect persons not only do not sin with full and deliberate consent, nor fall away totally from faith and grace, but it is utterly impossible for them either to sin with full consent or to fall away totally or finally from faith and grace.
“6. The two last of these means [vocation and perseverance,] belong only to the elect who are of adult age. But God employs a shorter way to salvation, by which he conducts those children of believers and saints who depart out of this life before they arrive at years of maturity; that is, provided they belong to the number of the elect, (who are known to God alone,) for God bestows on them Christ as their Savior, and gives them to Christ, to save them by his blood and Holy Spirit, without actual faith and perseverance in it [faith]; and this he does according to the promise of the covenant of grace, I will be a God unto you, and unto your seed after you. “7. The means pertaining to the execution of the decree of reprobation to eternal death, are partly such as peculiarly belong to all those who are rejected and reprobate, whether they ever arrive at years of maturity or die before that period; and they are partly such as are proper only to some of them. The mean that is common to all the reprobate, is desertion in sin, by denying to them that saving grace which is sufficient and necessary to the salvation of any one. This negation [or denial,] consists of two parts. For, in the first place, God did not will that Christ should die for them [the reprobate,] or become their Savior, and this neither in reference to the antecedent will of God, (as some persons call it,) nor in reference to his sufficient will, or the value of the price of reconciliation; because this price was not offered for reprobates, either with respect to the decree of God, or its virtue and efficacy.
“6. The two last of these means [vocation and perseverance] belong only to the elect who reach adult age. But God employs a shorter way to salvation for the children of believers and saints who depart this life before reaching years of maturity—provided they belong to the number of the elect (who are known to God alone). For God bestows Christ on them as their Savior and gives them to Christ, saving them by His blood and Holy Spirit without actual faith or perseverance in it, in accordance with the covenant promise: 'I will be a God to you and to your children after you.' 7. The means pertaining to the execution of the decree of reprobation to eternal death are twofold: some apply to all who are rejected and reprobate (whether they reach maturity or die in childhood), while others apply only to some of them. The means common to all the reprobate is desertion in sin, by denying them that saving grace which is sufficient and necessary for salvation. This denial consists of two parts: First, God did not will that Christ should die for them or become their Savior—neither in reference to the antecedent will of God (as some call it), nor in reference to His sufficient will, nor the value of the price of reconciliation. According to this view, the price of reconciliation was never offered for the reprobate, neither in God’s decree nor in its saving efficacy.
(2.) But the other part of this negation [or denial] is, that God is unwilling to communicate the Spirit of Christ to reprobates, yet without such communication they can neither be made partakers of Christ nor of his benefits.
(2.) The second part of this denial is that God refuses to give the Spirit of Christ to the reprobate—even though apart from the Holy Spirit no one can ever share in Christ or receive His saving benefits.
“8. The mean which belongs properly only to some of the reprobates, is obduration, [or the act of hardening,] which befalls those of them who have attained to years of maturity, either because they have very frequently and enormously sinned against the law of God, or because they have rejected the grace of the gospel.
“8. The means which belongs properly only to some of the reprobate is hardening, which befalls those who have reached maturity, either because they have frequently and grievously sinned against the law of God, or because they have rejected the grace of the gospel.
(1.) To the execution of the first species of induration, or hardening, belong the illumination of their conscience by means of knowledge, and its conviction of the righteousness of the law. For it is impossible that this law should not necessarily detain them in unrighteousness, to render them inexcusable.
(1.) To the execution of the first species of hardening belongs the illumination of their conscience through knowledge and its conviction of the righteousness of the law. For this law inevitably holds them guilty in their unrighteousness, leaving them entirely without excuse.
(2.) For the execution of the second species of induration, God employs a call by the preaching of his gospel, which call is inefficacious and insufficient both in respect to the decree of God, and to its issue or event. This calling is either only an external one, which it is neither in their desire nor in their power to obey. Or it is likewise an internal one, by which some of them may be excited in their understandings to accept and believe the things which they hear; but yet it is only with such a faith as that with which the devils are endowed when they believe and tremble. Others of them are excited and conducted still further, so as to desire in a certain measure to taste the heavenly gift. But the latter are, of all others, the most unhappy, because they are raised up on high, that they may be brought down with a heavier fall. And this fate it is impossible for them to escape, for they must of necessity return to their vomit, and depart or fall away from the faith.
(2.) For the execution of the second species of hardening, God employs a call through the preaching of His gospel, which is an ineffectual and insufficient call both in respect to the decree of God and in its final outcome. This call is either merely external—which they have neither the desire nor the power to obey—or it includes an internal stirring of their intellect, leading some of them to accept and believe what they hear, yet only with the kind of faith demons possess when they believe and tremble. Others are stirred and carried still further, so that they desire in a measure to taste the heavenly gift. But these are of all people the most miserable, because they are lifted up on high only to be cast down with a heavier fall. And this fate it is impossible for them to escape; for they must of necessity return to their vomit and fall away from the faith.
“9. From this decree of Divine election and reprobation, and from this administration of the means which pertain to the execution of both of them, it follows, that the elect are necessarily saved, it being impossible for them to perish — and that the reprobate are necessarily damned, it being impossible for them to be saved; and all this from the absolute purpose [or determination] of God, which is altogether antecedent to all things, and to all those causes which are either in things themselves or can possibly result from them.”
“9. From this decree of divine election and reprobation, and from this administration of the means designed to execute both, it follows that the elect are saved by absolute necessity, it being impossible for them to perish; while the reprobate are damned by absolute necessity, it being impossible for them to be saved. And all of this stems from the absolute decree of God, which is entirely antecedent to all things, prior to all causes that reside in creatures or can possibly result from them.”
These opinions concerning predestination are considered, by some of those who advocate them, to be the foundation of Christianity, salvation and of its certainty. On these sentiments they suppose, “is founded the sure and undoubted consolation of all believers, which is capable of rendering their consciences tranquil; and on them also depends the praise of the grace of God, so that if any contradiction be offered to this doctrine, God is necessarily deprived of the glory of his grace, and then the merit of salvation is attributed to the free will of man and to his own powers and strength, which ascription savors of Pelagianism.”
These opinions concerning predestination are considered by some of their advocates to be the very foundation of Christianity, of salvation, and of its certainty. On these views, they suppose, is founded the sure and undoubted comfort of all believers, which can bring peace to troubled consciences; and on them also depends the praise of God’s grace, so that if anyone contradicts this doctrine, God is supposedly robbed of the glory of His grace, and the merit of salvation is attributed to human free will and strength, which they claim smacks of Pelagianism.
These then are the causes which are offered why the advocates of these sentiments labor with a common anxiety to retain the purity of such a doctrine in their churches and why they oppose themselves to all those innovations which are at variance with them.
These, then, are the reasons why the defenders of this view work so anxiously to preserve this teaching in our churches, and why they oppose innovations that differ from it.
2. MY SENTIMENTS ON THE
2. MY SENTIMENTS ON THE
PRECEDING SCHEME OF PREDESTINATION.
PRECEDING SCHEME OF PREDESTINATION.
But, for my own part, to speak my sentiments with freedom, and yet with a salvo in favor of a better judgment, I am of opinion, that this doctrine of theirs contains many things that are both false and impertinent, and at an utter disagreement with each other; all the instances of which, the present time will not permit me to recount, but I will subject it to an examination only in those parts which are most prominent and extensive. I shall, therefore, propose to myself four principal heads, which are of the greatest importance in this doctrine; and when I have in the first place explained of what kind they are, I will afterwards declare more fully the judgment and sentiments which I have formed concerning them. They are the following: “1. That God has absolutely and precisely decreed to save certain particular men by his mercy or grace, but to condemn others by his justice: and to do all this without having any regard in such decree to righteousness or sin, obedience or disobedience, which could possibly exist on the part of one class of men or of the other.
For my own part, speaking my mind with freedom, yet always subject to sounder judgment, I am convinced that this doctrine of theirs contains many things that are false, unfounded, and in utter conflict with one another. Time does not permit me to recount every instance, so I will examine only its most prominent and far-reaching parts. I will therefore set forth four principal heads of greatest importance in this doctrine; and after explaining what they are, I will declare more fully the judgment and convictions I have formed concerning them. They are as follows: “1. That God has absolutely and unconditionally decreed to save certain particular individuals by His mercy or grace, and to condemn others by His justice—and to do all this without any regard in that decree to righteousness or sin, obedience or disobedience, in either group.
“2. That, for the execution of the preceding decree, God determined to create Adam, and all men in him, in an upright state of original righteousness; besides which he also ordained them to commit sin, that they might thus become guilty of eternal condemnation and be deprived of original righteousness.
“2. Second, to carry out that prior decree, God decided to create Adam—and the entire human race in him—in an upright state of original righteousness, while at the same time ordaining that they would inevitably fall into sin, so that they would become guilty of eternal condemnation and lose that original righteousness.
“3. That those persons whom God has thus positively willed to save, he has decreed not only to salvation but also to the means which pertain to it; (that is, to conduct and bring them to faith in Christ Jesus, and to perseverance in that faith ;) and that He also in reality leads them to these results by a grace and power that are irresistible, so that it is not possible for them to do otherwise than believe, persevere in faith, and be saved. “4. That to those whom, by his absolute will, God has fore-ordained to perdition, he has also decreed to deny that grace which is necessary and sufficient for salvation, and does not in reality confer it upon them; so that they are neither placed in a possible condition nor in any capacity of believing or of being saved.”
“3. That those persons whom God has thus unconditionally willed to save, He has decreed not only to salvation, but also to the means leading to it (that is, to bring them to faith in Jesus Christ and to perseverance in that faith); and that He actually brings them to these results by an irresistible grace and power, making it impossible for them to do anything other than believe, persevere in faith, and be saved. 4. That to those whom God by His absolute will has foreordained to destruction, He has also decreed to deny that grace which is necessary and sufficient for salvation, never actually conferring it upon them, so that they are left with neither the possibility nor the capacity of believing or being saved.”
After a diligent contemplation and examination of these four heads, in the fear of the Lord, I make the following declaration respecting this doctrine of predestination.
After carefully weighing and examining these four points in the fear of the Lord, I now offer my candid assessment of this first doctrine of predestination.
3. I REJECT THIS PREDESTINATION
3. I REJECT THIS PREDESTINATION
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
I. Because it is not the foundation of Christianity, of Salvation, or of its certainty.
I. First, I reject it because it is neither the foundation of Christianity, nor the foundation of salvation, nor the ground of our assurance of salvation.
1. It is not the foundation of Christianity:
1. It is not the foundation of Christianity:
(1.) For this Predestination is not that decree of God by which Christ is appointed by God to be the Savior, the Head, and the Foundation of those who will be made heirs of salvation. Yet that decree is the only foundation of Christianity.
(1.) For this Predestination is not that decree of God by which Christ is appointed to be the Savior, Head, and Foundation of those who will be made heirs of salvation—yet that decree is the only true foundation of Christianity.
(2.) For the doctrine of this Predestination is not that doctrine by which, through faith, we as lively stones are built up into Christ, the only corner stone, and are inserted into him as the members of the body are joined to their head.
(2.) For the doctrine of this Predestination is not that teaching through which, by faith, we as living stones are built up into Christ, the only cornerstone, and grafted into Him as members of the body are joined to their Head.
2. It is not the foundation of Salvation:
2. Nor is it the foundation of salvation:
(1.) For this Predestination is not that decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ Jesus on which alone our salvation rests and depends.
(1.) For this scheme of predestination is not the gracious decree of God in Christ Jesus upon which alone our salvation rests and depends.
(2.) The doctrine of this Predestination is not the foundation of Salvation: for it is not “the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth :” because through it “the righteousness of God” is not “revealed from faith to faith.”
(2.) Nor is this doctrine of predestination the foundation of salvation, for it is not “the power of God that brings salvation to everyone who believes”—because through this teaching “the righteousness of God” is not “revealed from faith to faith.”
3. Nor is it the foundation of the certainty of salvation: For that is dependent upon this decree, “they who believe, shall be saved :” I believe, therefore, I shall be saved. But the doctrine of this Predestination embraces within itself neither the first nor the second member of the syllogism.
3. Nor is it the foundation of the certainty of salvation. For assurance depends upon this promise: “Those who believe shall be saved; I believe, therefore I shall be saved.” But the doctrine of this Predestination embraces within itself neither of the two premises: that those who believe will be saved, and that I believe.
This is likewise confessed by some persons in these words: “we do not wish to state that the knowledge of this [Predestination] is the foundation of Christianity or of salvation, or that it is necessary to salvation in the same manner as the doctrine of the Gospel,” etc.
This is likewise confessed by some of its advocates in these words: “We do not claim that knowledge of this predestination is the foundation of Christianity or salvation, or that it is necessary to salvation in the same manner as the doctrine of the Gospel.”
II. This doctrine of Predestination comprises within it neither the whole nor any part of the Gospel. For, according to the tenor of the discourses delivered by John and Christ, as they are described to us by the Evangelist, and according to the doctrine of the Apostles and Christ after his ascension, the Gospel consists partly of an injunction to repent and believe, and partly of a promise to bestow forgiveness of sins, the grace of the Spirit, and life eternal. But this Predestination belongs neither to the injunction to repent and believe, nor to the annexed promise. Nay, this doctrine does not even teach what kind of men in general God has predestinated, which is properly the doctrine of the Gospel; but it embraces within itself a certain mystery, which is known only to God, who is the Predestinater, and in which mystery are comprehended what particular persons and how many he has decreed to save and to condemn. From these premises I draw a further conclusion, that this doctrine of Predestination is not necessary to salvation, either as an object of knowledge, belief, hope, or performance. A Confession to this effect has been made by a certain learned man, in the theses which he has proposed for discussion on this subject, in the following words: “Wherefore the gospel cannot be simply termed the book or the revelation of Predestination, but only in a relative sense. Because it does not absolutely denote either the matter of the number or the form; that is, it neither declares how many persons in particular, nor (with a few exceptions,) who they are, but only the description of them in general, whom God has predestinated.” III. This doctrine was never admitted, decreed, or approved in any Council, either general or particular, for the first six hundred years after Christ.
II. This doctrine of Predestination comprises within it neither the whole nor any part of the Gospel. For according to the preaching of John the Baptist and Jesus Christ recorded in the Gospels, and according to the doctrine of the apostles and of Christ after His ascension, the gospel consists partly of a command to repent and believe, and partly of a promise to bestow forgiveness of sins, the grace of the Spirit, and eternal life. But this Predestination belongs neither to the command to repent and believe nor to the accompanying promise. Indeed, this doctrine does not even teach what kind of people God has predestined—which is properly the teaching of the gospel. Instead, it hides within an inscrutable mystery known only to God, decreeing precisely which specific individuals and how many He has determined to save and to condemn. From these facts I draw the further conclusion that this doctrine of Predestination is not necessary to salvation, whether as an object of knowledge, faith, hope, or obedience. An admission to this effect was made by a certain learned theologian in his disputation theses on this subject: “Therefore the gospel cannot simply be called the book or revelation of Predestination, except in a qualified sense. For it does not reveal the exact number or, with a few exceptions, the individual identities of those predestined, but only the general character of those whom God has predestined.” III. This doctrine was never accepted, decreed, or approved in any council, either ecumenical or regional, during the first six hundred years after Christ.
1. Not in the General Council of Nice, in which sentence was given against Arius and in favor of the Deity and Consubstantiality of the Son of God. Not in the first Council of Constantinople, in which a decree was passed against Macedonius, respecting the Deity of the Holy Spirit. Not in the Council of Ephesus, which determined against Nestorius, and in favor of the Unity of the Person of the Son of God. Not in that of Chalcedon, which condemned Eutyches, and determined, “that in one and the same person of our Lord Jesus Christ, there were two distinct natures, which differ from each other in their essence.” Not in the second Council of Constantinople, in which Peter, Bishop of Antioch, and Anthymus, Bishop of Constantinople, with certain other persons, were condemned for having asserted “that the Father had likewise suffered,” as well as the Son. Nor in the third Council of Constantinople, in which the Monothelites were condemned for having asserted “that there was only one will and operation in Jesus Christ.”
1. Not in the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea, in which sentence was passed against Arius and in favor of the deity and consubstantiality of the Son of God. Not in the first Council of Constantinople, in which a decree was issued against Macedonius regarding the deity of the Holy Spirit. Not in the Council of Ephesus, which ruled against Nestorius and in favor of the unity of the person of the Son of God. Not in the Council of Chalcedon, which condemned Eutyches and affirmed that in the one person of our Lord Jesus Christ there are two distinct natures, differing from each other in essence. Not in the second Council of Constantinople, in which Peter, Bishop of Antioch, and Anthimus, Bishop of Constantinople, were condemned for asserting that the Father had suffered along with the Son. Nor in the third Council of Constantinople, in which the Monothelites were condemned for claiming that there was only one will and operation in Jesus Christ.
2. But this doctrine was not discussed or confirmed in particular Councils, such as that of Jerusalem, Orange, or even that of Mela in Africa, which was held against Pelagius and his errors, as is apparent from the articles of doctrine which were then decreed both against his person and his false opinions.
2. Nor was this doctrine ever discussed or confirmed in regional councils, such as those of Jerusalem, Orange, or Milevis in Africa (held against Pelagius and his errors), as is obvious from the doctrinal canons decreed against his person and false opinions.
But so far was Augustine’s doctrine of Predestination from being received in those councils, that when Celestinus, the Bishop of Rome, who was his contemporary, wrote to the Bishops of France, and condemned the doctrines of the Pelagians, he concluded his epistle in these words: “but as we dare not despise, so neither do we deem it necessary to defend the more profound and difficult parts of the questions which occur in this controversy, and which have been treated to a very great extent by those who opposed the heretics. Because we believe, that whatever the writings according to the forementioned rules of the Apostolic See have taught us, is amply sufficient for confessing the grace of God, from whose work, credit and authority not a little must be subtracted or withdrawn,” etc. In reference to the rules which were laid down by Celestinus in that epistle, and which had been decreed in the three preceding particular Councils, we shall experience no difficulty in agreeing together about them, especially in regard to those matters which are necessary to the establishment of grace in opposition to Pelagius and his errors.
Indeed, Augustine’s doctrine of Predestination was far from being received in those councils. When Celestine, Bishop of Rome and a contemporary of Augustine, wrote to the bishops of Gaul condemning Pelagian doctrines, he concluded his letter with these words: “As we dare not despise, so neither do we deem it necessary to defend the more profound and difficult questions that arise in this controversy, which were treated at great length by those who opposed the heretics. For we believe that what the Apostolic See has taught according to the aforementioned rules is amply sufficient for confessing the grace of God, from whose work, credit, and authority nothing must be subtracted.” [Editorial note: The collection reads “not a little”; the parallel Bangs/Nichols text reads “not a tittle,” meaning nothing at all.] Regarding the rules laid down by Celestine in that epistle and affirmed by those three regional councils, we will have no difficulty agreeing with one another, especially concerning what is necessary to uphold divine grace against Pelagius and his errors.
4. None of those Doctors or Divines of the Church who held correct and orthodox sentiments for the first six hundred years after the birth of Christ, ever brought this doctrine forward or gave it their approval. Neither was it professed and approved by a single individual of those who shewed themselves the principal and keenest defenders of grace against Pelagius. Of this description, it is evident, were St. Jerome, Augustine, the author of the treatise entitled, De Vocatione Gentium, [“The calling of the Gentiles,”] Prosper of Aquitaine, Hilary, Fulgentius, and Orosius. This is very apparent from their writings.
4. None of the church fathers and orthodox teachers for the first six hundred years after Christ ever advanced this doctrine or gave it their approval. Nor was it professed and approved by a single one of those who were the foremost defenders of grace against Pelagius—such as Jerome, Augustine, the author of The Calling of the Gentiles, Prosper of Aquitaine, Hilary, Fulgentius, and Orosius. This is abundantly evident from their writings.
5. It neither agrees nor corresponds with the Harmony of those confessions which were printed and published together in one volume at Geneva, in the name of the Reformed and Protestant Churches. If that harmony of Confessions be faithfully consulted, it will appear that many of them do not speak in the same manner concerning Predestination; that some of them only incidentally mention it; and that they evidently never once touch upon those heads of the doctrine, which are now in great repute and particularly urged in the preceding scheme of Predestination, and which I have already adduced. Nor does any single Confession deliver this doctrine in the same manner as it has just now been propounded by me. The Confessions of Bohemia, England and Wirtemburgh, and the first Helvetian [Swiss] Confession, and that of the four cities of Strasburgh, Constance, Memmingen, and Lindau, make no mention of this Predestination. Those of Basle and Saxony, only take a very cursory notice of it in three words. The Augustan Confession speaks of it in such a manner as to induce the Genevan editors to think, that some annotation was necessary on their part, to give us a previous warning. The last of the Helvetian [Swiss] Confessions, to which a great portion of the Reformed Churches have expressed their assent and which they have subscribed, likewise speaks of it in such a strain as makes me very desirous to see what method can possibly be adopted to give it any accordance with that doctrine of Predestination which I have just now advanced. Yet this [Swiss] Confession is that which has obtained the approbation of the Churches of Geneva and Savoy.
5. It neither agrees nor corresponds with the Harmony of Confessions published in Geneva in the name of the Reformed and Protestant churches. If that collection of confessions is carefully examined, it becomes clear that many of them do not speak of Predestination in this manner at all; some mention it only in passing, and none ever touch upon the points currently emphasized in the scheme I have outlined. Not a single confession presents the doctrine in the form I have just described. The confessions of Bohemia, England, and Württemberg, the First Helvetic Confession, and the Tetrapolitan Confession (of Strasbourg, Constance, Memmingen, and Lindau) make no mention of such predestination. Those of Basel and Saxony give it only a passing nod in a few words. The Augsburg Confession speaks of it in a way that prompted the Genevan editors to add an explanatory warning note. Even the Second Helvetic Confession—subscribed to by a large portion of the Reformed churches—speaks of it in a way that makes me eager to see how anyone could harmonize it with the supralapsarian scheme I have described, even though that confession was approved by the churches of Geneva and Savoy.
6. Without the least contention or caviling, it may very properly be made a question of doubt, whether this doctrine agrees with the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism; as I shall briefly demonstrate.
6. Without any spirit of quarrel or nitpicking, we may legitimately ask whether this doctrine agrees with our own Belgic Confession and Heidelberg Catechism—as I will now briefly show.
1. In the 14th Article of the Dutch Confession, these expression soccur: “Man knowingly and willingly subjected himself to sin, and, consequently, to death and cursing, while he lent an ear to the deceiving words and impostures of the devil,” etc. From this sentence I conclude, that man did not sin on account of any necessity through a preceding decree of Predestination: which inference is diametrically opposed to that doctrine of Predestination against which I now contend. Then, in the 16th Article, which treats of the eternal election of God, these words are contained: “God shewed himself Merciful, by delivering from damnation, and by saving, those persons whom, in his eternal and immutable counsel and cording to his gratuitous goodness, he chose in Christ Jesus our Lord, without any regard to their works. And he shewed himself just, in leaving others in that their fall and perdition into which they had precipitated themselves.” It is not obvious to me, how these words are consistent with this doctrine of Predestination.
1. In Article 14 of the Belgic Confession, these words occur: “Man knowingly and willingly subjected himself to sin, and consequently to death and the curse, while he listened to the deceptive words and impostures of the devil.” From this statement I conclude that man did not sin out of necessity driven by a prior decree of Predestination—an inference diametrically opposed to the doctrine I am refuting. Furthermore, Article 16, which treats God’s eternal election, states: “God showed Himself merciful by delivering from damnation and saving those whom, in His eternal and unchangeable counsel and according to His gracious goodness, He chose in Christ Jesus our Lord, without regard to their works. And He showed Himself just in leaving others in the fall and ruin into which they had plunged themselves.” It is not clear to me how these words can be reconciled with this supralapsarian doctrine of Predestination.
2. In the 20th question of the Heidelberg Catechism, we read: “salvation through Christ is not given [restored] to all them who had perished in Adam, but to those only who are engrafted into Christ by the faith, and who embrace his benefits.” From this sentence I infer, that God has not absolutely Predestinated any men to salvation; but that he has in his decree considered [or looked upon] them as believers. This deduction is at open conflict with the first and third points of this Predestination. In the 54th question of the same Catechism, it is said: “I believe that, from the beginning to the end of the world, the Son of God out of the entire race of mankind doth by his word and Spirit gather or collect unto himself a company chosen unto eternal life and agreeing together in the true faith.” In this sentence “election to eternal life,” and “agreement in the faith,” stand in mutual juxtaposition; and in such a manner, that the latter is not rendered subordinate to the former, which, according to these sentiments on Predestination ought to have been done. In that case the words should have been placed in the following order: “the son of God calls and gathers to himself, by his word and Spirit, a company chosen to eternal life, that they may believe and agree together in the true faith.”
2. In Question 20 of the Heidelberg Catechism, we read: “Salvation through Christ is not restored to all who had perished in Adam, but to those only who are grafted into Christ by true faith and embrace His benefits.” From this statement I infer that God has not unconditionally predestined anyone to salvation, but that in His decree He viewed them as believers. This conclusion directly conflicts with the first and third points of the scheme I described. In Question 54 of the same Catechism, it is said: “I believe that from the beginning to the end of the world, the Son of God out of the entire human race gathers for Himself by His Word and Spirit a community chosen to eternal life and agreeing in true faith.” In this sentence, “election to eternal life” and “agreement in faith” stand side by side, in such a way that the latter is not made subordinate to the former—as this scheme of Predestination would require. If their view were correct, the words should have been ordered like this: “The Son of God calls and gathers to Himself by His Word and Spirit a community chosen to eternal life, so that they may believe and agree together in true faith.”
Since such are the statements of our Confession and Catechism, no reason whatever exists, why those who embrace and defend these sentiments on Predestination, should either violently endeavor to obtrude them on their colleagues and on the Church of Christ; or why they should take it amiss, and put the worst construction upon it, when any thing is taught in the Church or University that is not exactly accordant with their doctrine, or that is opposed to it.
Since our Confession and Catechism make these statements, there is no reason whatever why those who embrace and defend these views on Predestination should violently force them on their colleagues and on the Church of Christ; nor why they should take offense and assume the worst whenever anything is taught in the church or university that does not align with their doctrine, or that is opposed to it.
7. I affirm, that this doctrine is repugnant to the Nature of God, but particularly to those Attributes of his nature by which he performs and manages all things, his wisdom, justice, and goodness.
7. I further maintain that this doctrine contradicts the very nature of God—especially those divine attributes by which He governs and carries out all things: His wisdom, His justice, and His goodness.
1. It is repugnant to his wisdom in three ways.
1. First, it dishonors God’s wisdom in three ways:
(1.) Because it represents God as decreeing something for a particular end [or purpose] which neither is nor can be good: which is, that God created something for eternal perdition to the praise of his justice.
(1.) Because it represents God as decreeing something for a purpose that neither is nor can be good: namely, that God created something for eternal destruction in order to display His justice.
(2.) Because it states, that the object which God proposed to himself by this Predestination, was, to demonstrate the glory of his mercy and justice: But this glory he cannot demonstrate, except by an act that is contrary at once to his mercy and his justice, of which description is that decree of God in which he determined that man should sin and be rendered miserable.
(2.) Because it says that God’s purpose in this Predestination was to display the glory of His mercy and justice. Yet on this account He could display that glory only through an act contrary to both His mercy and His justice: the decree by which He determined that humanity should sin and become miserable.
(3.) Because it changes and inverts the order of the two-fold wisdom of God, as it is displayed to us in the Scriptures. For it asserts, that God has absolutely predetermined to save men by the mercy and wisdom that are comprehended in the doctrine of the cross of Christ, without having foreseen this circumstance, that it was impossible for man (and that, truly, through his own fault,) to be saved by the wisdom which was revealed in the law and which was infused into him at the period of his creation: When the scripture asserts, on the contrary, that “it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe;” that is, “by the doctrine of the cross, after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God.” (1 Corinthians 1:21.)
(3.) Because it changes and inverts the order of the twofold wisdom of God as revealed in the Scriptures. For it asserts that God unconditionally predetermined to save people by the mercy and wisdom comprehended in the doctrine of the cross of Christ, without having foreseen that it was impossible for man (and that through his own fault) to be saved by the wisdom revealed in the law and implanted in him at creation. Yet Scripture asserts on the contrary: “It pleased God through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe”—that is, by the message of the cross, after “the world through its wisdom did not know God” in the wisdom of God (1 Corinthians 1:21).
2. It is repugnant to the justice of God, not only in reference to that attribute denoting in God a love of righteousness and a hatred of iniquity, but also in reference to its being a perpetual and constant desire in him to render to every one that which is his due.
2. Second, it contradicts the justice of God—both God’s essential love of righteousness and hatred of evil, and His unwavering commitment to render to every person what is right and fair.
(1.) It is at variance with the first of these ideas of justice in the following manner: Because it affirms, that God has absolutely willed to save certain individual men, and has decreed their salvation without having the least regard to righteousness or obedience: The proper inference from which, is, that God loves such men far more than his own justice [or righteousness.]
(1.) It is at variance with the first idea of justice because it affirms that God unconditionally willed to save certain individual men, decreeing their salvation without having the least regard to righteousness or obedience. The necessary inference from this is that God loves those particular men far more than His own justice.
(2.) It is opposed to the second idea of his justice: Because it affirms, that God wishes to subject his creature to misery, (which cannot possibly have any existence except as the punishment of sin,) although, at the same time, he does not look upon [or consider] the creature as a sinner, and therefore as not obnoxious either to wrath or to punishment. This is the manner in which it lays down the position, that God has willed to give to the creature not only something which does not belong to it, but which is connected with its greatest injury. Which is another act directly opposed to his justice. In accordance, therefore, with this doctrine, God, in the first place, detracts from himself that which is his own, [or his right,] and then imparts to the creature what does not belong to it, to its great misery and unhappiness.
(2.) It is opposed to the second idea of His justice because it affirms that God willed to subject His creature to misery (which cannot exist except as the punishment for sin), while at the same time He does not view the creature as a sinner, and therefore not liable to wrath or punishment. In this way it lays down the position that God willed to inflict upon the creature what does not belong to it, bringing about its greatest ruin—an act directly opposed to His justice. According to this doctrine, therefore, God first robs Himself of what is His own, and then inflicts upon the creature what is undeserved, to its profound misery and destruction.
3. It is also repugnant to the Goodness of God. Goodness is an affection [or disposition] in God to communicate his own good so far as his justice considers and admits to be fitting and proper. But in this doctrine the following act is attributed to God, that, of himself, and induced to it by nothing external, he wills the greatest evil to his creatures; and that from all eternity he has pre-ordained that evil for them, or pre-determined to impart it to them, even before he resolved to bestow upon them any portion of good. For this doctrine states, that God willed to damn; and, that he might be able to do this, be willed to create; although creation is the first egress [or going forth] of God’s goodness towards his creatures. How vastly different are such statements as these from that expansive goodness of God by which he confers benefits not only on the unworthy, but also on the evil, the unjust and on those who are deserving of punishment, which trait of Divine beneficence in our Father who is in heaven, we are commanded to imitate. (Matthew 5:45.)
3. Third, it contradicts the goodness of God. Goodness is God’s desire to share His blessings as far as His justice allows. Yet this doctrine claims that God—entirely unprovoked by any wrong—willed the worst possible evil for His creatures, destining them to eternal ruin from all eternity before He ever resolved to give them a single blessing! According to this view, God first decided to damn them, and only then decided to create them so that He could carry out their damnation—although creation is the very first expression of God’s goodness toward His creatures. How utterly foreign this is to the generous heart of our heavenly Father, who pours out His blessings not only on the undeserving, but even on the wicked and unjust—a merciful kindness that Jesus commands us to imitate (Matthew 5:45).
8. Such a doctrine of Predestination is contrary to the nature of man, in regard to his having been created after the Divine image in the knowledge of God and in righteousness, in regard to his having been created with freedom of will, and in regard to his having been created with a disposition and aptitude for the enjoyment of life eternal. These three circumstance, respecting him, may be deduced from the following brief expressions: “Do this, and live :” (Romans 10:5 .) “In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” (Genesis 2:17.) If man be deprived of any of these qualifications, such admonitions as these cannot possibly be effective in exciting him to obedience.
8. Such a doctrine of Predestination is contrary to the nature of man—in regard to his having been created in the divine image with the knowledge of God and in righteousness, with freedom of will, and with a capacity and aptitude for enjoying eternal life. These three realities concerning humanity may be deduced from the biblical words: “Do this and live” (Romans 10:5), and “In the day that you eat of it you shall surely die” (Genesis 2:17). If man is deprived of any of these qualifications, such divine warnings cannot possibly be effective in stirring him to obedience.
1. This doctrine is inconsistent with the Divine image, which consists of the knowledge of God and holiness. For according to this knowledge and righteousness man was qualified and empowered, he was also laid under an obligation to know God, to love, worship, and serve him. But by the intervention, or rather by the prevention, of this Predestination, it was pre-ordained that man should be formed vicious and should commit sin, that is, that he should neither know God, love, worship, nor serve him; and that he should not perform that which by the image of God, he was well qualified and empowered to do, and which he was bound to perform. This is tantamount to such a declaration as the following, which any one might make: “God did undoubtedly create man after his own image, in righteousness and true holiness; but, notwithstanding this, he fore-ordained and decreed, that man should become impure and unrighteous, that is, should be made conformable to the image of Satan.”
1. This doctrine is inconsistent with the divine image, which consists of the knowledge of God and true holiness. For by virtue of this knowledge and righteousness, man was empowered and obligated to know God, to love, worship, and serve Him. But by the intervention—or rather the prior determination—of this Predestination, it was preordained that man should be formed corrupt and commit sin, meaning that he should neither know God, love, worship, nor serve Him, failing to do what the divine image fully empowered him to do. This is equivalent to asserting: “God undoubtedly created man after His own image, in righteousness and true holiness; yet He foreordained and decreed that man should become impure and unrighteous—that is, conformed to the image of Satan.”
2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the freedom of the will, in which and with which man was created by God. For it prevents the exercise of this liberty, by binding or determining the will absolutely to one object, that is, to do this thing precisely, or to do that. God, therefore, according to this statement, may be blamed for the one or the other of these two things, (with which let no man charge his Maker!) either for creating man with freedom of will, or for hindering him in the use of his own liberty after he had formed him a free agent. In the former of these two cases, God is chargeable with a want of consideration, in the latter with mutability. And in both, with being injurious to man as well as to himself.
2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the freedom of the will with which man was created by God. For it destroys the exercise of this liberty by binding and determining the will absolutely to a single outcome—forcing it to do one specific thing. According to this teaching, God might be blamed for one of two things (may no one ever charge his Maker with such!): either for creating man with free will, or for hindering him in the exercise of that freedom after forming him a free agent. In the first case, God would be charged with a lack of foresight; in the second, with mutability; and in both, with dealing unjustly both with man and with Himself.
3. This Predestination is prejudicial to man in regard to the inclination and capacity for the eternal fruition of salvation, with which he was endowed at the period of his creation. For, since by this Predestination it has been pre-determined, that the greater part of mankind shall not be made partakers of salvation, but shall fall into everlasting condemnation, and since this predetermination took place even before the decree had passed for creating man, such persons are deprived of something, for the desire of which they have been endowed by God with a natural inclination. This great privation they suffer, not in consequence of any preceding sin or demerit of their own, but simply and solely through this sort of Predestination.
3. This Predestination is prejudicial to man in regard to the inclination and capacity for enjoying eternal salvation with which he was endowed at creation. For since by this Predestination it was predetermined that the greater part of mankind would not share in salvation, but fall into everlasting condemnation—and since this predetermination occurred before the decree to create man was enacted—such persons are stripped of that very blessing for which God gave them a natural inclination and desire. This profound loss they suffer not on account of any prior sin or guilt of their own, but purely and solely through this form of Predestination.
9. This Predestination is diametrically opposed to the Act of Creation.
9. Furthermore, this view of predestination stands in direct conflict with the work of creation itself.
1. For creation is a communication of good according to the intrinsic property of its nature. But, creation of this description, whose intent or design is, to make a way through itself by which the reprobation that had been previously determined may obtain its object, is not a communication of good. For we ought to form our estimate and judgment of every good, from the mind and intention of Him who is the Donor, and from the end to which or on account of which it is bestowed. In the present instance, the intention of the Donor would have been, to condemn, which is an act that could not possibly affect any one except a creature; and the end or event of creation would have been the eternal perdition of the creature. In that case creation would not have been a communication of any good, but a preparation for the greatest evil both according to the very intention of the Creator and the actual issue of the matter; and according to the words of Christ, “it had seen good for that man, if he had never been born!” (Matthew 26:24.)
1. For creation is a communication of good according to the intrinsic property of its nature. But a creation of this description—whose design is merely to open a path through which a previously determined reprobation may achieve its goal—is no communication of good at all. We ought to judge every good gift from the intention of the Giver and from the end for which it is bestowed. In this instance, the Giver’s intention would have been to condemn—an act that can apply only to a creature—and the ultimate outcome of creation would have been the creature's eternal destruction. In that case, creation was not a communication of any good, but a setup for the greatest evil, both in the Creator's design and in the actual result—fulfilling the words of Christ: “It would have been good for that man if he had never been born!” (Matthew 26:24).
2. Reprobation is an act of hatred, and from hatred derives its origin. But creation does not proceed from hatred; it is not therefore a way or means, which belongs to the execution of the decree of reprobation.
2. Reprobation is an act of hatred and derives its origin from hatred. But creation does not proceed from hatred; therefore, it cannot be a means or instrument belonging to the execution of a decree of reprobation.
3. Creation is a perfect act of God, by which he has manifested his wisdom, goodness and omnipotence: It is not therefore subordinate to the end of any other preceding work or action of God. But it is rather to be viewed as that act of God, which necessarily precedes and is antecedent to all other acts that he can possibly either decree or undertake. Unless God had formed a previous conception of the work of creation, he could not have decreed actually to undertake any other act; and until he had executed the work of creation, he could by no means have completed any other operation.
3. Creation is a perfect act of God by which He has displayed His wisdom, goodness, and almighty power. It cannot, therefore, be subordinated to the purpose of any prior work or decree of God. Rather, creation must be seen as the foundational act of God that necessarily precedes all other acts He could possibly decree or undertake toward creatures. Until God conceived the work of creation, He could not decree any subsequent action; and until He carried out creation, He could by no means execute any other operation upon them.
4. All the actions of God which tend to the condemnation of his creatures, are strange work or foreign to him; because God consents to them, for some other cause that is quite extraneous. But creation is not an action that is foreign to God, but it is proper to him. It is eminently an action most appropriate to Him, and to which he could be moved by no other external cause, because it is the very first of the Divine acts, and, till it was done, nothing could have any actual existence, except God himself; for every thing else that has a being, came into existence through this action.
4. All the actions of God that tend toward the condemnation of His creatures are a “strange work,” foreign to His nature, because God consents to punish only when moved by an extraneous cause—human sin. Creation, however, is not a foreign action, but God’s own proper work. It is an act to which He could be moved by no external cause, for until it was performed, nothing had any existence except God Himself; everything else that exists came into being through this very act.
5. If creation be the way and means through which God willed the execution of the decree of his reprobation, he was more inclined to will the act of reprobation than that of creation; and he consequently derived greater satisfaction from the act of condemning certain of his innocent creatures, than in the act of their creation.
5. If creation were the means through which God willed to execute His decree of reprobation, He would have been more inclined to will reprobation than creation. Consequently, He would have derived greater satisfaction from condemning innocent creatures than from creating them.
6. Lastly. Creation cannot be a way or means of reprobation according to the absolute purpose of God: because, after the creation was completed, it was in the power of man still to have remained obedient to the divine commands, and not to commit sin; to render this possible, while God had on one part bestowed on him sufficient strength and power, he had also on the other placed sufficient impediments; a circumstance most diametrically opposed to a Predestination of this description.
6. Lastly. Creation cannot be a way or means of reprobation according to the absolute purpose of God: because after creation was completed, it was still within man’s power to remain obedient to the divine commands and not commit sin. To make this possible, God on the one hand gave him sufficient strength and power, while on the other hand placing sufficient safeguards against sin—a reality diametrically opposed to a Predestination of this description.
10. This doctrine is at open hostility with the Nature of Eternal Life, and the titles by which it is signally distinguished in the Scriptures. For it is called “the inheritance of the sons of God ;” (Titus 3:7,) but those alone are the sons of God, according to the doctrine of the Gospel, “who believe in the name of Jesus Christ.” (John 1:12.) It is also called, “the reward of obedience,” (Matthew 5:12,) and of “the labor of love;” (Hebrews 6:10,) “the recompense of those who fight the good fight and who run well, a crown of righteousness,” etc. (Revelation 2:10; 2 Timothy 4:7, 8.) God therefore has not, from his own absolute decree, without any consideration or regard whatever to faith and obedience, appointed to any man, or determined to appoint to him, life eternal. 11 This Predestination is also opposed to the Nature of Eternal Death, and to those appellations by which it is described in Scripture. For it is called “the wages of sin; (Romans 6:23,) the punishment of everlasting destruction, which shall be recompensed to them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; (2 Thessalonians 1:8, 9,) the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels, (Matthew 25:41,) a fire which shall devour the enemies and adversaries of God.” (Hebrews 10:27.) God, therefore, has not, by any absolute decree without respect to sin and disobedience, prepared eternal death for any person.
10. Tenth, this doctrine clashes with the very nature of eternal life and the names Scripture gives it. In the Bible, eternal life is called “the inheritance of God’s children” (Titus 3:7)—and the gospel teaches that those alone are God’s children “who believe in the name of Jesus Christ” (John 1:12). Scripture also calls eternal life “the reward of obedience” (Matthew 5:12) and of “the work produced by love” (Hebrews 6:10), as well as the prize given to those who fight the good fight and finish the race, “the crown of righteousness” (Revelation 2:10; 2 Timothy 4:7, 8). Therefore, God has not appointed eternal life to anyone by a sheer, unconditional decree that ignores faith and obedience. 11. Likewise, this predestination contradicts the nature of eternal death and the way Scripture describes it. The Bible calls eternal death “the wages of sin” (Romans 6:23), the penalty of “everlasting destruction” brought upon “those who do not know God and do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Thessalonians 1:8, 9), “the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels” (Matthew 25:41), and a “raging fire that will consume the enemies of God” (Hebrews 10:27). Clearly, then, God has not prepared eternal death for any human being by an unconditional decree without regard to sin and rebellion.
12. This Predestination is inconsistent with the Nature and Properties of Sin in two ways:
12. Twelfth, this view of predestination is incompatible with the true nature of sin in two fundamental ways:
(1.) Because sin is called “disobedience” and “rebellion,” neither of which terms can possibly apply to any person who by a preceding divine decree is placed under an unavoidable necessity of sinning.
(1.) Scripture defines sin as “disobedience” and “rebellion.” Neither of those words can honestly be applied to someone whom God’s own prior decree has locked into an inescapable necessity of sinning.
(2.) Because sin is the meritorious cause of damnation. But the meritorious cause which moves the Divine will to reprobate, is according to justice; and it induces God, who holds sin in abhorrence, to will reprobation. Sin, therefore, which is a cause, cannot be placed among the means, by which God executes the decree or will of reprobation.
(2.) Because sin is the meritorious cause of damnation. But the meritorious cause that moves the divine will to reprobate operates according to justice, prompting God—who holds sin in abhorrence—to will reprobation. Sin, therefore, which is the blameworthy cause, cannot be placed among the means by which God executes the decree or will of reprobation.
13. This doctrine is likewise repugnant to the Nature of Divine Grace, and as far as its powers permit, it effects its destruction. Under whatever specious pretenses it may be asserted, that “this kind of Predestination is most admirably adapted and quite necessary for the establishment of grace,” yet it destroys it in three ways:
13. This doctrine is likewise repugnant to the Nature of Divine Grace, and as far as it can, it effects its destruction. Under whatever specious pretenses it may be asserted that “this kind of Predestination is admirably adapted and necessary for establishing grace,” it actually destroys it in three ways:
1. Because grace is so attempered and commingled with the nature of man, as not to destroy within him the liberty of his will, but to give it a right direction, to correct its depravity, and to allow man to possess his own proper notions. While, on the contrary, this Predestination introduces such a species of grace, as takes away free will and hinders its exercise.
1. Because grace is so harmonized with human nature that it does not destroy the freedom of man's will, but gives it right direction, corrects its depravity, and enables man to act freely. In contrast, this Predestination introduces a kind of grace that destroys free will and prevents its exercise.
2. Because the representations of grace which the scriptures contain, are such as describe it capable of “being resisted, (Acts 7:51,) and received in vain;” (2 Corinthians 6:1,) and that it is possible for man to avoid yielding his assent to it; and to refuse all co-operation with it. (Hebrews 12:15; Matthew 23:37; Luke 7:30.) While, on the contrary, this Predestination affirms, that grace is a certain irresistible force and operation.
2. Second, throughout Scripture divine grace is described as something that can be “resisted” (Acts 7:51) and “received in vain” (2 Corinthians 6:1). Human beings can refuse to yield to God’s grace and reject its help (Hebrews 12:15; Matthew 23:37; Luke 7:30). This scheme of predestination, by contrast, insists that grace is an irresistible force that cannot be refused.
3. Because, according to the primary intention and chief design of God, grace conduces to the good of those persons to whom it is offered and by whom it is received: while, on the contrary, this doctrine drags along with it the assertion, that grace is offered even to certain reprobates, and is so far communicated to them as to illuminate their understandings and to excite within them a taste for the heavenly gifts, only for this end and purpose, that, in proportion to the height to which they are elevated, the abyss into which they are precipitated may be the deeper, and their fall the heavier; and that they may both merit and receive the greater perdition.
3. Because according to God’s primary intention and chief design, grace is given for the good of those to whom it is offered and by whom it is received. In contrast, this doctrine brings with it the claim that grace is offered even to certain reprobates, illuminating their minds and stirring within them a taste for heavenly gifts, solely for the purpose that the height to which they are raised may make their plunge into the abyss all the deeper and their ruin all the heavier, so they may incur and receive a far greater damnation.
14. The doctrine of this Predestination is Injurious to the Glory of God, which does not consist of a declaration of liberty or authority, nor of a demonstration of anger and power, except to such an extent as that declaration and demonstration may be consistent with justice, and with a perpetual reservation in behalf of the honor of God’s goodness. But, according to this doctrine, it follows that God is the author of sin, which may be proved by four arguments:
14. The doctrine of this Predestination is Injurious to the Glory of God, which does not consist in a mere display of sovereignty or power, nor in a demonstration of wrath and might, except in so far as that display harmonizes with justice and preserves the honor of God’s goodness. But according to this doctrine, it follows that God is the author of sin, which may be proved by four arguments:
1. One of its positions is, that God has absolutely decreed to demonstrate his glory by punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men, and in the damnation of others, which neither was done, nor could have possibly been done, unless sin had entered into the world.
1. Its first premise is that God unconditionally decreed to display His glory through both punitive justice and mercy—saving some human beings and damning others—a display that could never take place unless sin first entered the world.
2. This doctrine affirms, that, in order to obtain his object, God ordained that man should commit sin, and be rendered vitiated; and, from this Divine ordination or appointment, the fall of man necessarily followed.
2. Its second premise is that, in order to accomplish this goal, God ordained that humanity should sin and become corrupt—so that the fall of Adam followed by necessity from God’s own decree.
3. It asserts that God has denied to man, or has withdrawn from him, such a portion of grace as is sufficient and necessary to enable him to avoid sin, and that this was done before man had sinned: which is an act that amounts to the same as if God had prescribed a law to man, which it would be utterly impossible for him to fulfill, when the nature in which he had been created was taken into consideration.
3. It asserts that God denied to man, or withdrew from him, the grace sufficient and necessary to avoid sin before man had ever sinned. This amounts to God giving man a law which it was utterly impossible for him to fulfill, given the nature in which he was created.
4. It ascribes to God certain operations with regard to man, both external and internal, both mediate (by means of the intervention of other creatures) and immediate — which Divine operations being once admitted, man must necessarily commit sin, by that necessity which the schoolmen call “a consequential necessity antecedent to the thing itself,” and which totally destroys the freedom of the will. Such an act does this doctrine attribute to God, and represents it to proceed from his primary and chief intention, without any foreknowledge of an inclination, will, or action on the part of man.
4. It ascribes to God certain operations regarding man—both external and internal, both mediate (through the intervention of creatures) and immediate—which, once granted, make it necessary for man to commit sin by what the scholastic theologians call “a consequential necessity antecedent to the act itself,” completely destroying the freedom of the will. This doctrine attributes such an act to God, asserting that it proceeds from His primary intention, without any foreknowledge of human inclination, will, or action.
From these premises, we deduce, as a further conclusion, that God really sins. Because, according to this doctrine, he moves to sin by an act that is unavoidable, and according to his own purpose and primary intention, without having received any previous inducement to such an act from any preceding sin or demerit in man.
From these premises, we deduce the further conclusion that God really sins. For according to this doctrine, He moves man to sin by an irresistible act, according to His own purpose and primary intention, unprompted by any prior sin or guilt in man.
From the same position we might also infer, that God is the only sinner. For man, who is impelled by an irresistible force to commit sin, (that is, to perpetrate some deed that has been prohibited,) cannot be said to sin himself.
From the same position, we might also infer that God is the only sinner. For a human being who is impelled by an irresistible force to commit sin (that is, to perform a forbidden deed) cannot truly be said to sin himself.
As a legitimate consequence it also follows, that sin is not sin, since whatever that be which God does, it neither can be sin, nor ought any of his acts to receive that appellation.
From this it would logically follow that sin is not really sin at all—since whatever God Himself designs and brings about cannot possibly be sin, nor should any work of God ever be called evil.
Besides the instances which I have already recounted, there is another method by which this doctrine inflicts a deep wound on the honor of God — but these, it is probable, will be considered at present to be amply sufficient.
Beyond the points I have already listed, there is yet another argument showing how deeply this teaching wounds the honor of God—though what I have already said will probably be considered sufficient for the present.
15. This doctrine is highly dishonorable to Jesus Christ our Savior. For,
15. Fifteenth, this doctrine deeply dishonors Jesus Christ our Savior, for two reasons:
(1.) It entirely excludes him from that decree of Predestination which predestinates the end: and it affirms, that men were predestinated to be saved, before Christ was predestinated to save them; and thus it argues, that he is not the foundation of election.
(1.) It shuts Christ completely out of the foundational decree of election, claiming that God predestined people to salvation before He ever appointed Christ to save them—which means Christ is no longer the foundation of our election.
(2.) It denies, that Christ is the meritorious cause, that again obtained for us the salvation which we had lost, by placing him as only a subordinate cause of that salvation which had been already foreordained, and thus only a minister and instrument to apply that salvation unto us. This indeed is in evident congruity with the opinion which states “that God has absolutely willed the salvation of certain men, by the first and supreme decree which he passed, and on which all his other decrees depend and are consequent.” If this be true, it was therefore impossible for the salvation of such men to have been lost, and therefore unnecessary for it to be repaired and in some sort regained afresh, and discovered, by the merit of Christ, who was fore-ordained a Savior for them alone.
(2.) It denies that Christ is the meritorious cause who regained for us the salvation we had lost, placing Him merely as a subordinate cause of a salvation already foreordained, and thus only an instrument to apply that salvation to us. This aligns with the opinion that “God unconditionally willed the salvation of certain men by the first and supreme decree He enacted, on which all other decrees depend.” If this were true, it would have been impossible for the salvation of those men to ever be lost, and therefore unnecessary for it to be restored through the merit of Christ, who was foreordained as a Savior for them alone.
16. This doctrine is also hurtful to the salvation of men.
16. Sixteenth, this teaching is also spiritually harmful to the salvation of human souls:
1. Because it prevents that saving and godly sorrow for sins that have been committed, which cannot exist in those who have no consciousness of sin. But it is obvious, that the man who has committed sin through the unavoidable necessity of the decree of God, cannot possibly have this kind of consciousness of sin. (2 Corinthians 7:10.)
1. It extinguishes the godly sorrow for sin that leads to repentance (2 Corinthians 7:10). No one can feel genuine remorse without recognizing personal guilt—and how can anyone feel truly responsible for sin if he believes he was forced into it by an inescapable divine decree?
2. Because it removes all pious solicitude about being converted from sin unto God. For he can feel no such concern who is entirely passive and conducts himself like a dead man, with respect not only to his discernment and perception of the grace of God that is exciting and assisting, but also to his assent and obedience to it; and who is converted by such an irresistible impulse, that he not only cannot avoid being sensible of the grace of God which knocks within him, but he must likewise of necessity yield his assent to it, and thus convert himself, or rather be converted. Such a person it is evident, cannot produce within his heart or conceive in his mind this solicitude, except he have previously felt the same irresistible motion. And if he should produce within his heart any such concern, it would be in vain and without the least advantage. For that cannot be a true solicitude, which is not produced in the heart by any other means except by an irresistible force according to the absolute purpose and intention of God to effect his salvation. (Revelation 2:3; Revelation 3:2 3:2.)
2. Because it removes all godly concern about being converted from sin to God. For no one can feel such concern who is entirely passive and acts like a dead corpse—not only in discerning the grace of God that prompts and assists, but also in assenting and obeying it—and who is converted by such an irresistible impulse that he cannot help but feel grace knocking within him and must of necessity yield, thus being converted. Such a person cannot cultivate this concern in his heart unless he has already felt that irresistible motion; and if he did try to cultivate it, it would be useless: concern produced only by an irresistible force, according to God’s absolute purpose to save him, cannot be genuine concern (Revelation 2:3; Revelation 3:2 3:2).
3. Because it restrains, in persons that are converted, all zeal and studious regard for good works, since it declares “that the regenerate cannot perform either more or less good than they do.” For he that is actuated or impelled by saving grace, must work, and cannot discontinue his labor; but he that is not actuated by the same grace, can do nothing, and finds it necessary to cease from all attempts. (Titus 3:14.)
3. Because it dampens in believers all zeal and earnest dedication to good works, since it asserts “that the regenerate cannot perform either more or less good than they actually do.” For one who is moved by saving grace must work and cannot cease, while one not moved by that grace can do nothing and must cease all attempts (Titus 3:14).
4. Because it extinguishes the zeal for prayer, which yet is an efficacious means instituted by God for asking and obtaining all kinds of blessings from him, but principally the great one of salvation. (Luke 11:1-13.) But from the circumstance of it having been before determined by an immutable and inevitable decree, that this description of men [the elect] should obtain salvation, prayer cannot on any account be a means for asking and obtaining that salvation. It can only be a mode of worshipping God; because according to the absolute decree of his Predestination he has determined that such men shall be saved.
4. Because it extinguishes the spirit of prayer, which is God’s appointed means for asking and receiving all kinds of blessings from Him—above all, the great gift of salvation (Luke 11:1-13). But if it has already been determined by an unchangeable decree that the elect must inevitably obtain salvation, prayer cannot be a genuine means of asking for and obtaining that salvation; it can only be a way of worshiping God, since God has already unconditionally decided that such men shall be saved.
5. It takes away all that most salutary fear and trembling with which we are commanded to work out our own salvation. (Philippians 2:12) for it states “that he who is elected and believes, cannot sin with that full and entire willingness with which sin is committed by the ungodly; and that they cannot either totally or finally fall away from faith or grace.”
5. It takes away all that wholesome fear and trembling with which we are commanded to work out our own salvation (Philippians 2:12); for it asserts “that he who is elected and believes cannot sin with that full and entire willingness with which sin is committed by the ungodly, and that they cannot fall away either totally or finally from faith or grace.”
6. Because it produces within men a despair both of performing that which their duty requires and of obtaining that towards which their desires are directed. For when they are taught that the grace of God (which is really necessary to the performance of the least portion of good) is denied to the majority of mankind, according to an absolute and peremptory decree of God — and that such grace is denied because, by a preceding decree equally absolute, God has determined not to confer salvation on them but damnation; when they are thus taught, it is scarcely possible for any other result to ensue, than that the individual who cannot even with great difficulty work a persuasion within himself of his being elected, should soon consider himself included in the number of the reprobate. From such an apprehension as this, must arise a certain despair of performing righteousness and obtaining salvation.
6. Because it produces within men a despair both of doing what duty requires and of obtaining what their desires seek. For when they are taught that the grace of God (which is necessary to perform the least good) is denied to the majority of mankind by an absolute and unconditional decree—and that this grace is denied because God has unconditionally determined to damn them—scarcely any other outcome can follow than that anyone who struggles to feel assured of his election will quickly conclude he is numbered among the reprobate. From such a dread must arise utter despair of living righteously and obtaining salvation.
17. This doctrine inverts the order of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. For in the Gospel God requires repentance and faith on the part of man, by promising to him life everlasting, if he consent to become a convert and a believer. (Mark 1:15; Mark 16:16 16:16.) But it is stated in this [Supralapsarian] decree of Predestination, that it is God’s absolute will, to bestow salvation on certain particular men, and that he willed at the same time absolutely to give those very individuals repentance and faith, by means of an irresistible force, because it was his will and pleasure to save them. In the Gospel, God denounces eternal death on the impenitent and unbelieving. (John 3:36.) And those threats contribute to the purpose which he has in view, that he may by such means deter them from unbelief and thus may save them. But by this decree of Predestination it is taught, that God wills not to confer on certain individual men that grace which is necessary for conversion and faith because he has absolutely decreed their condemnation. The Gospel says,
17. This doctrine inverts the order of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. For in the gospel, God requires repentance and faith from man, promising him everlasting life if he consents to repent and believe (Mark 1:15; Mark 16:16 16:16). But in this supralapsarian decree of Predestination, it is claimed that God unconditionally wills to bestow salvation on certain particular individuals, and that He simultaneously wills to give those same individuals repentance and faith by irresistible force simply because He willed to save them. In the gospel, God threatens eternal death against the impenitent and unbelieving (John 3:36)—threats intended to deter them from unbelief and lead them to salvation. But by this decree of Predestination, it is taught that God refuses to grant the grace necessary for conversion and faith because He has unconditionally decreed their condemnation. The Gospel says:
“God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should have everlasting life.” (John 3:16.) But this doctrine declares; “that God so loved those whom he had absolutely elected to eternal life, as to give his son to them alone, and by an irresistible force to produce within them faith on him.” To embrace the whole in few words, the Gospel says, “fulfill the command, and thou shalt obtain the promise; believe, and thou shalt live.” But this [supralapsarian] doctrine says, “since it is my will to give thee life, it is therefore my will to give thee faith:” which is a real and most manifest inversion of the Gospel.
“God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoever believes in him should have everlasting life” (John 3:16). But this doctrine declares: “God so loved those whom He had unconditionally elected to eternal life that He gave His Son to them alone, producing faith in them by an irresistible force.” To sum up the whole matter: the gospel says, “Fulfill the command and you will receive the promise; believe, and you will live.” But this supralapsarian doctrine says, “Since it is my will to give you life, it is therefore my will to give you faith”—which is a blatant inversion of the Gospel.
18. This Predestination is in open hostility to the ministry of the Gospel.
18. Eighteenth, this doctrine of predestination directly undermines the ministry of the gospel:
1. For if God by an irresistible power quicken him who is dead in trespasses and sins, no man can be a minister and “a laborer together with God,” (1 Corinthians 3:9,) nor can the word preached by man be the instrument of grace and of the Spirit, any more than a creature could have been an instrument of grace in the first creation, or a dispenser of that grace in the resurrection of the body from the dead.
1. If God brings spiritually dead sinners to life solely by an irresistible exercise of power, then no human preacher can truly be a “fellow worker with God” (1 Corinthians 3:9), nor can the preached Word serve as a genuine instrument of grace and the Spirit—any more than a creature assisted God in the original creation of the universe or will assist Him in raising the dead at the last day.
2. Because by this Predestination the ministry of the gospel is made “the savor of death unto death” in the case of the majority of those who hear it, (2 Corinthians 2:14-16,) as well as an instrument of condemnation, according to the primary design and absolute intention of God, without any consideration of previous rebellion.
2. Furthermore, under this doctrine, the preaching of the gospel becomes “the smell of death leading to death” for the majority of hearers (2 Corinthians 2:14-16)—functioning as a tool of condemnation by God’s own primary intention, before those hearers have ever rejected it.
3. Because, according to this doctrine, baptism, when administered to many reprobate children, (who yet are the offspring of parents that believe and are God’s covenant people,) is evidently a seal [or ratification] of nothing, and thus becomes entirely useless, in accordance with the primary and absolute intention of God, without any fault [or culpability] on the part of the infants themselves, to whom it is administered in obedience to the Divine command.
3. Because according to this doctrine, baptism administered to reprobate children (even the offspring of believing parents within God's covenant) is evidently a seal of nothing at all, and thus becomes entirely useless by the primary and absolute intention of God, through no fault of the infants themselves, to whom it was administered in obedience to the divine command.
4. Because it hinders public prayers from being offered to God in a becoming and suitable manner, that is, with faith, and in confidence that they will be profitable to all the hearers of the word; when there are many among them, whom God is not only unwilling to save, but whom by his absolute, eternal, and immutable will, (which is antecedent to all things and causes whatever,) it is his will and pleasure to damn: In the mean time, when the apostle commands prayers and supplications to be made for all men, he adds this reason,
4. Because it hinders public prayers from being offered to God in a fitting manner—that is, in faith and with confidence that they will benefit all who hear the Word—since under this doctrine there are many present whom God is unwilling to save, but whom by His absolute, eternal, and unchangeable will—prior to all things and causes—He has purposed to damn. Meanwhile, when the apostle commands prayers and supplications to be made for all men, he adds this reason:
“for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior; who will have all men to be saved,and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.” (1 Timothy 2:1-4.)
“This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth” (1 Timothy 2:1-4).
5. The constitution of this doctrine is such, as very easily to render pastors and teachers slothful and negligent in the exercise of their ministry: Because, from this doctrine it appears to them as though it were impossible for all their diligence to be useful to any persons, except to those only whom God absolutely and precisely wills to save, and who cannot possibly perish; and as though all their negligence could be hurtful to none, except to those alone whom God absolutely wills to destroy, who must of necessity perish, and to whom a contrary fate is impossible.
5. The very nature of this doctrine easily makes pastors and teachers slothful and negligent in their ministry. For it makes them feel that all their diligence cannot benefit anyone except those whom God unconditionally wills to save (who cannot possibly perish), and that all their negligence can harm none except those whom God unconditionally wills to destroy (who must of necessity perish, and for whom salvation is impossible).
19. This doctrine completely subverts the foundation of religion in general, and of the Christian Religion in particular.
19. This doctrine undermines the very foundation of all religion in general, and of the Christian faith in particular.
1. The foundation of religion considered in general, is a two-fold love of God; without which there neither is nor can be any religion: The first of them is a love for righteousness [or justice] which gives existence to his hatred of sin. The second is a love for the creature who is endowed with reason, and (in the matter now before us,) it is a love for man, according to the expression of the Apostle to the Hebrews. “for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” (Hebrews 11:6 11:6.) God’s love of righteousness is manifested by this circumstance, that it is not his will and pleasure to bestow eternal life on any except on “those who seek him.” God’s love of man consists in his being willing to give him eternal life, if he seek Him.
1. The foundation of true religion in general rests upon God's twofold love, without which no religion can exist at all. The first is his love for righteousness and justice, which produces his hatred of sin. The second is his love for his rational creatures—specifically, in this discussion, his love for human beings—as the author of Hebrews declares: "Whoever comes to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who sincerely seek him" (Hebrews 11:6). God's love for righteousness is clearly shown because he refuses to grant eternal life to anyone except those who seek him. His love for humanity is shown in his genuine willingness to give eternal life to those who do seek him.
A mutual relation subsists between these two kinds of love, which is this. The latter species of love, which extends itself to the creatures, cannot come into exercise, except so far as it is permitted by the former, [the love of righteousness]: The former love, therefore, is by far the most excellent species; but in every direction there is abundant scope for the emanations of the latter, [the love of the creature,] except where the former [the love of righteousness] has placed some impediment in the range of its exercise. The first of these consequences is most evidently proved from the circumstance of God’s condemning man on account of sin, although he loves him in the relation in which he stands as his creature; which would by no means have been done, had he loved man more than righteousness, [or justice,] and had he evinced a stronger aversion to the eternal misery of man than to his disobedience. But the second consequence is proved by this argument, that God condemns no person, except on account of sin; and that he saves such a multitude of men who turn themselves away [or are converted] from sin; which he could not do, unless it was his will to allow as abundant scope to his love for the creatures, as is permitted by righteousness [or justice] under the regulation of the Divine judgment. But this [Supralapsarian] doctrine inverts this order and mutual relation in two ways:
A vital relationship exists between these two loves. The second love—God's love for his creatures—can only operate within the boundaries permitted by the first, his supreme love for righteousness. Therefore, God's love for righteousness is paramount. At the same time, his love for his creatures flows out abundantly in every direction, except where his love for righteousness sets a necessary boundary. The priority of God's love for righteousness is demonstrated by the fact that God condemns people because of sin, even though he genuinely loves them as his creatures. He would never do this if he loved human beings more than righteousness, or if he hated human misery more than he hated disobedience. On the other hand, the vast scope of his love for humanity is proven by the fact that he condemns no one except on account of sin, and that he saves vast multitudes who turn away from sin in true repentance. He could not do this unless he intended his love for his creatures to extend as far as his righteousness and divine judgment permit. Yet the supralapsarian doctrine of predestination turns this divine order upside down in two serious ways:
(1.) The one is when it states, that God wills absolutely to save certain particular men, without having had in that his intention the least reference or regard to their obedience. This is the manner in which it places the love of God to man before his love of righteousness, and lays down the position — that God loves men (as such) more than righteousness, and evinces a stronger aversion to their misery than to their sin and disobedience.
(1.) First, it claims that God absolutely resolved to save specific individuals without any regard whatsoever to their obedience. In doing so, it places God's love for human beings ahead of his love for righteousness. It effectively asserts that God loves people more than he loves holiness, and that he shrinks more from their eternal suffering than from their sin and rebellion.
(2.) The other is when it asserts, on the contrary, that God wills absolutely to damn certain particular men without manifesting in his decree any consideration of their disobedience. In this manner it detracts from his love to the creature that which belongs to it; while it teaches, that God hates the creature, without any cause or necessity derived from his love of righteousness and his hatred of iniquity. In which case, it is not true, “that sin is the primary object of God’s hatred, and its only meritorious cause.” The great influence and potency which this consideration possesses in subverting the foundation of religion, may be appropriately described by the following simile: Suppose a son to say, “My father is such a great lover of righteousness and equity, that, notwithstanding I am his beloved son, he would disinherit me if I were found disobedient to him. Obedience, therefore, is a duty which I must sedulously cultivate, and which is highly incumbent upon me, if I wish to be his heir.” Suppose another son to say: “My father’s love for me is so great, that he is absolutely resolved to make me his heir. There is, therefore, no necessity for my earnestly striving to yield him obedience; for, according to his unchangeable will, I shall become his heir. Nay, he will by an irresistible force draw me to obey him, rather than not suffer me to be made his heir.” But such reasoning as the latter is diametrically opposed to the doctrine contained in the following words of John the Baptist:
(2.) Second, it asserts conversely that God absolutely resolved to damn specific individuals without any consideration of their disobedience in his decree. In this way, it robs God's creatures of the love rightfully due to them, teaching that God hates them without any cause rooted in his love for righteousness or his hatred of sin. If that were true, sin would not be the primary object of God's hatred nor would it be the sole cause deserving that hatred. The destructive power of this error to undermine true religion can be clearly illustrated with a comparison. Suppose a son says: "My father loves righteousness and justice so deeply that, even though I am his beloved child, he would disinherit me if I were found disobedient. Therefore, I must diligently cultivate obedience if I hope to remain his heir." But imagine a second son saying: "My father loves me so unconditionally that he has unconditionally determined to make me his heir no matter what. Therefore, there is no real need for me to strive to obey him; by his unalterable will, I will receive the inheritance. In fact, he will compel me by irresistible power to obey rather than let me lose my inheritance." This second mindset stands completely opposed to the biblical truth taught by John the Baptist:
“And think not to say within yourselves, we have Abraham to our father: For I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.” (Matthew 3:9.)
"And do not presume to say to yourselves, 'We have Abraham as our father.' For I tell you that God can raise up children for Abraham from these very stones" (Matthew 3:9).
2. But the Christian religion also has its superstructure built upon this two-fold love as a foundation. This love, however, is to be considered in a manner somewhat different, in consequence of the change in the condition of man, who, when he had been created after the image of God and in his favor, became by his own fault a sinner and an enemy to God.
2. The Christian faith itself is built upon this twofold love as its foundational rock. However, this love must now be understood in light of humanity's fallen condition. Though mankind was originally created in God's image and enjoyed his favor, human beings fell through their own fault, becoming sinners and enemies of God.
(1.) God’s love of righteousness [or justice] on which the Christian religion rests, is, first, that righteousness which he declared only once, which was in Christ; because it was his will that sin should not be expiated in any other way than by the blood and death of his Son, and that Christ should not be admitted before him as an Advocate, Deprecator and Intercessor, except when sprinkled by his own blood. But this love of righteousness is, secondly, that which he daily manifests in the preaching of the gospel, in which he declares it to be his will to grant a communication of Christ and his benefits to no man, except to him who becomes converted and believes in Christ.
(1.) God's love for righteousness, on which the Christian faith rests, is expressed first in the once-for-all demonstration of justice in Jesus Christ. God willed that sin should never be atoned for in any other way than through the sacrificial death and blood of his Son, and that Christ could stand before him as our Advocate and Intercessor only through his own shed blood. Second, God's love for righteousness is displayed every day in the preaching of the gospel, where he declares that no one can share in Christ and his saving benefits except through genuine repentance and faith in him.
(2.) God’s love of miserable sinners, on which likewise the Christian religion is founded, is, first, that love by which he gave his Son for them, and constituted him a Savior of those who obey him. But this love of sinners is, secondly, that by which he hath required obedience, not according to the rigor and severity to which he was entitled by his own supreme right, but according to his grace and clemency, and with the addition of a promise of the remission of sins, provided fallen man repent. The [supralapsarian] doctrine of Predestination is, in two ways, opposed to this two-fold foundation: first, by stating, “that God has such a great love for certain sinners, that it was his will absolutely to save them before he had given satisfaction, through Christ Jesus, to his love of righteousness, [or justice,] and that he thus willed their salvation even in his own fore-knowledge and according to his determinate purpose.” Besides, it totally and most completely overturns this foundation, by teaching it to be “God’s pleasure, that satisfaction should be paid to his justice, [or righteousness,] because he willed absolutely to save such persons:” which is nothing less, than to make his love for justice, manifested in Christ, subordinate to his love for sinful man whom it is his will absolutely to save. Secondly. It opposes itself to this foundation, by teaching, “that it is the will of God absolutely to damn certain sinners without any consideration of their impenitency;” when at the same time a most plenary and complete satisfaction had been rendered, in Christ Jesus, to God’s love of righteousness [or justice] and to his hatred of sin. So that nothing now can hinder the possibility of his extending mercy to the sinner, whosoever he may be, except the condition of repentance. Unless some person should choose to assert, what is stated in this doctrine, “that it has been God’s will to act towards the greater part of mankind with the same severity as he exercised towards the devil and his angels, or even with greater, since it was his pleasure that neither Christ nor his gospel should be productive of greater blessings to them than to the devils, and since, according to the first offense, the door of grace is as much closed against them as it is against the evil angels.” Yet each of those angels sinned, by himself in his own proper person, through his individual maliciousness, and by his voluntary act; while men sinned, only in Adam their parent, before they had been brought into existence.
(2.) God's love for miserable sinners, on which the Christian faith is likewise founded, is revealed first in that he gave his only Son for them, making him the Savior of all who obey him. Second, God's love for sinners is demonstrated because he does not demand obedience according to the absolute rigor and severity that his sovereign right could require; rather, he deals with us in grace and clemency, promising the full forgiveness of sins to all fallen people who repent. The supralapsarian doctrine of predestination conflicts with this twofold foundation in two ways. First, it claims that God loved certain sinners so much that he absolutely willed to save them before his love of justice had been satisfied through Jesus Christ—willing their salvation in his eternal foreknowledge and predetermined purpose prior to Christ's atonement. It overturns this foundation by teaching that God required satisfaction for his justice only because he had already unconditionally chosen to save those specific individuals. This makes his love for justice in Christ entirely subordinate to an absolute decree saving particular sinners. Second, it opposes this foundation by teaching that God absolutely willed to damn certain sinners without any regard to their impenitence, even though Jesus Christ rendered full and complete satisfaction to God's justice and his hatred of sin. Because of Christ's sacrifice, nothing stands in the way of God extending mercy to any sinner whatever, except the sinner's refusal to repent. The only other alternative is to claim, as this doctrine does, that God chose to treat the majority of mankind with the same severity—or even greater severity—than he showed to the devil and fallen angels, willing that neither Christ nor the gospel should offer them any more hope than the demons have, and slamming the door of grace shut against them forever from the moment of Adam's first offense. Yet each of those rebellious angels sinned personally through his own malice and voluntary choice, whereas human beings sinned only in Adam, their ancestor, before they had even been brought into existence.
But, that we may more clearly understand the fact of this two-fold love being the foundation of all religion and the manner in which it is so, with the mutual correspondence that subsists between each other, as we have already described them, it will be profitable for us to contemplate with greater attention the following words of the Apostle to the Hebrews: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” In these words two things are laid down as foundations to religion, in opposition to two fiery darts of Satan, which are the most pernicious pests to it, and each of which is able by itself to overturn and extirpate all religion. One of them is security, the other despair. Security operates, when a man permits himself, that, how inattentive soever he may be to the worship of God, he will not be damned, but will obtain salvation. Despair is in operation, when a person entertains a persuasion, that, whatever degree of reverence he may evince towards God, he will not receive any remuneration. In what human mind soever either of these pests is fostered, it is impossible that any true and proper worship of God can there reside. Now both of them are overturned by the words of the Apostle: For if a man firmly believes, “that God will bestow eternal life on those alone who seek Him, but that He will inflict on the rest death eternal,” he can on no account indulge himself in security. And if he likewise believes, that “God is truly a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him,” by applying himself to the search he will not be in danger of falling into despair. The foundation of the former kind of faith by which a man firmly believes, “that God will bestow eternal life on none except on those who seek Him,” is that love which God bears to his own righteousness, [or justice,] and which is greater than that which he entertains for man. And, by this alone, all cause of security is removed. But the foundation of the latter kind of faith, “that God will undoubtedly be a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him,” is that great love for man which neither will nor can prevent God from effecting salvation for him, except he be hindered by his still greater love for righteousness or justice. Yet the latter kind of love is so far from operating as a hindrance to God from becoming a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him, that on the contrary, it promotes in every possible way the bestowment of that reward. Those persons, therefore, who seek God, can by no means indulge in a single doubt concerning his readiness to remunerate. And it is this which acts as a preservative against despair or distrust. Since this is the actual state of the case, this two-fold love, and the mutual relation which each part of it bears to the other and which we have just unfolded, are the foundations of religion, without which no religion can possibly exist. That doctrine, therefore, which is in open hostility to this mutual love and to the relation that mutually subsists between them, is, at the same time, subversive of the foundation of all religion.
To understand more clearly how this twofold love forms the very foundation of all religion, and how its two aspects correspond to each other, we should carefully reflect on the words of the author of Hebrews: "Whoever comes to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who sincerely seek him." In this passage, two vital truths are established as pillars of religion to counter two fiery darts of Satan—deadly spiritual poisons, either of which can completely uproot true religion. One is false security; the other is despair. False security sets in when someone convinces himself that, no matter how careless or indifferent he is toward God, he will never be damned but will surely be saved. Despair sets in when someone becomes convinced that, no matter how reverently he seeks God, he will never receive any reward. Wherever either of these poisons takes root, true and heartfelt worship cannot survive. Yet both errors are shattered by the apostle's words. If someone firmly believes that God will bestow eternal life only on those who seek him, while leaving the rest to eternal death, he cannot possibly rest in false security. And if he also firmly believes that God genuinely rewards those who diligently seek him, he will never give way to despair as he seeks the Lord. The first conviction—that God gives eternal life only to those who seek him—is grounded in God's supreme love for his own righteousness, which surpasses his love for man, and this entirely removes all excuse for spiritual presumption. The second conviction—that God will faithfully reward those who diligently seek him—is grounded in his deep love for humanity, a love that moves him to save everyone who comes to him, hindered only if his justice demands punishment for unrepentant rebellion. But his justice never hinders him from rewarding those who sincerely seek him; on the contrary, it actively rejoices in bestowing that promised reward. Therefore, those who seek God have no reason to doubt his readiness to reward them, and this shields them against despair and distrust. This twofold love and the harmony between its two expressions form the indispensable foundation of all true religion. Any doctrine that stands in direct opposition to this twofold love and its divine order inherently undermines the foundation of true religion itself.
10. Lastly. This doctrine of Predestination has been rejected both in former times and in our own days, by the greater part of the professors of Christianity.
20. Finally, this particular doctrine of predestination has been rejected, both in earlier centuries and in our own day, by the greater part of professing Christians.
1. But, omitting all mention of the periods that occurred in former ages, facts themselves declare, that the Lutheran and Anabaptist Churches, as well as that of Rome, account this to be an erroneous doctrine.
1. Even setting aside the history of past centuries, the clear facts of our own time show that the Lutheran and Anabaptist churches, as well as the Church of Rome, all regard this view as erroneous.
2. However highly Luther and Melancthon might at the very commencement of the reformation, have approved of this doctrine, they afterwards deserted it. This change in Melancthon is quite apparent from his latter writings: And those who style themselves “Luther’s disciples,” make the same statement respecting their master, while they contend that on this subject he made a more distinct and copious declaration of his sentiments, instead of entirely abandoning those which he formerly entertained. But Philip Melancthon believed that this doctrine did not differ greatly from the fate of the Stoics: This appears from many of his writings, but more particularly in a certain letter which he addressed to Gasper Peucer, and in which, among other things, he states: “Laelius writes to me and says, that the controversy respecting the Stoical Fate is agitated with such uncommon fervor at Geneva, that one individual is cast into prison because he happened to differ from Zeno. O unhappy times! When the doctrine of salvation is thus obscured by certain strange disputes!”
2. Although Luther and Melanchthon may have favored this view at the very start of the Reformation, they later abandoned it. Melanchthon's shift is obvious from his later writings. Those who consider themselves Luther's true followers say the same regarding their master, maintaining that he later explained his views much more clearly and fully rather than entirely abandoning his earlier views. Philip Melanchthon was convinced that this doctrine closely resembled the fatalism of the Stoics. This is evident throughout his writings, especially in a letter to Caspar Peucer where he wrote: "Laelius writes to tell me that the dispute over Stoic fate is raging with such fierce intensity in Geneva that a man has actually been imprisoned simply because he disagreed with Zeno! What sad and tragic times, when the doctrine of salvation is clouded by such bizarre controversies!"
3. All the Danish Churches embrace a doctrine quite opposed to this, as is obvious from the writings of Nicholas Hemmingius in his treatise on Universal Grace, in which he declares that the contest between him and his adversaries consisted in the determination of these two points: “do the Elect believe ,” or, “are believers the true elect?” He considers “those persons who maintain the former position, to hold sentiments agreeable to the doctrine of the Manichees and Stoics; and those who maintain the latter point, are in obvious agreement with Moses and the Prophets, with Christ and his Apostles.”
3. All the Danish churches hold a doctrine directly contrary to this view, as shown clearly in the writings of Niels Hemmingsen in his treatise On Universal Grace. He explains that the fundamental debate between him and his opponents turns on two questions: "Do the elect believe?" or "Are believers the true elect?" He concluded that those who take the first position align themselves with the errors of the Manichees and the Stoics, while those who maintain the second position stand in clear agreement with Moses and the prophets, and with Christ and his apostles.
4. Besides, by many of the inhabitants of these our own provinces, this doctrine is accounted a grievance of such a nature, as to cause several of them to affirm, that on account of it, they neither can nor will have any communion with our Church. Others of them have united themselves with our Churches, but not without entering a protest, “that they cannot possibly give their consent to this doctrine.” But, on account of this kind of Predestination, our Churches have been deserted by not a few individuals, who formerly held the same opinions as ourselves: Others, also, have threatened to depart from us, unless they be fully assured that the Church holds no opinion of this description.
4. Furthermore, many people in our own provinces view this doctrine as such a serious grievance that a number of them declare they neither can nor will fellowship with our church because of it. Others have joined our congregations only after registering a formal protest, insisting they can never endorse such teaching. Indeed, not a few believers who once shared our fellowship have departed our churches entirely over this view of predestination, while others have threatened to leave unless they receive clear assurance that our church does not endorse it.
5. There is likewise no point of doctrine which the Papists, Anabaptists, and Lutherans oppose with greater vehemence than this, and through whose sides they create a worse opinion of our Churches or procure for them a greater portion of hatred, and thus bring into disrepute all the doctrines which we profess. They likewise affirm “that of all the blasphemies against God which the mind of man can conceive or his tongue can express, there is none so foul as not to be deduced by fair consequence from this opinion of our doctors.”
5. Likewise, there is no doctrine that Roman Catholics, Anabaptists, and Lutherans attack with more fury than this one. They use it as a weapon to damage the reputation of our churches, stirring up deep hostility against us and discrediting all our other teachings. They even charge that every conceivable blasphemy against God that human lips could utter or the human mind imagine can be logically deduced from this teaching of our theologians.
6. Lastly. Of all the difficulties and controversies which have arisen in these our Churches since the time of the Reformation, there is none that has not had its origin in this doctrine, or that has not, at least, been mixed with it. What I have here said will be found true, if we bring to our recollection the controversies which existed at Leyden in the affair of Koolhaes, at Gouda in that of Herman Herberts, at Horn with respect to Cornelius Wiggerston, and at Mendenblich in the affair of Tako Sybrants. This consideration was not among the last of those motives which induced me to give my most diligent attention to this head of doctrine, and endeavor to prevent our Churches from suffering any detriment from it; because, from it, the Papists have derived much of their increase. While all pious teachers ought most heartily to desire the destruction of Popery, as they would that of the kingdom of Antichrist, they ought with the greatest zeal, to engage in the attempt, and as far as it is within their power, to make the most efficient preparations for its overthrow.
6. Finally, every conflict and controversy that has arisen in our churches since the Reformation began has either stemmed directly from this doctrine or become entangled with it. The truth of this will be obvious if we recall the disputes in Leiden over Caspar Coolhaes, in Gouda over Herman Herberts, in Hoorn over Cornelis Wiggertsz, and in Medemblik over Taco Sybrantsz. This reality was one of the strongest reasons that compelled me to study this doctrine so thoroughly, seeking to protect our churches from harm. Rome has drawn much of its strength and many of its converts by pointing to these very teachings. Since all godly teachers ought earnestly to desire the downfall of the papacy as they would that of the kingdom of Antichrist, they ought to work toward it zealously and, as far as they can, make effective preparations for its overthrow.
The preceding views are, in brief, those which I hold respecting this novel doctrine of Predestination. I have propounded it with all good faith from the very expressions of the authors themselves, that I might not seem to invent and attribute to them any thing which I was not able clearly to prove from their writings.
These, in brief, are my conclusions regarding this novel view of predestination. I have presented it fairly and faithfully using the authors' own expressions, so no one could accuse me of misrepresenting them or attributing to them views that cannot be proven directly from their own writings.
2. A SECOND KIND OF PREDESTINATION.
2. A SECOND VIEW OF PREDESTINATION
But some other of our doctors state the subject of God’s Predestination in a manner somewhat different. We will cursorily touch upon the two modes which they employ.
Other theologians among us explain God's predestination in a somewhat different way. I will briefly outline the two main variations they present.
Among some of them the following opinion is prevalent:
Among some of them, the following view prevails:
1. God determined within himself, by an eternal and immutable decree, to make (according to his own good pleasure,) the smaller portion out of the general mass of mankind partakers of his grace and glory, to the praise of his own glorious grace. But according to his pleasure he also passed by the greater portion of men, and left them in their own nature, which is incapable of every thing supernatural, [or beyond itself,] and did not communicate to them that saving and supernatural grace by which their nature, (if it still retained its integrity,) might be strengthened, or by which, if it were corrupted, it might be restored — for a demonstration of his own liberty. Yet after God had made these men sinners and guilty of death, he punished them with death eternal — for a demonstration of his own justice.
1. God resolved within himself, by an eternal and unchangeable decree according to his good pleasure, to grant the smaller portion from the common mass of humanity a share in his grace and glory, to the praise of his glorious grace. But according to his sovereign pleasure, he passed by the greater portion of mankind, leaving them in their natural human state, which cannot attain anything supernatural on its own. He chose not to grant them that saving and supernatural grace which could either have strengthened their nature (had it remained unfallen) or restored it (once corrupted)—all to display his absolute sovereignty and freedom. Then, after God had made these people sinners and guilty of death, he condemned them to eternal death to demonstrate his justice.
2. Predestination is to be considered in respect to its end and to the means which tend to it. But these persons employ the word “Predestination” in its special acceptation for election and oppose it to reprobation.
2. In this scheme, predestination is viewed in terms of its ultimate goal and the means leading to that goal. However, these writers use the term "predestination" in the specific sense of election, contrasting it with reprobation.
(1.) In respect to its end, (which is salvation, and an illustration of the glorious grace of God,) man is considered in common and absolutely, such as he is in his own nature.
(1.) Regarding its ultimate goal—which is salvation and the display of God's glorious grace—man is viewed simply and generally, as he is in his ordinary human nature.
(2.) But in respect to the means, man is considered as perishing from himself and in himself, and as guilty in Adam.
(2.) Regarding the means to achieve that goal, man is viewed as ruined in and of himself, guilty and lost in Adam.
3. In the decree concerning the end, the following gradations are to be regarded.
3. In the decree concerning the goal, they distinguish the following successive steps:
(1.) The prescience of God, by which he foreknew those whom he had predestinated. Then
(1.) God's foreknowledge, by which he foreknew those whom he chose to predestine; followed by
(2.) The Divine prefinition, [or predetermination,] by which he foreordained the salvation of those persons by whom he had foreknown. First, by electing them from all eternity: and secondly, by preparing for them grace in this life, and glory in the world to come.
(2.) Divine predetermination, by which he foreordained the salvation of those he foreknew—first by electing them from eternity, and second by preparing grace for them in this life and glory in the life to come.
4. The means which belong to the execution of this Predestination, are
4. The means appointed to execute this predestination are:
(1.) Christ himself:
(1.) Jesus Christ himself;
(2.) An efficacious call to faith in Christ, from which justification takes its origin:
(2.) An effective call to faith in Christ, from which justification flows; and
(3.) The gift of perseverance unto the end.
(3.) The gift of final perseverance to the end.
5. As far as we are capable of comprehending their scheme of reprobation it consists of two acts, that of preterition and that of predamnatian. It is antecedent to all things, and to all causes which are either in the things themselves or which arise out of them; that is, it has no regard whatever to any sin, and only views man in an absolute and general aspect.
5. So far as we can understand their scheme of reprobation, it consists of two distinct acts: passing by (preterition) and pre-condemnation. This decree precedes all other things and all causes within or arising from creatures; that is, it pays no regard whatever to any sin, viewing man only in an absolute and general human condition.
6. Two means are fore-ordained for the execution of the act of preterition:
6. Two means are foreordained to carry out this act of passing by:
(1.) Dereliction [or abandoning] in a state of nature, which by itself is incapable of every thing supernatural: and
(1.) Leaving the person in a purely natural state, which is incapable of attaining anything supernatural; and
(2.) Non-communication [or a negation] of supernatural grace, by which their nature (if in a state of integrity,) might be strengthened, and (if in a state of corruption,) might be restored.
(2.) Withholding supernatural grace, which could have strengthened human nature if unfallen, or restored it once fallen.
7. Predamnation is antecedent to all things, yet it does by no means exist without a fore-knowledge of the causes of damnation. It views man as a sinner, obnoxious to damnation in Adam, and as on this account perishing through the necessity of Divine justice.
7. Pre-condemnation likewise precedes all things, though it is said not to exist without foreknowledge of the causes of damnation. It views man as a sinner liable to damnation in Adam, perishing under the requirements of divine justice.
8. The means ordained for the execution of this predamnation, are
8. The means ordained to execute this pre-condemnation are:
(1.) Just desertion, which is either that of exploration, [or examination,] in which God does not confer his grace, or that of punishment when God takes away from a man all his saving gifts, and delivers him over to the power of Satan.
(1.) Just abandonment—either for testing, where God withholds his grace, or as punishment, where God strips away all saving gifts and hands the person over to the power of Satan; and
(2.) The second means are induration or hardening, and those consequences which usually follow even to the real damnation of the person reprobated.
(2.) Judicial hardening of heart, along with all the consequences that usually follow, culminating in the actual damnation of the reprobate.
3. A THIRD KIND OF PREDESTINATION.
3. A THIRD VIEW OF PREDESTINATION
But others among our doctors state their sentiments on this subject in the following manner:
Still other theologians among us explain their position in this way:
1. Because God willed within himself from all eternity to make a decree by which he might elect certain men and reprobate the rest, he viewed and considered the human race not only as created but likewise as fallen or corrupt, and on that account obnoxious to cursing and malediction. Out of this lapsed and accursed state God determined to liberate certain individuals and freely to save them by his grace, for a declaration of his mercy; but he resolved in his own just judgment to leave the rest under the curse [or malediction] for a declaration of his justice. In both these cases God acts without the least consideration of repentance and faith in those whom he elects, or of impenitence and unbelief in those whom he reprobates.
1. Since God purposed within himself from all eternity to decree the election of some and the reprobation of the rest, he viewed the human race not merely as created, but as fallen and corrupt, subject to his righteous curse. From this fallen and cursed mass, God determined to deliver certain individuals and freely save them by his grace to demonstrate his mercy, while resolving in his just judgment to leave the rest under condemnation to demonstrate his justice. In both instances, God acts without the slightest consideration of repentance and faith in those he elects, or of impenitence and unbelief in those he reprobates.
2. The special means which relate particularly to the execution both of election and reprobation, are the very same as those which we have already expounded in the first of these kinds of Predestination, with the exception of those means which are common both to election and reprobation; because this [third] opinion places the fall of man, not as a means fore-ordained for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination, but as something that might furnish a fixed purpose or occasion for making this decree of Predestination.
2. The specific means appointed to carry out both election and reprobation are identical to those described in the first scheme, except for those means common to both. This third view does not treat the fall of man as a means foreordained to execute an earlier decree of predestination, but rather as the occasion or condition providing the basis for making the decree itself.
4. MY JUDGMENT RESPECTING THE TWO LAST DESCRIBED
4. MY EVALUATION OF THESE TWO LATTER
SCHEMES OF PREDESTINATION.
VIEWS OF PREDESTINATION
Both these opinions, as they outwardly pretend, differ from the first in this point — that neither of them lays down the creation or the fall as a mediate cause fore-ordained by God for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination. Yet, with regard to the fall, some diversity may be perceived in the two latter opinions. For the second kind of Predestination places election, with regard to the end, before the fall; it also places before that event preterition, [or passing by,] which is the first part of reprobation. While the third kind does not allow any part of election and reprobation to commence till after the fall of man. But, among the causes which seem to have induced the inventors of the two latter schemes to deliver the doctrine of Predestination in this manner, and not to ascend to such a great height as the inventors of the first scheme have done, this is not the least — that they have been desirous of using the greatest precaution, lest it might be concluded from their doctrine that God is the author of sin, with as much show of probability as, (according to the intimation of some of those who yield their assent to both the latter kinds,) it is deducible from the first description of Predestination.
Both of these theories claim on the surface to differ from the first view by denying that creation or the fall were foreordained as means to execute an earlier decree of predestination. Yet between these two latter views there is still a noticeable difference regarding the fall. The second view places election (regarding its goal) before the fall, along with preterition—the first part of reprobation—while the third view does not allow any part of election or reprobation to take place until after the fall. What prompted the authors of these two schemes to frame predestination this way, rather than ascending to the extreme heights of the supralapsarian view, was, among other reasons, their desire to avoid the inference that God is the author of sin—an inference that some adherents of the two later views acknowledge can plausibly be drawn from the first scheme.
Yet if we be willing to inspect these two latter opinions a little more closely, and in particular if we accurately examine the second and third kind and compare them with other sentiments of the same author concerning some subjects of our religion, we shall discover, that the fall of Adam cannot possibly, according to their views, be considered in any other manner than as a necessary means for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination.
Yet if we examine these two latter theories more closely, especially when comparing them with what their proponents teach on related theological topics, we quickly discover that Adam's fall cannot be understood in their systems as anything other than a necessary means to execute an earlier decree of predestination.
1. In reference to the second of the three, this is apparent from two reasons comprised in it:
1. In regard to the second view, this becomes evident from two inherent reasons:
The first of these reasons is that which states God to have determined by the decree of reprobation to deny to man that grace which was necessary for the confirmation and strengthening of his nature, that it might not be corrupted by sin; which amounts to this, that God decreed not to bestow that grace which was necessary to avoid sin; and from this must necessarily follow the transgression of man, as proceeding from a law imposed on him. The fall of man is therefore a means ordained for the execution of the decree of reprobation.
First, this view asserts that God decided by his decree of reprobation to deny man the grace needed to strengthen his nature and protect it from corruption. In practical terms, this means God decreed to withhold the very grace required to avoid sin. As a result, man's transgression under God's law became inevitable. Therefore, in this system, the fall of man is effectively an ordained means for executing the decree of reprobation.
The second of these reasons is that which states the two parts of reprobation to be preterition and predamnation. These two parts, according to that decree, are connected together by a necessary and mutual bond, and are equally extensive. For, all those whom God passed by in conferring Divine grace, are likewise damned. Indeed no others are damned, except those who are the subjects of this act of preterition. From this therefore it may be concluded, that “sin must necessarily follow from the decree of reprobation or preterition, because, if it were otherwise, it might possibly happen, that a person who had been passed by, might not commit sin, and from that circumstance might not become liable to damnation; since sin is the sole meritorious cause of damnation: and thus certain of those individuals who had been passed by, might neither be saved nor damned — which is great absurdity.
Second, this view defines the two parts of reprobation as passing by and pre-condemnation. According to this theory, these two parts are inseparable and coextensive: everyone whom God passed by in withholding grace is inevitably damned, and no one is damned except those who were passed by. From this, it follows that sin must inevitably occur as a result of the decree of preterition. If it did not, someone who was passed by might avoid committing sin, and without sin could not be justly condemned—since sin is the only deserving cause of damnation. That would produce the absurdity of individuals who are neither saved nor damned!
This second opinion on Predestination, therefore, falls into the same inconvenience as the first. For it not only does not avoid that [conclusion of making God the author of sin,] but while those who profess it make the attempt, they fall into a palpable and absurd self-contradiction — while, in reference to this point, the first of these opinions is alike throughout and consistent with itself.
Thus, this second view falls into the exact same trap as the first. Not only does it fail to escape the conclusion that God is the author of sin, but in trying to escape it, its advocates tumble into obvious self-contradiction—whereas the first view, despite its errors, is at least logically consistent with itself.
2. The third of these schemes of Predestination would escape this rock to much better effect, did not the patrons of it, while declaring their sentiments on Predestination and providence, employ certain expressions, from which the necessity of the fall might be deduced. Yet this necessity cannot possibly have any other origin than some degree of Predestination.
2. The third scheme of predestination might avoid this trap more successfully if its defenders, when explaining providence and predestination, did not use terms that make the fall necessary. And that necessity can arise from nowhere else than an underlying decree of predestination.
(1.) One of these explanatory expressions is their description of the Divine permission, by which God permits sin. Some of them describe it thus: “permission is the withdrawing of that Divine grace, by which, when God executes the decrees of his will through rational creatures, he either does not reveal to the creature that divine will of his own by which he wills that action to be performed, or does not bend the will of the creature to yield obedience in that act to the Divine will.” To these expressions, the following are immediately subjoined: “if this be a correct statement, the creature commits sin through necessity, yet voluntarily and without restraint.” If it be objected that “this description does not comport with that permission by which God permitted the sin of Adam:” We also entertain the same opinion about it. Yet it follows, as a consequence, from this very description, that “other sins are committed through necessity.”
(1.) Take, for example, how some of them define divine permission: "Permission is the withdrawal of divine grace, through which God—while carrying out His decrees through rational creatures—either withholds the revelation of His will or declines to bend the creature's will to obey in that specific act." They then admit: "If this definition stands, the creature sins by necessity, even though he acts willingly and without external compulsion." If someone objects that this description does not fit God’s permission of Adam’s sin, I agree. Nevertheless, this very description still implies that other sins are committed by necessity.
(2.) Of a similar tendency are the expressions which some of them use, when they contend, that the declaration of the glory of God, which must necessarily be illustrated, is placed in “the demonstration of mercy and of punitive justice.” But such a demonstration could not have been made, unless sin, and misery through sin, had entered into the world, to form at least some degree of misery for the least sin. And in this manner is sin also necessarily introduced, through the necessity of such a demonstration of the Divine glory. Since the fall of Adam is already laid down to be necessary, and, on that account, to be a means for executing the preceding decree of Predestination; creation itself is likewise at the same time laid down as a means subservient to the execution of the same decree. For the fall cannot be necessarily consequent upon the creation, except through the decree of Predestination, which cannot be placed between the creation and the fall, but is prefixed to both of them, as having the precedence, and ordaining creation for the fall, and both of them for executing one and the same decree — to demonstrate the justice of God in the punishment of sin, and his mercy in its remission. Because, if this were not the case, that which must necessarily ensue from the act of creation had not seen intended by God when he created, which is to suppose an impossibility. But let it be granted, that the necessity of the fall of Adam cannot be deduced from either of the two latter opinions, yet all the preceding arguments which have been produced against the first opinion, are, after a trifling modification to suit the varied purpose, equally valid against the two latter. This would be very apparent, if, to demonstrate it, a conference were to be instituted.
(2.) The same problem appears when they argue that the display of God's glory requires the demonstration of both his mercy and his punitive justice. Such a demonstration could never happen unless sin, and the misery caused by sin, first entered the world. Thus sin is introduced as an inevitable necessity simply to display divine glory. Once Adam's fall is made necessary as a means to execute a prior decree of predestination, creation itself becomes merely an instrument to serve that decree. For the fall cannot be an inevitable result of creation except through a decree of predestination that precedes both—ordaining creation for the fall, and both together to execute a single decree displaying God's justice in punishing sin and his mercy in forgiving it. Otherwise, what inevitably resulted from creation would not have been intended by God in creating, which is impossible. Even if we grant that the necessity of the fall cannot be directly deduced from either of these two latter views, all the arguments I leveled against the first view still apply with full force to them with minor adjustments. This would be readily demonstrated in a formal theological conference.
5. MY OWN SENTIMENTS ON PREDESTINATION.
5. MY OWN VIEW OF PREDESTINATION
I have hitherto been stating those opinions concerning the article of Predestination which are inculcated in our Churches and in the University of Leyden, and of which I disapprove. I have at the same time produced my own reasons, why I form such an unfavorable judgment concerning them; and I will now declare my own opinions on this subject, which are of such a description as, according to my views, appear most conformable to the word of God.
Up to this point, I have described the views on predestination taught in our churches and at the University of Leiden with which I disagree, explaining my reasons for rejecting them. I will now present my own convictions on this subject—convictions that seem to me most consistent with the Word of God.
1. The first absolute decree of God concerning the salvation of sinful man, is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator, Redeemer, Savior, Priest and King, who might destroy sin by his own death, might by his obedience obtain the salvation which had been lost, and might communicate it by his own virtue.
1. The first absolute decree of God regarding the salvation of sinful humanity is that by which he resolved to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, as Mediator, Redeemer, Savior, Priest, and King. Through his death Christ would destroy sin, through his obedience he would regain lost salvation, and by his divine power he would impart that salvation to us.
2. The second precise and absolute decree of God, is that in which he decreed to receive into favor those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for his sake and through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as persevered to the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ.
2. The second absolute decree of God is that by which he determined to receive into favor those who repent and believe, and in Christ, for Christ's sake, and through Christ, to save those who persevere in faith to the end. In this same decree, he determined to leave impenitent sinners and unbelievers in their sin under his wrath, condemning them as estranged from Christ.
3. The third Divine decree is that by which God decreed to administer in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means which were necessary for repentance and faith; and to have such administration instituted
3. The third divine decree is that by which God resolved to provide, in a sufficient and effective manner, the means necessary for repentance and faith, ordering this provision:
(1.) according to the Divine Wisdom, by which God knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity, and
(1.) According to divine wisdom, by which God knows what is fitting for both his mercy and his severity; and
(2.) according to Divine Justice, by which He is prepared to adopt whatever his wisdom may prescribe and put it in execution.
(2.) According to divine justice, by which he is prepared to carry out whatever his wisdom prescribes.
4. To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere, according to the before described administration of those means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere.
4. Following these is the fourth decree, by which God determined to save and damn specific individuals. This decree is grounded in the eternal foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity who would believe through his prevenient grace and persevere through his subsequent grace—under the gracious provision of means suited for conversion and faith—and by which he likewise knew who would refuse to believe and persevere.
Predestination, when thus explained, is
Predestination, explained in this way, is:
1. The foundation of Christianity, and of salvation and its certainty.
1. The foundation of Christianity, and of salvation and its certainty.
2. It is the sum and the matter of the gospel; nay, it is the gospel itself, and on that account necessary to be believed in order to salvation, as far as the two first articles are concerned.
2. The sum and substance of the gospel—indeed, the very gospel itself—and therefore essential to be believed for salvation, insofar as the first two decrees are concerned.
3. It has had no need of being examined or determined by any council, either general or particular, since it is contained in the scriptures clearly and expressly in so many words; and no contradiction has ever yet been offered to it by any orthodox Divine.
3. A doctrine that has never needed to be defined or settled by any church council, general or local, because it is explicitly and clearly stated throughout Scripture, and has never been challenged by any orthodox theologian.
4. It has constantly been acknowledged and taught by all Christian teachers who held correct and orthodox sentiments.
4. A truth that has been continually acknowledged and taught by all orthodox Christian teachers throughout church history.
5. It agrees with that harmony of all confessions, which has been published by the protestant Churches.
5. In agreement with the published harmony of the Protestant churches' confessions.
6. It likewise agrees most excellently with the Dutch Confession and Catechism. This concord is such, that if in the Sixteenth article these two expressions “those persons whom” and “others,” be explained by the words “believers” and “unbelievers” these opinions of mine on Predestination will be comprehended in that article with the greatest clearness. This is the reason why I directed the thesis to be composed in the very words of the Confession, when, on one occasion, I had to hold a public disputation before my private class in the University. This kind of Predestination also agrees with the reasoning contained in the twentieth and the fifty-fourth question of the Catechism.
6. Completely in accord with the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. This agreement is so clear that if in Article 16 the phrases "those whom" and "others" are understood as "believers" and "unbelievers," my view of predestination is expressed in that article with crystal clarity. For this reason, when I presided over a public disputation for my students at the university, I framed the theses using the exact wording of the Confession. This understanding also agrees perfectly with questions 20 and 54 of the Heidelberg Catechism.
7. It is also in excellent accordance with the nature of God — with his wisdom, goodness, and righteousness; because it contains the principal matter of all of them, and is the clearest demonstration of the Divine wisdom, goodness, and righteousness [or justice]
7. In perfect harmony with the nature of God—his wisdom, goodness, and righteousness—because it reflects their core reality and provides the clearest demonstration of divine wisdom, goodness, and justice.
8. It is agreeable in every point with the nature of man — in what form soever that nature may be contemplated, whether in the primitive state of creation, in that of the fall, or in that of restoration.
8. Entirely consistent with the nature of man in every state—whether in his original innocence at creation, his fallen state in sin, or his restored state in grace.
9. It is in complete concert with the act of creation, by affirming that the creation itself is a real communication of good, both from the intention of God, and with regard to the very end or event; that it had its origin in the goodness of God; that whatever has a reference to its continuance and preservation, proceeds from Divine love; and that this act of creation is a perfect and appropriate work of God, in which he is at complaisance with himself, and by which he obtained all things necessary for an unsinning state.
9. Fully consonant with God's work of creation. It affirms that creation was a genuine bestowal of good, both in God's intention and in its outcome; that it originated in divine benevolence; that its ongoing preservation flows from divine love; and that creation was a good and perfect work in which God delighted, providing everything necessary for mankind to live without sin.
10. It agrees with the nature of life eternal, and with the honorable titles by which that life is designated in the scriptures.
10. True to the biblical nature of eternal life and the honor-filled titles Scripture uses to describe it.
11. It also agrees with the nature of death eternal, and with the names by which that death is distinguished in scripture.
11. True to the biblical nature of eternal death and the sobering names Scripture gives to it.
12. It states sin to be a real disobedience, and the meritorious cause of condemnation; and on this account, it is in the most perfect agreement with the fall and with sin.
12. True to the reality of the fall and sin, recognizing that sin is genuine rebellion and the deserving cause of condemnation.
13. In every particular, it harmonizes with the nature of grace, by ascribing to it all those things which agree with it, [or adapted to it,] and by reconciling it most completely to the righteousness of God and to the nature and liberty of the human will.
13. Fully harmonious in every detail with the nature of divine grace, attributing to grace everything proper to it, while perfectly reconciling it with God's righteousness and with the nature and freedom of the human will.
14. It conduces most conspicuously to declare the glory of God, his justice and his mercy. It also represents God as the cause of all good and of our salvation, and man as the cause of sin and of his own damnation.
14. Powerfully magnifies the glory of God, both in his justice and his mercy, clearly presenting God as the source of all goodness and salvation, and man as the cause of sin and his own damnation.
15. It contributes to the honor of Jesus Christ, by placing him for the foundation of Predestination and the meritorious as well as communicative cause of salvation.
15. Upholds the supreme honor of Jesus Christ by establishing him as the true foundation of predestination and both the meritorious and imparting cause of salvation.
16. It greatly promotes the salvation of men: It is also the power, and the very means which lead to salvation — by exciting and creating within the mind of man sorrow on account of sin, a solicitude about his conversion, faith in Jesus Christ, a studious desire to perform good works, and zeal in prayer — and by causing men to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. It likewise prevents despair, as far as such prevention is necessary.
16. Strongly promotes human salvation, serving as a powerful instrument to stir up godly sorrow for sin, earnest concern for conversion, faith in Jesus Christ, a diligent desire for good works, and fervor in prayer—motivating believers to work out their salvation with fear and trembling, while preventing despair as far as such prevention is necessary.
17. It confirms and establishes that order according to which the gospel ought to be preached,
17. Confirms and establishes the true biblical pattern for preaching the gospel:
(1.) By requiring repentance and faith —
(1.) First, by demanding repentance and faith; and
(2.) And then by promising remission of sins, the grace of the spirit, and life eternal.
(2.) Then, by promising the forgiveness of sins, the grace of the Holy Spirit, and eternal life.
18. It strengthens the ministry of the gospel, and renders it profitable with respect to preaching, the administration of the sacraments and public prayers.
18. Strengthens the ministry of the gospel, making preaching, the administration of the sacraments, and public prayer fruitful and effective.
19. It is the foundation of the Christian religion; because in it, the two-fold love of God may be united together — God’s love of righteousness [or justice], and his love of men, may, with the greatest consistency, be reconciled to each other.
19. Forms the true foundation of the Christian faith, because it perfectly unites God's twofold love—his love for righteousness and his love for mankind—reconciling them in total harmony.
20. Lastly. This doctrine of Predestination, has always been approved by the great majority of professing Christians, and even now, in these days, it enjoys the same extensive patronage. It cannot afford any person just cause for expressing his aversion to it; nor can it give any pretext for contention in the Christian Church.
20. Finally, this doctrine of predestination has always been embraced by the overwhelming majority of Christians, as it still is today. It gives no one any justifiable reason for offense, nor does it provide any excuse for division and controversy in the church of Christ.
It is therefore much to be desired, that men would proceed no further in this matter, and would not attempt to investigate the unsearchable judgments of God — at least that they would not proceed beyond the point at which those judgments have been clearly revealed in the scriptures. This, my most potent Lords, is all that I intend now to declare to your mightinesses, respecting the doctrine of Predestination, about which there exists such a great controversy in the Church of Christ. If it would not prove too tedious to your Lordships, I have some other propositions which I could wish to state, because they contribute to a full declaration of my sentiments, and tend to the same purpose as that for which I have been ordered to attend in this place by your mightinesses.
It is therefore greatly to be desired that people would not pry any further into this mystery, nor attempt to penetrate the unsearchable judgments of God beyond what is clearly revealed in Holy Scripture. This, most noble Lords, is what I wished to set before your Excellencies regarding the doctrine of predestination, which has stirred up such fierce controversy in the church of Christ. If it will not test your patience, there are a few related points I would like to address, as they will help provide a complete picture of my convictions, in keeping with the purpose for which you summoned me.
There are certain other articles of the Christian religion, which possess a close affinity to the doctrine of Predestination, and which are in a great measure dependent on it: Of this description are the providence of God, the free-will of man, the perseverance of saints, and the certainty of salvation. On these topics, if not disagreeable to your mightinesses, I will in a brief manner relate my opinion.
There are several other theological topics closely linked to predestination and largely dependent upon it: divine providence, the free will of man, the perseverance of the saints, and the assurance of salvation. With your permission, I will briefly outline my views on each of these.
2. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
2. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
I consider Divine Providence to be “that solicitous, continued, and universally present inspection and oversight of God, according to which he exercises a general care over the whole world, but evinces a particular concern for all his [intelligent] creatures without any exception, with the design of preserving and governing them in their own essence, qualities, actions, and passions, in a manner that is at once worthy of himself and suitable to them, to the praise of his name and the salvation of believers. In this definition of Divine Providence, I by no means deprive it of any particle of those properties which agree with it or belong to it; but I declare that it preserves, regulates, governs and directs all things and that nothing in the world happens fortuitously or by chance. Beside this, I place in subjection to Divine Providence both the free-will and even the actions of a rational creature, so that nothing can be done without the will of God, not even any of those things which are done in opposition to it; only we must observe a distinction between good actions and evil ones, by saying, that “God both wills and performs good acts,” but that “He only freely permits those which are evil.” Still farther than this, I very readily grant, that even all actions whatever, concerning evil, that can possibly be devised or invented, may be attributed to Divine Providence
I define divine providence as God's attentive, continuous, and universally present oversight, by which he cares for the entire world and shows particular concern for all his rational creatures without exception. Through providence, God preserves and governs them according to their nature, qualities, actions, and experiences, in a manner worthy of himself and appropriate to them, to the praise of his name and the salvation of believers. In this definition, I do not strip providence of a single attribute that belongs to it. I affirm that God preserves, regulates, governs, and directs all things, and that nothing in the universe happens by pure luck or chance. Furthermore, I place both human free will and creaturely actions under divine providence, so that nothing can happen without God's sovereign will—even things done in direct disobedience to his commands. We must, however, maintain this crucial distinction: God wills and actively produces what is good, but he only freely permits what is evil. Beyond this, I readily grant that every conceivable action concerning evil may be attributed to divine providence—
Employing solely one caution, “not to conclude from this concession that God is the cause of sin.” This I have testified with sufficient clearness, in a certain disputation concerning the Righteousness and Efficacy of Divine Providence concerning things that are evil, which was discussed at Leyden on two different occasions, as a divinity-act, at which I presided. In that disputation, I endeavored to ascribe to God whatever actions concerning sin I could possibly conclude from the scriptures to belong to him; and I proceeded to such a length in my attempt, that some persons thought proper on that account to charge me with having made God the author of sin. The same serious allegation has likewise been often produced against me, from the pulpit, in the city of Amsterdam, on account of those very theses; but with what show of justice such a charge was made, may be evident to any one, from the contents of my written answer to those Thirty-one Articles formerly mentioned, which have been falsely imputed to me, and of which this was one.
Provided we observe this single, indispensable caution: we must never conclude that God is the author or cause of sin. I demonstrated this clearly in a formal disputation on the righteousness and efficacy of divine providence regarding evil, which I presided over on two separate occasions at the University of Leiden. In that disputation, I took care to ascribe to God every action regarding sin that Scripture warrants, going so far that some critics actually accused me of making God the author of sin! That very accusation has even been hurled against me from the pulpit in Amsterdam based on those academic theses. Anyone can judge how just that charge was from my written reply to the Thirty-One Articles falsely attributed to me, of which this accusation was one.
3. THE FREE-WILL OF MAN
3. THE FREE WILL OF MAN
This is my opinion concerning the free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.
Regarding human free will, this is what I believe: In his original state, as he came from the hands of his Creator, man was endowed with understanding, holiness, and capability, enabling him to understand, value, consider, will, and carry out what is truly good in obedience to God's command. Yet he could do none of these things apart from the assistance of divine grace. But in his fallen and sinful state, man is completely unable, of and by himself, to think, will, or do anything that is genuinely good. He must be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, desires, will, and all his faculties by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit before he can rightly understand, value, consider, will, and perform what is truly good. And even when a person is made partaker of this new birth and delivered from sin's power, he can think, will, and do good only through the continuous, assisting aid of divine grace.
4. THE GRACE OF GOD
4. THE GRACE OF GOD
In reference to Divine Grace, I believe,
Concerning divine grace, I believe:
(1.) It is a gratuitous affection by which God is kindly affected towards a miserable sinner, and according to which he, in the first place, gives his Son, “that whosoever believers in him might have eternal life,” and, afterwards, he justifies him in Christ Jesus and for his sake, and adopts him into the right of sons, unto salvation.
(1.) First, grace is the generous, unmerited favor with which God looks upon helpless sinners—moving Him first to give His own Son so "that everyone who believes in Him may have eternal life," and then to justify believers in Christ for Christ's sake and adopt them as His own children for eternal salvation.
(2.) It is an infusion (both into the human understanding and into the will and affections,) of all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which appertain to the regeneration and renewing of man — such as faith, hope, charity, etc.; for, without these gracious gifts, man is not sufficient to think, will, or do any thing that is good.
(2.) It is the inward working and imparting of the Holy Spirit's gifts—such as faith, hope, and love—into the human mind, heart, and will, bringing about regeneration and renewal; for without these gracious gifts, no one has the capacity to think, will, or do anything truly good.
(3.) It is that perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy Spirit, according to which He acts upon and excites to good the man who has been already renewed, by infusing into him salutary cogitations, and by inspiring him with good desires, that he may thus actually will whatever is good; and according to which God may then will and work together with man, that man may perform whatever he wills.
(3.) It is the ongoing, continuous help of the Holy Spirit, by which he prompts and stirs the renewed person toward what is good, placing healthy thoughts in his mind and inspiring righteous desires in his heart, so that he genuinely wills what is good; and through this grace, God may then will and work together with the person, so that the person may carry out what he wills.
In this manner, I ascribe to grace the commencement, the continuance and the consummation of all good, and to such an extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can neither conceive, will, nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil temptation, without this preventing and exciting, this following and co-operating grace. From this statement it will clearly appear, that I by no means do injustice to grace, by attributing, as it is reported of me, too much to man’s free-will. For the whole controversy reduces itself to the solution of this question, “is the grace of God a certain irresistible force?” That is, the controversy does not relate to those actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace, (for I acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as any man ever did,) but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be irresistible or not. With respect to which, I believe, according to the scriptures, that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered.
In this way, I attribute to grace the beginning, the continuation, and the completion of all that is good. I emphasize its absolute necessity to such a degree that even a regenerate person cannot conceive, desire, or do any good thing, nor resist any temptation to evil, without this prevenient, awakening, subsequent, and cooperating grace. This makes it crystal clear that I do not minimize grace or overstate the power of human free will, as some have falsely claimed. The entire controversy boils down to a single question: Is God's saving grace irresistible? The debate is not about what grace accomplishes—for I attribute as much to the work of grace as any theologian ever has—but solely about its mode of operation, whether it acts irresistibly. On this point, I believe on the authority of Scripture that people can and do resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace offered to them.
5. THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS
5. THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS
My sentiments respecting the perseverance of the saints are, that those persons who have been grafted into Christ by true faith, and have thus been made partakers of his life-giving Spirit, possess sufficient powers [or strength] to fight against Satan, sin, the world and their own flesh, and to gain the victory over these enemies — yet not without the assistance of the grace of the same Holy Spirit. Jesus Christ also by his Spirit assists them in all their temptations, and affords them the ready aid of his hand; and, provided they stand prepared for the battle, implore his help, and be not wanting to themselves, Christ preserves them from falling. So that it is not possible for them, by any of the cunning craftiness or power of Satan, to be either seduced or dragged out of the hands of Christ. But I think it is useful and will be quite necessary in our first convention, [or Synod] to institute a diligent inquiry from the Scriptures, whether it is not possible for some individuals through negligence to desert the commencement of their existence in Christ, to cleave again to the present evil world, to decline from the sound doctrine which was once delivered to them, to lose a good conscience, and to cause Divine grace to be ineffectual.
My conviction concerning the perseverance of the saints is this: Those who have been united to Christ by living faith and have partaken of his life-giving Spirit are fully equipped with power to battle Satan, sin, the world, and their own flesh, and to gain complete victory over these enemies—always through the help of the Holy Spirit's grace. Jesus Christ assists them in every temptation by his Spirit, holding out his helping hand. As long as they stand ready for the fight, seek his help, and do not fail to do their part, Christ will preserve them from falling. Thus no cunning or power of Satan can seduce them away or drag them out of Christ's hands. At the same time, I believe it is necessary and important for our upcoming synod to examine the Scriptures diligently to determine whether it is possible for someone through sheer negligence to forsake their beginning in Christ, cling once again to this present evil world, turn away from the sound doctrine once delivered to them, shipwreck their good conscience, and make God's grace ineffective.
Though I here openly and ingenuously affirm, I never taught that a true believer can, either totally or finally fall away from the faith, and perish; yet I will not conceal, that there are passages of scripture which seem to me to wear this aspect; and those answers to them which I have been permitted to see, are not of such a kind as to approve themselves on all points to my understanding. On the other hand, certain passages are produced for the contrary doctrine [of unconditional perseverance] which are worthy of much consideration.
I openly and honestly declare that I have never taught that a true believer can totally or finally fall away from the faith and perish. Yet I will not hide the fact that there are passages of Scripture that appear to point in that direction, and the explanations of those passages I have examined have not fully satisfied my mind. On the other hand, there are weighty biblical passages advanced in support of unconditional perseverance that deserve our most serious consideration.
6. THE ASSURANCE OF SALVATION
6. THE ASSURANCE OF SALVATION
With regard to the certainty [or assurance] of salvation, my opinion is, that it is possible for him who believes in Jesus Christ to be certain and persuaded, and, if his heart condemn him not, he is now in reality assured, that he is a son of God, and stands in the grace of Jesus Christ. Such a certainty is wrought in the mind, as well by the action of the Holy Spirit inwardly actuating the believer and by the fruits of faith, as from his own conscience, and the testimony of God’s Spirit witnessing together with his conscience. I also believe, that it is possible for such a person, with an assured confidence in the grace of God and his mercy in Christ, to depart out of this life, and to appear before the throne of grace, without any anxious fear or terrific dread: and yet this person should constantly pray, “O lord, enter not into judgment with thy servant!”
Regarding the assurance of salvation, I believe that everyone who trusts in Jesus Christ can be certain and confident—and if his heart does not condemn him, he is indeed assured—that he is a child of God and stands in the grace of Christ. This assurance is produced in the soul through the inner working of the Holy Spirit, the fruits of faith, the testimony of a clear conscience, and the Spirit of God witnessing together with our conscience. I also believe that a Christian can leave this life with confident trust in God's grace and Christ's mercy, appearing before the throne of grace without anxious fear or terrifying dread—even while continuing to pray humbly: "O Lord, do not bring your servant into judgment!"
But, since “God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things,” and since a man judges not his own self — yea, though a man know nothing by himself, yet is he not thereby justified, but he who judgeth him is the Lord, (1 John 3:19; 1 Corinthians 4:3,) I dare not [on this account] place this assurance [or certainty] on an equality with that by which we know there is a God, and that Christ is the Savior of the world. Yet it will be proper to make the extent of the boundaries of this assurance, a subject of inquiry in our convention.
Yet, because "God is greater than our hearts and knows all things," and because we cannot fully judge ourselves—indeed, even if our conscience is clear, that does not make us innocent, for the one who judges us is the Lord (1 John 3:20; 1 Corinthians 4:3–4)—I dare not place personal assurance on the exact same footing as our certain knowledge that God exists and that Jesus Christ is the Savior of the world. Still, exploring the precise nature and limits of this assurance will be a fitting subject for our synod to investigate.
7. THE PERFECTION OF BELIEVERS IN THIS LIFE
7. THE PERFECTION OF BELIEVERS IN THIS LIFE
Beside those doctrines on which I have treated, there is now much discussion among us respecting the perfection of believers, or regenerated persons, in this life; and it is reported, that I entertain sentiments on this subject, which are very improper, and nearly allied to those of the Pelagians, viz: “that it is possible for the regenerate in this life perfectly to keep God’s precepts.” To this I reply, though these might have been my sentiments yet I ought not on this account to be considered a Pelagian, either partly or entirely, provided I had only added that “they could do this by the grace of Christ, and by no means without it.” But while I never asserted, that a believer could perfectly keep the precepts of Christ in this life, I never denied it, but always left it as a matter which has still to be decided. For I have contented myself with those sentiments which St. Augustine has expressed on this subject, whose words have frequently quoted in the University, and have usually subjoined, that I had no addition to make to them.
In addition to the topics already covered, there is considerable discussion among us regarding the Christian perfection of believers in this life. Rumors have circulated that I hold improper views closely aligned with Pelagianism—namely, that believers in this life can keep God's commandments perfectly. To this I reply: Even if that were my view, I should not be branded a Pelagian in whole or in part, provided I affirmed that believers can do this only through the grace of Christ and never on their own! In reality, while I have never asserted that a believer can keep Christ's commandments perfectly in this life, I have never outright denied it either; I have always left it as an open question to be thoroughly investigated. I have been content with the position of Saint Augustine, whose words I have often quoted at the university, adding that I had nothing further to say beyond what he wrote.
Augustine says, “four questions may claim our attention on this topic. The first is, was there ever yet a man without sin, one who from the beginning of life to its termination never committed sin? The second, has there ever been, is there now, or can there possibly be, an individual who does not sin, that is, who has attained to such a state of perfection in this life as not to commit sin, but perfectly to fulfill the law of God? The third, is it possible for a man in this life to exist without sin? The fourth, if it be possible for a man to be without sin, why has such an individual never yet been found?” St. Augustine says, that such a person as is described in the first question never yet lived, or will hereafter be brought into existence, with the exception of Jesus Christ. He does not think, that any man has attained to such perfection in this life as is portrayed in the second question. With regard to the third, he thinks it possible for a man to be without sin, by means of the grace of Christ and free-will. In answer to the fourth, man does not do what it is possible for him by the grace of Christ to perform, either because that which is good escapes his observation, or because in it he places no part of his delight.” From this quotation it is apparent, that St. Augustine, one of the most strenuous adversaries of the Pelagian doctrine, retained this sentiment, that “it is possible for a man to live in this world without sin.”
Augustine noted that four questions arise on this topic: "First, has any person ever lived from birth to death without committing sin? Second, has there ever been, is there now, or could there be someone who does not sin—who has reached such maturity in this life that he does not sin, but perfectly fulfills God's law? Third, is it possible for someone in this life to live without sin? Fourth, if it is possible, why has no such person ever been found?" Augustine answered that no such person as described in the first question ever lived or will live, except for Jesus Christ alone. Regarding the second, he did not believe anyone has actually attained such perfection in this life. Regarding the third, he believed it is possible for a person to live without sin through Christ's grace and free will. And to the fourth question, he answered that people fail to do what is possible through Christ's grace either because they do not recognize what is good or because they take no delight in it. This shows that Saint Augustine, one of the strongest opponents of Pelagianism, maintained that it is possible for someone to live in this world without sin through divine grace.
Beside this, the same Christian father says, “let Pelagius confess, that it is possible for man to be without sin, in no other way than by the grace of Christ, and we will be at peace with each other.” The opinion of Pelagius appeared to St. Augustine to be this — “that man could fulfill the law of God by his own proffer strength and ability; but with still “greater facility by means of the grace of Christ.” I have already most abundantly stated the great distance at which I stand from such a sentiment; in addition to which I now declare, that I account this sentiment of Pelagius to be heretical, and diametrically opposed to these words of Christ, “Without me ye can do nothing:” (John 15:5.) It is likewise very destructive, and inflicts a most grievous wound on the glory of Christ.
Furthermore, this same church father wrote: "Let Pelagius confess that it is possible for a person to be without sin in no other way than by the grace of Christ, and we will be at peace with one another." Augustine understood Pelagius to hold that man can fulfill God's law by his own natural strength, though he can do so more easily with the help of Christ's grace. I have already made it abundantly clear how far removed I am from such a view. I now openly declare that I consider Pelagius's idea heretical and diametrically opposed to Christ's solemn words: "Apart from me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). Such teaching is destructive and strikes a grievous blow against the glory of Christ.
I cannot see that anything is contained in all I have hitherto produced respecting my sentiments, on account of which any person ought to be “afraid of appearing in the presence of God,” and from which it might be feared that any mischievous consequences can possibly arise. Yet because every day brings me fresh information about reports concerning me, “that I carry in my breast destructive sentiments and heresies,” I cannot possibly conceive to what points those charges can relate, except perhaps they draw some such pretext from my opinion concerning the Divinity of the Son of God, and the justification of man before God. Indeed, I have lately learnt, that there has been much public conversation, and many rumors have been circulated, respecting my opinion on both these points of doctrine, particularly since the last conference [between Gomarus and myself] before the Counselors of the Supreme Court. This is one reason why I think, that I shall not be acting unadvisedly if I disclose to your mightinesses the real state of the whole matter.
I can find nothing in anything I have stated so far that should make anyone afraid to stand before God, or that could produce harmful consequences in the church. Yet every day I hear fresh rumors that I secretly harbor destructive heresies. I cannot imagine what these accusations could possibly be based on, unless critics are twisting my views on two other doctrines: the divinity of the Son of God and the justification of man before God. Indeed, I have recently learned that there is much gossip and rumor regarding my stance on these two points, especially following my recent conference with Gomarus before the Supreme Court justices. For this reason, I believe it is wise to lay before your Excellencies the exact facts of both matters.
8. THE DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD
8. THE DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD
With regard to the Divinity of the Son of God and the word αυτοθεος both of which have been discussed in our University in the regular form of scholastic disputations, I cannot sufficiently wonder what the motive can be, which has created a wish in some persons to render me suspected to other men, or to make me an object of suspicion to themselves. This is still more wonderful, since this suspicion has not the least ground of probability on which to rest, and is at such an immense distance from all reason and truth, that, whatever reports have been spread abroad respecting this affair to the prejudice of my character, they can be called nothing better than “notorious calumnies.” At a disputation held one afternoon in the University, when the thesis that had been proposed for disputation was the Divinity of the Son of God, one of the students happened to object, “that the Son of God was autotheos, and that he therefore had his essence from himself and not from the Father.” In reply to this I observed, “that the word autotheos was capable of two different acceptations, since it might signify either “one who is truly God,” or “one who is God of himself;” and that it was with great propriety and correctness attributed to the Son of God according to the former signification, but not according to the latter.” The student, in prosecution of his argument, violently contended, that the word was justly applicable to the Son of God, principally according to the second of these significations: and that the essence of the Father could not be said to be communicated to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, in any other than in an improper sense; but that it was in perfect correctness and strict propriety common alike to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” He added “that he asserted this with the greater confidence because he had the younger Trelcatius of pious memory, [but who was then living,] as an authority in his favor on this point; for that learned Professor had written to the same purport in his Common Places.” To these observations I answered, “that this opinion was at variance with the word of God, and with the whole of the ancient Church, both Greek and Latin, which had always taught, that the Son had His Deity from the Father by eternal generation.” To these remarks I subjoined, “that from such an opinion as this, necessarily followed the two mutually conflicting errors, Tri-theism and Sabellianism; that is,
Regarding the divinity of the Son of God and the Greek term *autotheos*, both of which were debated in academic disputations at our university, I am at a loss to understand why some have tried to make me an object of suspicion. This suspicion is utterly baseless, contrary to all reason and truth, and the damaging rumors spread about me are nothing less than outright slander. During an afternoon disputation on the divinity of the Son of God, a student argued that "the Son of God is *autotheos*, and therefore has his divine essence from himself and not from the Father." I replied that the word *autotheos* can have two meanings: it can mean "one who is truly God," or "one who is God of himself." I explained that the term rightly applies to the Son in the first sense, but not in the second. The student pushed back vigorously, insisting that it applied to the Son primarily in the second sense, claiming that the divine essence cannot properly be said to be communicated from the Father to the Son and Spirit, but is, strictly and properly speaking, common alike to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. He appealed to Professor Trelcatius the younger, who was still living at the time but has since died, and who had written to that effect in his Common Places. I answered that this idea contradicts the Word of God and the unanimous teaching of the ancient church, both Greek and Latin, which has always confessed that the Son receives his deity from the Father by eternal generation. I added that two opposite errors inevitably flow from such a view—Tritheism and Sabellianism:
(1.) It would ensue as a necessary consequence, from these premises, that there are three Gods, who have together and collaterally the Divine essence, independently of this circumstance — that one of them (being only personally distinguished from the rest) has that essence from another of the persons. Yet the proceeding of the origin of one person from another, (that is, of the Son from the Father,) is the only foundation that has ever been used for defending the Unity of the Divine Essence in the Trinity of Persons.
(1.) First, it would logically follow that there are three separate Gods, each possessing the divine essence independently and collaterally, without one person deriving that essence from another. Yet the eternal generation of the Son from the Father is the only foundation ever used on which the church has always defended the unity of the divine essence within the Trinity of persons.
(2.) It would likewise follow as another consequence, that the Son would himself be the Father, because he would differ from the Father in nothing but in regard to name, which was the opinion of Sabellius. For, since it is peculiar to the Father to derive his Deity from himself, or (to speak more correctly,) to derive it from no one, if, in the sense of being “God of himself,” the Son be called autotheos, it follows that he is the Father.” Some account of this disputation was dispersed abroad in all directions, and it reached Amsterdam. A minister of that city, who now rests in the Lord, having interrogated me respecting the real state of this affair, I related the whole of it to him plainly, as I have now done: and I requested him to make Trelcatius of blessed memory acquainted with it as it had actually occurred, and to advise him in a friendly manner to amend his opinion, and to correct those inappropriate words in his Common Places: this request the minister from Amsterdam engaged to fulfill in his own way. In all this proceeding I am far from being liable to any blame; for I have defended the truth and the sentiments of the Catholic and Orthodox Church. Trelcatius undoubtedly was the person most open to animadversion; for he adopted a mode of speaking which detracted somewhat from the truth of the matter. But such has always been either my own infelicity or the zeal of certain individuals that, as soon as any disagreement arises, all the blame is instantly cast upon me, as if it was impossible for me to display as much veracity [or orthodoxy] as any other person. Yet on this subject I have Gomarus himself consenting with me; for, soon after Trelcatius had published his common places, a disputation on the Trinity having been proposed in the University, Gomarus did in three several parts of his theses express himself in such terms as were diametrically opposed to those of Trelcatius. The very obvious difference in opinion between those two Professors I pointed out to the Amsterdam minister, who acknowledged its existence. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, no one endeavored to vindicate me from this calumny; while great exertion was employed to frame excuses for Trelcatius, by means of a qualified interpretation of his words, though it was utterly impossible to reconcile their palliative explanations with the plain signification of his unperverted expressions. Such are the effects which the partiality of favor and the fervor of zeal can produce!
(2.) Second, it would follow that the Son is actually the Father, differing from the Father only in name—the ancient heresy of Sabellianism. Since it is the unique property of the Father to derive his deity from no one, if the Son is called *autotheos* in the sense of being "God of himself," it follows that he must be the Father! News of this disputation spread far and wide, reaching Amsterdam. When a minister from that city (now resting in the Lord) asked me about it, I explained everything straightforwardly, just as I have here. I asked him to explain to Trelcatius what had actually happened and counsel him to correct the misleading phrasing in his Common Places, which the minister agreed to do. I acted blamelessly throughout, defending the orthodox faith of the universal church. Trelcatius was clearly the one who used careless language that undermined the truth. Yet such has been my misfortune, or the partisan zeal of my critics, that whenever any theological dispute arises, all the blame is heaped onto me, as if I were incapable of holding orthodox views. In fact, Gomarus himself agreed with me on this point! Soon after Trelcatius published his book, in a university disputation on the Trinity, Gomarus expressed himself in three distinct places in direct opposition to Trelcatius. I pointed out this clear contradiction to the Amsterdam minister, who admitted it was true. Yet no one stepped forward to defend me from slander, while great effort was spent inventing excuses for Trelcatius through strained interpretations that could never be reconciled with his plain words. Such is the power of personal favoritism and partisan bias!
The milder and qualified interpretation put upon the words of Trelcatius, was the following: “the Son of God may be styled autotheos, or may be said to have his Deity from himself, in reference to his being God, although he has his Deity from the Father, in reference to his being the Son.” For the sake of a larger explanation, it is said, “God, or the Divine Essence, may be considered both absolutely and relatively. When regarded absolutely, the Son has his Divine essence from himself; but, when viewed relatively, he derives it from the Father.” But these are new modes of speaking and novel opinions, and such as can by no means consist together. For the Son, both in regard to his being the Son, and to his being God, derives his Deity from the Father. When he is called God, it is then only not expressed that he is from the Father; which derivation is particularly noted when the word Son is employed. Indeed, the essence of God can in no manner come under our consideration, except it be said, “that the Divine Essence is communicated to the Son by the Father.” Nor can it possibly in any different respect whatever be said, that this essence is both “communicated to him” and “not communicated;” because these expressions are contradictory, and can in no diverse respect be reconciled to each other. If the Son have the Divine Essence from himself in reference to its being absolutely considered, it cannot be communicated to him. If it be communicated to him in reference to its being relatively considered, he cannot have it from himself in reference to its being absolutely considered.
The softened interpretation offered to defend Trelcatius was this: "The Son of God may be called *autotheos*, or said to have his deity from himself, in respect to his being God, even though he has his deity from the Father in respect to his being the Son." To elaborate, they argued: "The divine essence may be considered either absolutely or relatively. Considered absolutely, the Son has his divine essence from himself; considered relatively, he derives it from the Father." But these are novel phrases and conflicting ideas that cannot be reconciled. For the Son, both as Son and as God, receives his deity from the Father. When he is called "God," it simply leaves unstated that he is from the Father—a relation that the name "Son" explicitly affirms. Indeed, we cannot properly speak of the divine essence belonging to the Son without affirming that it was communicated to him by the Father. It is impossible to claim that the divine essence is both communicated and uncommunicated to the Son, for those two statements are contradictory. If the Son has the divine essence from himself considered absolutely, it cannot have been communicated to him. And if it was communicated to him, he cannot have it from himself.
1 shall probably be asked, “do you not acknowledge, that, to be the Son of God, and to be God, are two things entirely distinct from each other?” I reply, undoubtedly I subscribe to such distinction. But when those who make it proceed still further, and say, “since to be the Son of God signifies that he derives his essence from the Father, to be God in like manner signifies nothing less than that he has his essence from himself or from no one;” I deny this assertion, and declare, at the same time, that it is a great and manifest error, not only in sacred theology, but likewise in natural philosophy. For, these two things, to be the Son and to be God, are at perfect agreement with each other; but to derive his essence from the Father, and, at the same time, to derive it from no one, are evidently contradictor, and mutually destructive the one of the other. But, to make this fallacy still more apparent, it must be observed, how equal in force and import are certain double ternary and parallel propositions, when standing in the following juxta-position: God is from eternity, possessing the Divine Essence from eternity. The Father is from no one, having the Divine Essence from no one. The Son is from the Father, having the Divine Essence from the Father. The word “God” therefore signifies, that He has the true Divine Essence; but the word “Son” signifies, that he has the Divine Essence from the Father. On this account, he is correctly denominated both God and the Son of God. But since he cannot be styled the Father, he cannot possibly be said to have the Divine Essence from himself or from no one. Yet much labor is devoted to the purpose of excusing these expressions, by saying, “that when the son of God in reference to his being God is said to have his essence from that form of speech signifies nothing more, than that the Divine essence is not derived from any one.” But if this be thought to be the most proper mode of action which should be adopted, there will be no depraved or erroneous sentiment which can be uttered that may not thus find a ready excuse. For though God and the divine Essence do not differ substantially, yet whatever may be predicated of the Divine Essence can by no means be equally predicated of God; because they are distinguished from each other in our mode of framing conceptions, according to which mode all forms of speech ought to be examined, since they are employed only with a design that through them we should receive correct impressions. This is very obvious from the following examples, in which we speak with perfect correctness when we say, “Deum mortuum esse,” and “the Essence of God is communicated;” but very incorrectly when we say, “God is communicated.” That man who understands the difference existing between concrete and abstract, about which there were such frequent disputes between us and the Lutherans will easily perceive what a number of absurdities will ensue, if explanations of this description be once tolerated in the Church of God. Therefore, in no way whatever can this phrase, “the Son of God is autotheos,” [“God of himself,” or “in his own right,”] be excused as a correct one, or as having been happily expressed. Nor can that be called a proper form of speech which says, “the Essence of God is common to three persons;” but it is improper, since the Divine Essence is declared to be communicated by one of them to another. The observations which I now make, I wish to be particularly regarded, because it may appear from them how much we are capable of tolerating in a man whom we do not suspect of heresy; and, on the contrary, with what avidity we seize upon any trivial circumstance by which we may inculpate another man whom we hold under the ban of suspicion. Of such partiality, this incident affords two manifest examples.
Someone may ask me: "Do you not recognize that being God and being the Son of God are two distinct concepts?" I answer: Certainly I recognize that distinction. But when people go further and argue that because "Son of God" means deriving his essence from the Father, "being God" must mean having his essence from himself or from no one, I deny that completely. That is a glaring error not only in theology but also in natural philosophy. Being God and being the Son are in perfect harmony; but receiving one's essence from the Father while simultaneously having it from no one is a blatant contradiction. To expose this confusion, consider these clear parallel propositions: God is from eternity, possessing the divine essence from eternity. The Father is from no one, having the divine essence from no one. The Son is from the Father, having the divine essence from the Father. The title "God" denotes the possession of the true divine essence, while the title "Son" denotes receiving that divine essence from the Father. For this reason, he is rightly called both God and the Son of God. But since he is not the Father, he cannot be said to have the divine essence from himself or from no one. People try to excuse this language by claiming that saying the Son has his essence from himself merely means the divine essence itself is unoriginated. But if that kind of excuse is allowed, any erroneous statement can be defended. Although God and the divine essence do not differ in substance, what is said of the divine essence cannot always be said equally of God. They are distinct in the way we form concepts. All forms of speech should be examined according to that distinction, because their purpose is to give us correct understanding. We speak correctly when we say that “God died” ("Deum mortuum esse"), or that the divine essence is communicated; but we would speak improperly if we said "God is communicated." Anyone who understands the distinction between the concrete and the abstract—so often disputed between us and the Lutherans—will see what absurdities follow if such loose explanations are accepted in the church. Therefore, the phrase "the Son of God is *autotheos*," in the sense of "God of himself" or "in his own right," cannot be defended as accurate or well expressed. Nor is it proper to say, "The essence of God is common to three persons," since the divine essence is said to be communicated by one of them to another. I share this so you may see how leniently people treat someone who is not suspected of heresy, while pouncing on the slightest pretext to condemn someone who has fallen under suspicion. This incident provides two clear examples of that partiality.
9. THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN BEFORE GOD
9. THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN BEFORE GOD
I am not conscious to myself, of having taught or entertained any other sentiments concerning the justification of man before God, than those which are held unanimously by the Reformed and Protestant Churches, and which are in complete agreement with their expressed opinions. There was lately a short controversy in relation to this subject, between John Piscator, Professor of Divinity in the University of Herborn in Nassau, and the French Churches. It consisted in the determination of these two questions:
I am unaware of having taught or held any view on justification before God other than what is unanimously embraced by the Reformed and Protestant churches and expressed in their confessions. Recently, a brief controversy on this subject arose between Johannes Piscator, professor of theology at Herborn, and the French Reformed churches. It centered on two questions:
(1.) “is the obedience or righteousness of Christ, which is imputed to believers and in which consists their righteousness before God, is this only the passive obedience of Christ?” which was Piscator’s opinion. Or
(1.) Is the obedience or righteousness of Christ imputed to believers for their acceptance before God solely Christ's passive obedience (his suffering and death)? This was Piscator's view; or
(2.) “is it not, in addition to this, that active righteousness of Christ which he exhibited to the law of God in the whole course of his life, and that holiness in which he was conceived?” Which was the opinion of the French Churches. But I never durst mingle myself with the dispute, or undertake to decide it; for I thought it possible for the Professors of the same religion to hold different opinions on this point from others of their brethren, without any breach of Christian peace or the unity of faith. Similar peaceful thoughts appear to have been indulged by both the adverse parties in this dispute; for they exercised a friendly toleration towards each other, and did not make that a reason for mutually renouncing their fraternal concord. But concerning such an amicable plan of adjusting differences, certain individuals in our own country are of a different judgment. A question has been raised from these words of the Apostle Paul: “Faith is imputed for righteousness.” (Romans 4:1 Romans 4) The inquiry was,
(2.) Does it also include Christ's active righteousness—his lifelong obedience to God's law and his sinless holiness from conception? This was the stance of the French churches. I never presumed to take sides or settle that dispute, believing that brethren of the same faith could hold differing views on this issue without breaking Christian peace or doctrinal unity. Indeed, both parties showed mutual forbearance and maintained their brotherly fellowship. Sadly, certain individuals in our own land take a much harsher stance. A related question has been raised from the words of the apostle Paul: "Faith is credited as righteousness" (Romans 4:1 Romans 4). The question was asked:
(1.) Whether those expressions ought to be properly understood, “so that faith itself, as an act performed according to the command of the gospel, is imputed before God for or unto righteousness — and that of grace; since it is not the righteousness of the law.”
(1.) Should these words be understood literally, meaning that faith itself, as an act of trust commanded by the gospel, is graciously credited by God for righteousness—since it is not legal righteousness based on works?
(2.) Whether they ought to be figuratively and improperly understood, “that the righteousness of Christ, being apprehended by faith, is imputed to us for righteousness.” Or
(2.) Or should they be understood figuratively, meaning that Christ's righteousness, grasped by faith, is what is credited to us as righteousness?
(3.) Whether it is to be understood “that the righteousness, for which, or unto which, faith is imputed, is the instrumental operation of faith;” which is asserted by some persons. In the theses on justification, which were disputed under me when I was moderator, I have adopted the former of these opinions not in a rigid manner, but simply, as I have likewise done in another passage which I wrote in a particular letter. It is on this ground that I am accounted to hold and to teach unsound opinions concerning the justification of man before God. But how unfounded such a supposition is, will be very evident at a proper season, and in a mutual conference. For the present, I will only briefly say, “I believe that sinners are accounted righteous solely by the obedience of Christ; and that the righteousness of Christ is the only meritorious cause on account of which God pardons the sins of believers and reckons them as righteous as if they had perfectly fulfilled the law. But since God imputes the righteousness of Christ to none except believers, I conclude that, in this sense, it may be well and properly said, to a man who believes, faith is imputed for righteousness through grace, because God hath set forth his Son, Jesus Christ, to be a propitiation, a throne of grace, [or mercy seat] through faith in his blood.” Whatever interpretation may be put upon these expressions, none of our Divines blames Calvin or considers him to be heterodox on this point; yet my opinion is not so widely different from his as to prevent me from employing the signature of my own hand in subscribing to those things which he has delivered on this subject, in the third book of his Institutes; this I am prepared to do at any time, and to give them my full approval. Most noble and potent Lords, these are the principal articles, respecting which I have judged it necessary to declare my opinion before this august meeting, in obedience to your commands.
(3.) Or should it be understood that "the righteousness for which, or toward which, faith is credited" is the instrumental operation of faith, as some maintain? In the theses on justification debated under my moderation, I favored the first phrasing, expressing it simply and without dogmatism, as I also did in a personal letter. On this basis, critics have accused me of teaching unsound doctrine on justification. Yet how baseless that charge is will become obvious in due time during a fraternal conference. For now, I state plainly: I believe that sinners are accounted righteous solely through the obedience of Christ, and that Christ's righteousness is the only meritorious cause on account of which God forgives believers and regards them as righteous as if they had perfectly kept the law. But because God imputes Christ's righteousness to no one except believers, it is entirely accurate to say that to the person who believes, faith is credited as righteousness through grace, because God presented Jesus Christ as an atoning sacrifice and mercy seat through faith in his blood. None of our theologians accuses John Calvin of heresy on this topic, yet my view is so close to his that I am ready at any moment to sign my name to everything he wrote on justification in Book 3 of his Institutes. Most noble and potent Lords, these are the principal theological articles on which I felt bound to declare my convictions before this august assembly in obedience to your command.
10. THE REVISION OF THE DUTCH CONFESSION,
10. THE REVISION OF THE BELGIC CONFESSION
AND THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM
AND THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM
But, besides these things, I had some annotations to make on the Confession of the Dutch Churches and on the Heidelberg Catechism; but they will be discussed most appropriately in our Synod, which at the first opportunity we hope to obtain through your consent, or rather by means of your summons. This is the sole request which I prefer to your mightinesses, that I may be permitted to offer a few brief remarks on a certain clause, subject to which their high mightinesses, the States General, gave their consent to the convening of a National Synod in this province, (Holland,) and the substance of which was, that in such Synod the Confession and Catechism of the Dutch Churches should be subjected to examination. This clause has given great umbrage to many persons, not only because they account it unnecessary, but likewise unjust, to subject the Confession and Catechism to examination. They also suppose, that I and a certain individual of great reputation, are the persons who prevailed with the States General to have such a clause inserted. But it is by no means true that the revision of the Confession and Catechism is unnecessary and unjust, or that we were the instigators of their high mightinesses in this affair. With regard to the last of these two suppositions, so far were we from having any concern with the origin of that clause, that, eleven or twelve years ago, at the pressing importunity of the Churches that prayed for a National Synod, the States of South Holland and West Friezland at last judged it proper to consent to it by their decree, on no other condition than that in such Synod the Confession of the Dutch Churches should be subjected to examination. Yet we, at that time, neither endeavored by our advice, nor by our influence, to promote any such measure. But if we had with all our might made the attempt, we should have been doing nothing but what was compatible with our official duties; because it is obviously agreeable to reason as well as to equity, and quite necessary in the present posture of affairs, that such a measure should be adopted. First. That it may openly appear to all the world that we render to the word of God alone such due and suitable honor, as to determine it to be beyond (or rather above) all disputes, too great to be the subject of any exception, and worthy of all acceptation.
In addition to these doctrines, I have prepared several observations on the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism, which will be most fittingly discussed at the national synod that we hope you will soon authorize and convene. My only request to your Excellencies today is for permission to say a few words regarding a specific clause in the resolution by which the States General authorized a national synod in Holland—namely, that the Confession and Catechism should be examined and reviewed at that gathering. This clause has provoked great offense among many, who consider reviewing our Confession and Catechism not only unnecessary but unjust. Some even suspect that I and another well-known colleague persuaded the States General to insert that requirement. But it is simply untrue that a revision is unnecessary or unjust, or that we were the instigators behind it. In fact, eleven or twelve years ago, when the churches urgently petitioned for a national synod, the States of South Holland and West Friesland consented only on the express condition that the Confession be examined. At that time, we had no hand in that decision whatsoever. Yet even if we had advocated for it with all our strength, we would only have been fulfilling our duty. Such a review is completely reasonable, just, and urgently needed in our present circumstances. First, it demonstrates to the entire world that we honor the Word of God alone as supreme—elevated far above all human writings, beyond dispute, and worthy of universal acceptance.
Secondly. Because these pamphlets are writings that proceed from men, and may, on that account, contain within them some portion of error, it is, therefore, proper to institute a lawful inquiry, that is, in a National Synod, whether or not there be any thing in those productions which requires amendment.
Second, because these documents were written by fallible human beings and may therefore contain error, it is entirely right to conduct a lawful inquiry at a national synod to determine whether anything in them requires correction.
1. The first inquiry may be, whether these human writings are accordant, in every part, with the word of God, with regard to the words themselves, the construction of the sentences and the correct meaning.
1. The first question to examine is whether these human writings agree in every part with the Word of God—in their vocabulary, sentence structure, and intended meaning.
2. Whether they contain whatever is necessary to be believed unto salvation, so that salvation is, according to this rule, not denied to those things to which it appertains.
2. Second, whether they contain everything necessary to be believed for salvation, so that this rule does not deny salvation where it belongs.
3. Whether it [the rule of these formularies] does not contain far too many particulars, and embrace several that are not necessary to be believed unto salvation, so that salvation is consequently attributed to those things to which it does not belong.
3. Third, whether they include too many nonessential details that are not necessary for salvation, mistakenly making peripheral matters tests of saving faith.
4. Whether certain words and forms of speech are not employed in them, which are capable of being understood in different ways and furnishing occasion for disputes. Thus, for example, in the Fourteenth article of the Confession, we read the following words, “nothing is done without God’s ordination,” [or appointment]: if by the word “ordination” is signified, “that God appoints things of any kind to be done,” this mode of enunciation is erroneous, and it follows as a consequence from it, that God is the author of sin. But if it signify, that “whatever it be that is done, God ordains it to a good end,” the terms in which it is conceived are in that case correct.
4. Fourth, whether ambiguous words or phrases are used that can be understood in conflicting ways and provoke needless controversy. For example, Article 13 of the Confession states that "nothing happens without God's ordination." If "ordination" means that God appoints every kind of thing to be done, that statement is erroneous and implies that God is the author of sin. But if it means that God overrules whatever happens to serve a good end, the phrasing is entirely orthodox.
5. Whether things utterly repugnant to each other may not be discovered in them. For instance, a certain individual who is highly honored in the Church, addressed a letter to John Piscator, Professor of Divinity in the University of Herborn in Nassau, and in it he exhorted him to confine himself within the opinion of the Heidelberg Catechism on the doctrine of Justification. For this purpose he cited three passage, which he considered to be at variance with Piscator’s sentiments. But the learned Professor replied, that he confined himself completely within the doctrinal boundaries of the Catechism; and then quoted out of that formulary ten or eleven passages as proofs of his sentiments. But I solemnly declare, I do not perceive by what method these several passages can possibly be reconciled with each other.
5. Fifth, whether contradictory statements can be found within them. For instance, a highly respected church leader wrote to Johannes Piscator urging him to adhere strictly to the Heidelberg Catechism on justification, citing three passages he believed contradicted Piscator's views. But the professor replied that he was adhering fully to the Catechism, quoting ten or eleven other passages from that same document in defense of his position! I must honestly confess that I cannot see how those opposing sets of passages can be reconciled.
6. Whether every thing in these writings is digested in that due order in which the Scripture requires them to be placed.
6. Sixth, whether all doctrines in these writings are arranged in the proper theological order required by Scripture.
7. Whether all things are disposed in a manner the most suitable and convenient for preserving peace and unity with the rest of the reformed Churches.
7. Seventh, whether everything is framed in the most suitable manner to foster peace and unity with all other Reformed churches.
Thirdly. The third reason is, because a National Synod is held for the purpose of discovering whether all things in the Church are in a proper state or right condition. One of the chief duties which appertains to such an assembly, is, the examination of doctrine, whether it be that which is admitted by unanimous consent, or that for which particular Divines contend.
Third, the very purpose of convening a national synod is to evaluate the condition of the church and see if all is in order. One of its highest responsibilities is to examine doctrine, both what is unanimously accepted and what is currently debated by theologians.
Fourthly. The fourth reason is, because an examination of this description will obtain for these writings a greater degree of authority, when after a mature and rigid examination they shall be found to agree with the word of God, or shall be made conformable to it in a still greater measure. Such an examination will also excite within the minds of men a greater value for Christian ministers, when they perceive that these sacred functionaries hold in the highest estimation that truth which is revealed in Scripture, and that their attachment to it is so great as to induce them to spare no labor in order to render their own doctrine more and more conformable to that revealed truth.
Fourth, such an examination will actually bestow greater authority upon these confessions once they have been carefully tested and confirmed by the Word of God, or revised to align more closely with it. It will also deepen people's respect for Christian ministers, seeing that their pastors hold biblical truth in the highest regard and spare no effort to ensure their teaching conforms entirely to Scripture.
Fifthly. The fifth reason why at this, if at any period, it is necessary to adopt the suggestion which we have mentioned, is,
Fifth, such a review is especially urgent at this present moment for two reasons:
(1.) Because there are several individuals in the ministry who have certain views and considerations respecting some points contained in these writings, which they reserve in secret and reveal to no one, because they hope that such points will become subjects of discussion in a National Synod. Because such a convention has been promised, some of them have suffered themselves to be persuaded not to give the least publicity to any of the views or considerations which they have formed on these subjects.
(1.) First, several ministers have private reservations and questions about specific points in these confessions which they have kept to themselves, trusting that these matters would be openly discussed at a national synod. On the promise of such a synod, they have agreed to keep their thoughts confidential for the time being.
(2.) Besides, this will be the design of a National Synod — That their high mightinesses the States General may be pleased to establish and arm with public authority certain ecclesiastical sanctions, according to which every one may be bound to conduct himself in the Church of God. That this favor may be obtained from their high mightinesses and that they may execute such a measure with a good conscience, it is necessary that they be convinced in their own understandings, that the doctrine contained in the formulary of union is agreeable to the word of God. This is a reason which ought to induce us spontaneously to propose an examination of our Confession before their high mightinesses, and to offer either to shew that it is in accordance with the word of God, or to render it conformable to that Divine standard.
(2.) Second, a further purpose of a national synod is for the States General to ratify church regulations with civil authority, binding everyone in the church. For the States General to enact such measures with a clear conscience, they must be persuaded in their own minds that the doctrine contained in these standards agrees with God's Word. We should therefore gladly propose this review before the States General, demonstrating that our confession conforms to the Word of God or revising it until it does.
Sixthly. The sixth reason is drawn from the example of those who are associated together under the Augustan Confession, and from the conduct of the Swiss and the French Churches, that have within two or three years enriched their Confessions with one entirely new article. And the Dutch Confession has itself been subjected to examination since it was first published: some things having been taken away from it and others added, while some of the rest have undergone various alterations. Numerous other reasons might be produced, but I omit them; because I consider those already mentioned to be quite sufficient for proving, that the clause concerning examination and revision, as it is termed, was with the greatest justice and propriety inserted in the instrument of consent of which we have made previous mention.
Sixth, we have the clear precedent of the Lutheran churches who subscribe to the Augsburg Confession, as well as the Swiss and French Reformed churches, which within the past two or three years added a brand-new article to their confessions. Indeed, our own Belgic Confession has already undergone examination and revision since its original publication, with certain portions removed, new material added, and other parts amended. Many more reasons could be given, but these are more than enough to prove that the clause requiring review and examination was included in your resolution with complete justice and propriety.
I am not ignorant, that other reasons are adduced, in opposition to these; and one in particular, which is made a principal subject of public conversation, and is accounted of all others the most solid. To it, therefore I consider it necessary to offer a brief reply. It is thus stated: “by such an examination as this, the doctrine of the Church will be called in question; which is neither an act of propriety nor of duty.
I am well aware that opposing arguments are raised, especially one common objection that many consider unanswerable: "If we examine our standards, the doctrine of the church will be called into question, which is neither appropriate nor right." They argue:
“1. Because this doctrine has obtained the approbation and suffrages of many respectable and learned men; and has been strenuously defended against all those who have offered it any opposition.
"1. Because this doctrine has received the approval and support of many respected, learned scholars, and has been vigorously defended against all opponents;
“2. Because it has been sealed with the blood of many thousand martyrs. “3. Because from such an examination will arise, within the Church, confusion, scandal, offenses, and the destruction of consciences; and, out of the Church, ridicule, calumnies and accusations.”
"2. Because it has been sealed with the blood of thousands of martyrs; and 3. Because such an examination will cause confusion, scandal, offenses, and the destruction of consciences within the church, while inviting ridicule, slander, and accusations from without."
To all these I answer:
To all these objections, I reply:
1. It would be much better, not to employ such odious forms of speech, as to call in question, and others of that class, when the conversation is only respecting some human composition, which is liable to have error intermixed with its contents. For with what right can any writing he said to be called in question or in doubt, which was never of itself unquestionable, or ought to be considered as indubitable?
1. We should avoid such alarmist language as "calling something into question" when speaking of human writings that are inherently fallible. How can a document be accused of being "called into question" when it was never infallible or beyond question to begin with?
2. The approbation of Divines, the defense of a composition against its adversaries, and the sealing of it with the blood of martyrs, do not render any doctrine authentic or place it beyond the limits of doubt: because it is possible both for Divines and martyrs to err — a circumstance which can admit of no denial in this argument.
2. The endorsement of scholars, the successful defense of a creed against opponents, and the blood of martyrs do not make any human document infallible. Both theologians and martyrs can err—a reality no honest person can deny.
3. A distinction ought to be made between the different matters contained in the Confession. For while some of them make a near approach to the foundation of salvation and are fundamental articles of the Christian religion, others of them are built up as a superstructure on the foundation, and of themselves are not absolutely necessary to salvation. The doctrines of this former class are approved by the unanimous consent of all the Reformed, and are effectually defended against all gainsaying adversaries. But those of the latter class become subjects of controversy between different parties: and some of these are attacked by enemies not without some semblance of truth and justice.
3. We must distinguish between the different types of doctrine in the Confession. Some articles touch the very core of salvation and are essential foundations of the Christian faith; others belong to the superstructure built upon that foundation and are not essential for salvation. The foundational doctrines are unanimously affirmed by all Reformed churches and effectively defended against every adversary. The secondary matters, however, are subjects of debate among godly believers, and some are challenged by opponents with considerable plausibility.
The blood of martyrs has sealed those of the former class but by no means those of the latter. In reference to this affair, it ought to be diligently observed, what was proposed by the martyrs of our days, and on what account they shed their blood. If this be done, it will be found, that no man among them was even interrogated on that subject which I consider it equitable to make a prominent part in the deliberations of a Synod, and, therefore, that no martyr ever sealed it with his blood. I will produce an example: when a question was raised about the meaning of the seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans, one individual said, “that the passage was quoted in the margin of the Confession exactly in the same sense as he had embraced it, and that the martyrs had with their own blood sealed this Confession.” But, in reply to this, it was stated, “that if the strictest search be instituted throughout the entire large history of the martyrs, as it is published by the French, it will be discovered, that no martyr has at any period been examined on that passage, or has shed his blood on that account.”
The blood of the martyrs sealed the foundational truths, not the secondary matters under debate. If we examine the historical records to see why our martyrs were questioned and executed, we will discover that not a single one was ever interrogated on the disputed points I propose examining at our synod; thus no martyr ever sealed those debatable points with his blood. For example, when a debate arose over the meaning of Romans 7, someone asserted that the passage was cited in the margin of the Confession in support of his view, claiming that the martyrs had sealed the Confession with their blood. But it was pointed out in response that if one searches the entire history of the martyrs published by the French churches, not a single martyr was ever questioned about Romans 7, let alone put to death over it!
To sum up the whole: the blood of the martyrs tends to confirm this truth, that they have made profession of their faith “in simplicity and sincerity of conscience.” But it is by no means conclusive, that the Confession which they produced is free from every degree of reprehension or superior to all exception; unless they had been led by Christ into all truth and therefore rendered incapable of erring.
In short, the blood of martyrs tends to confirm that they professed their faith with sincerity of conscience; it does not prove that every line of the confession they held is infallible and exempt from revision, unless we are prepared to claim that the martyrs were granted complete infallibility.
4. If the Church be properly instructed in that difference which really does and always ought to exist between the word of God and all human writings, and if the Church be also rightly informed concerning that liberty which she and all Christians possess, and which they will always enjoy, to measure all human compositions by the standard rule of God’s word, she will neither distress herself on that account, nor will she be offended on perceiving all human writings brought to be proved at the touch-stone of God’s word. On the contrary, she will rather feel far more abundant delight, when she sees, that God has bestowed on her in this country such pastors and teachers, as try at the chief touch-stone their own doctrine, in a manner at once suitable, proper, just, and worthy of perpetual observance; and that they do this, to be able exactly and by every possible means to express their agreement with the word of God, and their consent to it even in the most minute particulars.
4. If the church is rightly taught the immense difference between the inspired Word of God and all human writings, and if believers understand their God-given freedom to test all human creeds against the standard of Scripture, they will not be alarmed or offended when human writings are examined against the touchstone of God's Word. On the contrary, they will rejoice that God has given them pastors and teachers who humbly test their own doctrine against the supreme standard of Scripture, striving in every way to ensure that their confession conforms to God's Word even in the smallest details.
5. But it is no less proper, that the doctrine once received in the Church should be subjected to examination, however great the fear may be “lest disturbances should ensue, and lest evil disposed persons should make such revision an object of ridicule, calumny or accusation,” or should even turn it to their own great advantage, [by representing the matter so as to induce a persuasion,] “that those who propose this examination are not sufficiently confirmed in their own religion ;” when, on the contrary, this is one of God’s commands, “search and try the spirits whether they be of God.” (1 John 4:1.) If cogitations of that description had operated as hindrances on the minds of Luther, Zuinglius, and others, they would never have pried into the doctrine of the Papists, or have subjected it to a scrutinizing examination. Nor would those who adhere to the Augustan Confession have considered it proper to submit that formulary again to a new and complete revision, and to alter it in some particulars. This deed of theirs is an object of our praise and approval. And we conclude, that, when Luther towards the close of his life was advised by Philip Melancthon to bring the eucharistic controversy on the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper to some better state of concord, (as it is related in the writings of our own countrymen,) he acted very improperly in rejecting that counsel, and in casting it back as a reproach on Philip, for this reason, as they state his declaration, “lest by such an attempt to effect an amicable conclusion, the whole doctrine should be called in question.” Besides, if reasons of this kind ought to be admitted, the Papists with the best right and the greatest propriety formerly endeavored to prevent the doctrine, which had for many preceding centuries been received in the Church, from being called in question or subjected again to examination.
5. It is entirely right to examine church doctrine, regardless of fears that controversy might arise or that critics might mock us or claim we are uncertain of our faith. Scripture commands us: "Test the spirits to see whether they are from God" (1 John 4:1). If such fearful worries had restrained Luther, Zwingli, and others, they would never have challenged papal errors or subjected them to biblical examination. Nor would the Lutherans have felt free to revise the Augsburg Confession, which they did to our praise. According to accounts in the writings of our own countrymen, when Luther near the end of his life was urged by Melanchthon to seek concord on the Lord's Supper, he was wrong to reject that counsel out of fear that "the whole doctrine might be called into question." Indeed, if that objection were valid, the Roman church would have been completely justified in forbidding any questioning of the doctrines it held for centuries!
But it has been suggested, in opposition to these reasons, “that if the doctrine of the Churches be submitted to an entirely new revision as often as a National Synod shall be held, the Church would never have any thing to which it might adhere or on which it might fully depend, and it will be possible to declare with great justice, concerning Churches thus circumstanced, that, they have an anniversary faith: are tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine. (Ephesians 4:14.)
Yet opponents object: "If the church's doctrine is reexamined whenever a national synod meets, believers will never have an anchor to hold to, and it could rightly be said that we have a faith that changes each year, being tossed back and forth and carried about by every wind of doctrine" (Ephesians 4:14).
1. My first answer to these remarks, is, the Church always has Moses and the Prophets, the Evangelists and the Apostles, that is, the Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament; and these Scriptures fully and clearly comprehend whatever is necessary to salvation. Upon them the Church will lay the foundation of her faith, and will rest upon them as on an immovable basis, principally because, how highly soever we may esteem Confessions and Catechisms every decision on matters of faith and religion must obtain its final resolution in the Scriptures.
1. I reply, first: The church always has Moses and the prophets, the evangelists and the apostles—the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments—which clearly contain everything necessary for salvation. On them the church anchors her faith as an immovable foundation. However highly we value confessions and catechisms, every question of doctrine must ultimately be decided by Scripture alone.
2. Some points in the Confession are certain and do not admit of a doubt: these will never be called in question by any one, except by heretics. Yet there are other parts of its contents which are of such a kind, as may with the most obvious utility become frequent subjects of conference and discussion between men of learning who fear God, for the purpose of reconciling them with those indubitable articles as nearly as is practicable.
2. Second, core doctrines in the Confession are undeniable and beyond question; no one challenges them except heretics. But other secondary matters can be profitably discussed by learned, godly ministers to bring them into closer harmony with those undeniable foundational truths.
3. Let it be attempted to make the Confession contain as few articles as possible; and let it propose them in a very brief form, conceived entirely in the expressions of Scripture. Let all the more ample explanations, proofs, digressions, redundancies, amplifications and exclamations, be omitted; and let nothing be delivered in it, except those truths which are necessary to salvation. The consequences of this brevity will be, that the Confession will be less liable to be filled with errors, not so obnoxious to obloquy, and less subject to examination. Let the practice of the ancient Church be produced as an example, that comprehended, in as brief a form of words as was practicable, those articles which she judged necessary to be believed. Some individuals form a distinction between the Confession and the Catechism with respect to revision; and, since the Confession is the peculiar property of the Dutch Churches, and is on that account found in the hands of comparatively few people, they conclude, “that it is possible without any difficulty to revise it in a Synod and subject it to examination., But since the Catechism belongs not only to us, but likewise and principally to the Churches of the Palatinate, and is therefore to be found in the hands of all men, the same persons consider the examination of it “to be connected with great peril.” But to this I reply, if we be desirous of constituting the Heidelberg Catechism a formulary of concord among the teachers of the Churches, and if they be obliged to subscribe it, it is still necessary to subject it to examination. For no Churches whatever ought to hold such a high station in our esteem, as to induce us to receive any writing of their composition without, at the same time, reserving to ourselves the liberty of submitting it to a nice scrutiny. And I account this to be the principal cause, why the Churches of different provinces, although at perfect agreement with each other on the fundamental points of Christian doctrine, have each composed for themselves their own Confessions. But if the Heidelberg Catechism be not allowed, to become a formulary of this kind, and if a suitable liberty be conceded in the explanation of it, it will not then be necessary either to revise it or subject it to examination; provided, I repeat, that the obligatory burden of subscription be removed, and a moderate liberty be conceded in its explanation.
3. Third, we should strive to keep our confession as concise as possible, expressing its articles in the clear language of Scripture. Lengthy explanations, arguments, digressions, and rhetorical flourishes should be omitted, including only what is essential for salvation. This brevity will make the confession less prone to error, less open to dispute, and less in need of constant reexamination. We should follow the example of the early church, which framed its creeds as briefly as possible. Some people draw a distinction between revising the Confession and revising the Catechism. Because the Belgic Confession belongs strictly to our Dutch churches and is held by relatively few people, they say it can be revised without difficulty; but because the Heidelberg Catechism is shared with the Palatinate and used by all, they claim revising it would be dangerous. I answer: If we require all ministers to subscribe to the Heidelberg Catechism as an official standard of unity, then it must be open to examination. No church body should hold such authority over us that we adopt its writings without the freedom to test them. I consider this the chief reason why churches in different regions, while agreeing on the fundamental points of Christian doctrine, wrote their own confessions. However, if the Heidelberg Catechism is not enforced as a rigid test of orthodoxy, and if reasonable liberty is granted in interpreting it, then formal revision may not be necessary—provided the binding obligation of subscription is removed and moderate interpretive freedom is allowed.
This is all that I had to propose to your mightinesses, as to my most noble, potent, wise and prudent masters. While I own myself bound to render an account of all my actions, to the members of this most noble and potent assembly, (next after God,) I at the same time present to them my humble and grateful acknowledgments, because they have not disdained to grant me a courteous and patient audience. I embrace this opportunity solemnly to declare, that I am sincerely prepared to institute an amicable and fraternal conference with my reverend brethren, (at whatever time or place and on whatever occasion this honorable assembly may judge proper to appoint,) on all the topics which I have now mentioned, and on any other concerning which it will be possible for a controversy to exist, or at some future period to arise. I also make this additional promise, that I will in every conference conduct myself with equanimity, moderation and docility, and will shew myself not less actuated by the desire of being taught, than by that of communicating to others some portion of instruction. And, since in the discussion of every topic on which it will be possible to institute a conference, two points will become objects of attention. First. “Whether that be true which is the subject of the controversy,” and, secondly, “Whether it be necessary to be believed unto salvation,” and since both these points ought to be discussed and proved out of the Scriptures, I here tender my sacred affirmation, and solemnly bind myself hereafter to observe it, that, however cogently I may have proved by the most solid [human] arguments any article to be agreeable to the word of God, I will not obtrude it for an article of belief on those of my brethren who may entertain a different opinion respecting it, unless I have plainly proved it from the word of God and have with equal clearness established its truth, and the necessity unto salvation that every Christian should entertain the same belief.
This is what I desired to present to your Excellencies, my noble, potent, and prudent rulers. Acknowledging my duty to give an account of my conduct to this assembly next after God himself, I offer my humble gratitude for your patient and gracious hearing. I take this opportunity to declare solemnly that I am ready at any time and place your Excellencies appoint to enter into a friendly, brotherly conference with my fellow ministers on all the topics I have raised, or on any other doctrinal question. I promise to conduct myself in every discussion with gentleness, moderation, and an open heart, just as eager to learn as to teach. Furthermore, because two questions must be asked of every debated point—first, "Is it true?" and second, "Is it necessary for salvation?"—and because both must be established from Scripture, I make this solemn pledge: However convincingly I might defend a point with solid human reasoning, I will never impose it as a required article of faith on brethren who disagree, unless I have proved it clearly from the Word of God and shown that it is essential for salvation.
If my brethren will be prepared to act in this manner, as far as I know the complexion of my own opinions, there will not easily arise among us any schism or controversy. But, that I may on my part remove every cause of fear that can possibly invade this most noble assembly, occupied and engaged as its honorable members now are with important concerns on which in a great measure depends the safety of our native country and of the Reformed Churches, I subjoin this remark, “that to hinder my toleration of any matters in my brethren, they must be very numerous and very important. For I am not of the congregation of those who wish to have dominion over the faith of another man, but am only a minister to believers, with the design of promoting in them an increase of knowledge, truth, piety, peace and joy in Jesus Christ our Lord.”
If my brethren are willing to approach our discussions in this same spirit, as far as I understand my own views, division or controversy will not readily arise among us. And to ease any anxieties that might weigh upon your minds—occupied as your Excellencies are with the weightiest affairs concerning the safety of our nation and our churches—I add this: The matters on which I would refuse to bear with a brother would have to be very numerous and very important. For I have no desire to lord it over anyone's faith; I seek only to be a servant to believers, helping them grow in knowledge, truth, godliness, peace, and joy in Jesus Christ our Lord.
But if my brethren cannot perceive how they can possibly tolerate me, or allow me a place among them, in reference to myself I indulge in no hope that a schism will on this account be formed. May God avert any such catastrophe, since far too many schisms have already arisen and spread themselves abroad among Christians. It ought rather to be the earnest endeavor of every one, to diminish their number and destroy their influence. Yet, even under such circumstances, [when I shall be rejected from the communion of my brethren,] in patience willlpossess my soul; and though in that case I shall resign my office, yet I will continue to live for the benefit of our common Christianity as long as it may please God to lengthen out my days and prolong my existence. Never forgetting this sentiment, Sat Ecclesæ, sat Patriæ daturm, Enough has been done to satisfy the Church of Christ and my country!
Yet if my brethren conclude they cannot tolerate me or allow me a place among them, I pray that no division will result on my account. May God forbid such a tragedy, for far too many divisions have already torn the Christian church apart! Everyone should strive instead to heal divisions and reduce their influence. Even if I am cast out of my brethren's fellowship, I will possess my soul in patience. And though in that case I would resign my academic office, I will continue to devote my life to the benefit of our shared Christian faith as long as God grants me breath, holding fast to this consoling conviction: *Sat Ecclesiae, sat Patriae datum*—"Enough has been done for the church; enough has been done for my country!"
Small Group & Personal Study Guide
- What biblical and theological reasons does Arminius give for rejecting the three accounts of predestination he describes, especially regarding God’s character, Christ’s saving work, and the gospel?
- Outline the four decrees in Arminius’s own account of predestination. How does placing Christ first shape this account, and how does Arminius distinguish his stated convictions from questions he leaves for further examination?
- How does Arminius hold together humanity's total inability to do any saving good apart from grace ('Without me you can do nothing') with genuine human responsibility in receiving or resisting the Holy Spirit?
- Why does Arminius insist on drawing a sharp distinction between the infallible Word of God and human confessions of faith, and how does his closing appeal model Christian charity in theological disagreement?
Sovereign and Merciful Father, we praise You for Your infinite wisdom, justice, and love, revealed supremely in Your Son, Jesus Christ, whom You appointed as the Savior of the world. We confess that apart from Your grace we can do nothing good; we thank You for the prevenient, accompanying, and sustaining work of Your Holy Spirit. Anchor our faith in Your infallible Word, fill us with humble charity toward all who call upon Your name, and keep us abiding in Christ unto eternal life. Through Jesus Christ our Lord, Amen.